



**НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ БІОРЕСУРСІВ І
ПРИРОДОКОРИСТУВАННЯ УКРАЇНИ**

С. Б. Христюк

МЕТОДИЧНІ РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЇ

з дисципліни «Іноземна мова (англійська)»

**для студентів ОС «Бакалавр» спеціальності СЗ «Міжнародні відносини»
освітньої програми «Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та
регіональні студії»**



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Кафедра філософії та міжнародної комунікації

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**Методичні рекомендації
з дисципліни «Іноземна мова (англійська)»
для студентів ОС «Бакалавр»
спеціальності СЗ «Міжнародні відносини»
освітньої програми «Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та
регіональні студії»**

Методичні рекомендації призначені для покращення навиків двостороннього перекладу, розуміння текстів соціально-політичного спрямування, монологічного та діалогічного мовлення на запропоновані теми студентів спеціальності СЗ «Міжнародні відносини», освітньої програми «Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії» 1, 2 років навчання.

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PREFACE

English communication skills are important in both social and political areas. Lack of communication skills creates various problems leaving a bad impression on superiors and colleagues. From the above standpoint, curricular recommendations for the international instruments two-way translation have a significant educational and methodological value and grant you an excellent chance to review and practice vocabulary, develop the key diplomatic and political terminology, improve your communication skills in both spoken and written contexts and consider social and political fundamentals in a new way.

Curricular recommendations offer a range of materials that include components specifically designed to meet the needs of students who need to either learn their specialty through English, or take an exam in English in order to start their career. The materials can be used individually or in a variety of combinations.

These curricular recommendations are intended for students majoring in “International Relations, Public Communications and Regional Studies” of Bachelor’s degree for two-way translating and conversational skills development. Professional orientation in vocabulary and the problems presented for discussion and oral comprehensive communication correlate with modern sentence-structure.

The curricular recommendations’ structure and content stimulate the creative and initiative development from both – the foreign learner of English and the teacher of English. Structurally the content of each lesson is supplemented and developed by the content of the exercises. Technologically, exercises are targeted to create the perception of meaning through the notional field; the recommendations given to exercises do not limit the teacher’s initiatives in methods while working with material.

We hope the learners of English will find these recommendations beneficial and truly up-to-date. Everybody studying it will become more fluent and confident in language practices and increase career prospects.

LESSON 1. UK-UKRAINE 100 YEAR PARTNERSHIP DECLARATION



EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

Pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 3, of the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement signed on 16 January 2025 between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine, both sides have reached the following understandings:

PILLAR 1 – DEFENCE

1. Establish stronger and closer defence cooperation and industrial bases.

We will cooperate in the exchange of practical experience, equipment, munitions, training and development support in all domains, while ensuring adaptation to rapidly changing needs and technological progress. We will pursue rapid, innovative, and sustainable production at scale, including joint production, in particular developing advanced weapons and ammunition manufacturing capabilities. We will carry out joint defence capability projects and encourage the establishment of joint defence enterprises, fostering commercial partnerships and trade. We will also deepen cooperation on long-range strike capabilities, integrated air and missile defence and

complex weapons stockpiles to underpin deterrence. We will create a strong and dynamic ecosystem of defence innovation with innovative multi-year financing opportunities involving public and private investment. This will strengthen our defence capabilities and ensure joint arms exports to foreign markets. Both nations intend to explore joint initiatives aimed at creating more resilient and effective supply chains, including efforts to enhance manufacturing capabilities in Ukraine to facilitate better integration within the European defence industrial landscape. We will jointly strengthen Ukraine's defence procurement processes and structures through support with capacity building, alignment with NATO requirements, and ability to procure from and export to global markets. We will support scientific cooperation between defence industries and scientific/technological institutions to foster technology transfer, defence R&D and shorten innovation cycles, including through the establishment of a Joint Innovation Taskforce.

2. Cooperate in the creation of flexible rapid response mechanisms, including the creation, maintenance and joint use of military formations and other specialized structures to provide a wide range of mutual defence and security services. These mechanisms will make it possible to respond to challenges that may arise on territory of each other, and, if necessary, on territories of allied and other states.

3. The UK will expand its contribution to the modern fighter jet coalition, including intensifying language training, assisting coalition partners to increase F16s for Ukraine, and exploring supplying Ukraine with other fighter jets used by NATO.

4. The UK will provide Ukraine with annual military assistance of no less than £3 billion a year until 2030/31 and for as long as needed to support Ukraine.

5. The UK will work with Ukraine to identify common military requirements, collaborate on capabilities to broaden the spectrum of capabilities and technologies we can produce together. The Participants will explore options for deploying and maintaining defence infrastructure in Ukraine, including military bases, logistics depots, reserve military equipment storage facilities and war reserve

stockpiles. These facilities could be utilized to bolster their own defence capabilities in the event of a significant military threat.

PILLAR 2 – SECURITY

1. Promote a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine, based on full respect for principles of the UN Charter and international law. The UK welcomes Ukraine’s Peace Formula, supports its principles, and is ready to take an active part in the implementation of its points. The UK will play a leading role in taking forward steps to promote the Peace Formula and advance efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, including on issues such as preventing escalation and repetition of aggression.

2. Support the modernization of Ukraine’s national security architecture. The UK will support Ukraine’s desire to establish an effective, accountable, and transparent national security architecture, and to become increasingly aligned with Euro-Atlantic best practice. The UK will share expertise and best practice, including through partnerships with government ministries, Capability Coalitions, and independent colleges and think tanks. The UK will support Ukrainian defence and security leadership through education and mentoring. We will establish a permanent security dialogue in the “quadriga” format, with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of both countries.

3. Throughout the duration of the Declaration, neither Participant will be left alone in the face of an attack or aggression. If one side is attacked in violation of the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law, then both sides will consult within 24 hours to determine the measures needed to counter or deter aggression. Each side, acting in accordance with its legal requirements will provide each other swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment as necessary, and economic assistance.

4. Enhance our cyber capabilities. We will work together to better detect, deter, and disrupt cyber-attacks and espionage, develop greater cyber resilience, and develop new technological solutions. We will exchange expertise on capacity building,

technical advancements, as well as joint training and exercises. We will drive forward industry and private-public partnerships to provide essential hardware, software, and incident response support, crucial for our cybersecurity endeavours.

5. Enhance cooperation to combat Serious and Organised Crime. We will work together to address malign influence of third parties, including transnational threats, which pose direct risk to our security and stability. We will do this by sharing intelligence, data and information, and collaborating on analysis and exchange through dialogue and training exchanges including applying a serious and organised crime-sensitive approach. This includes conducting joint operations and working together through multilateral forums and tools, to support modernisation and reform at all levels. We will work together to address corruption, fraud, financial and economic crime, the malign influence of elites linked to the Russian state, combatting smuggling, countering significant threat from trade and movement of illicit tobacco, firearms, and other emerging serious organised crime threats, including the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings by network of smugglers and traffickers, and the protection of victims of such trafficking. We will also work together to identify assets that may be seized in criminal proceedings. We will exchange experience between technical agencies to implement recommendations into legislation at all relevant levels. We will strengthen controls related to Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring and implement appropriate measures to protect international systems from risks emanating from such countries.

6. Deepen our collaboration on protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). We will conduct education and training exchanges, and support Ukraine's fundraising. Ukraine will share its expertise and experience in CNI resilience.

7. Launch an assessment exchange. We will carry out a regular assessment exchange regarding threats and opportunities that relate to both of our nations.

8. Ukraine's NATO membership is the best guarantee of Ukraine's security. The UK is committed to Ukraine's irreversible path to membership. The UK will

continue working with Allies and Ukraine through NATO Ukraine Council to support Ukraine's reform efforts, and advance Ukraine's membership aspirations.

9. Development of the security and defence forces of Ukraine. The UK will support the modernisation of Ukraine's security and defence forces and increased interoperability with NATO standards and doctrine, utilising NATO and other regional security mechanisms such as the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) and the Northern Group, where appropriate.

PILLAR 3 – MARITIME

1. Build a partnership in maritime security. We will focus on speedy restoration of Ukraine's control over all temporarily occupied territories and strengthen its potential as a powerful maritime and riverine state through implementation of the Maritime Security Strategy of Ukraine.

2. The UK and Ukraine will work together to ensure safety of navigation and protection of trade in the Black and Azov seas and beyond. The Ukrainian Navy and the Royal Navy will take further steps to strengthen their partnership and deepen operational cooperation, including operating in joint task groupings (or 'flotillas') where appropriate. Such joint naval activity will help ensure security in waters of strategic importance to both countries. The Ukrainian Navy and the Royal Navy will play a core role in regional security alongside NATO allies to combat threats to safe navigation, including from drifting mines; and strengthen adherence to the international laws of the sea. The UK will support Ukraine to strengthen protection of its critical maritime infrastructure. All the above will help Ukraine deter and repel threats, and restore economic activity.

3. Through the Maritime Capability Coalition, which the UK leads jointly with Norway, we will build on the Ukrainian obtaining of former Royal Navy Mine Countermeasures Vessels, cooperating on long-term maritime capability and doctrine development, to help Ukraine build a balanced maritime force, able to work alongside the UK and NATO allies to protect and preserve overall maritime security in the Black and Azov Seas and beyond.

4. We will maximise the benefits of maritime training initiatives, in concert with Maritime Capability Coalition partners, both for the security and defence forces of Ukraine and for the UK, enabling joint training and to further develop the relationship between our two navies. This could include joint activities, exercises and port visits. Additionally, the UK and Ukraine will offer joint training opportunities for UK and Ukrainian personnel at national military educational institutions.

5. Facilitate the earliest possible achievement of Ukrainian interoperability with NATO in the maritime sphere. We will work together to ensure NATO learns the lessons from Ukraine's experience in the Black Sea to inform its development of future maritime capabilities. We will promote development of naval bases on the territory of Ukraine.

6. Develop our partnership in humanitarian mine action. The UK will continue to fund humanitarian mine action; help to develop innovative finance mechanisms that deliver additional funding and stronger outcomes; share analysis and expertise; support development of Ukrainian operational and productive mine action capacity; encourage recruitment of women and veterans into the sector; and encourage technological innovation and promote stronger international partnership working. The UK will work with Ukraine on maritime demining operations through the Maritime Counter-Mining Taskforce. The UK encourages Ukraine to continue with the transparent, inclusive approach they have adopted during development of the national mine action strategy, and with the establishment of the sectoral working group.

PILLAR 4 – ECONOMY & TRADE

1. Continue to implement, and modernise the Political Cooperation, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement, which will further enhance our economic security, strengthen our competitive advantages in foreign markets, improve conditions for national business and increase welfare of citizens.

2. Broaden mutual market access. We will design and implement a programme of work aimed at raising awareness and utilisation of the UK-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, accelerate and broaden the scope of elimination of customs duties on trade,

and improve ease of doing business. We will do this through insurance mechanisms, removing trade barriers, de-regulation, rolling guidance, targeted reforms and concerted private sector engagement. We will work together to boost and modernise Ukraine's economy by progressing reforms that aim to attract private finance, boost investor confidence, tackle corruption, strengthen commercial dispute resolution mechanisms and improve governance of state-owned enterprises.

3. Forge closer business-to-business trading to strengthen our private sectors. We will foster closer business-to-business relationships and partnerships, including through trade missions, to support private sector growth in both our nations. We will explore collaboration on advanced manufacturing and strengthening supply chain resilience.

4. Support Ukraine in developing a world-class financial centre and business environment through sustained UK business access. We will fully harness the creativity and expertise of the City of London through the City-Ukraine Hub, supporting Ukraine's economic reforms and modernising Ukraine's financial ecosystem to build investor confidence. This will support access to capital markets, support the development of Ukraine's stock market, and further align our governance, reporting and legal standards. This may include the use of English & Welsh common law to simplify financial contracts, notwithstanding local legal frameworks. Future capital market development will support emergent public financial self-sufficiency. We will support strengthening Ukraine's financial, banking, insurance and related professional sectors. We will promote attracting investments to both of our nations by providing mutual access to the financial and service markets. The UK stands ready to support developments in Ukraine towards a trustworthy, centralised, digital, and accessible companies register, including reliable beneficial ownership information.

5. Support Ukraine's public procurement regime. We will exchange expertise and promote best practice, which aims to ensure integrity by promoting 6 transparency, accountability and sound financial management, including on procurement principles, procedures, and criteria. This will help Ukraine in its

endeavour to achieve sustainable value for money, deliver high-quality contracts, and complement reforms Ukraine is carrying out to strengthen prioritisation, management and oversight of its public finances and investments, including recovery and reconstruction projects.

6. Help strengthen Ukraine’s macro-economic and financial resilience; through identifying ways the UK can help Ukraine’s private sector grow. The UK will align vocational training and job opportunities for Ukrainians in the UK in fields supportive green economic growth in Ukraine. We will support the development of Ukraine’s human capital, strengthening inclusive labour markets and the economic empowerment of women, people with disabilities and marginalised groups. Ukraine will continue to lead its humanitarian response, recognising that well-coordinated humanitarian aid is an essential enabler to inclusive and sustainable recovery and reconstruction. The UK will continue to play an active role through its support in seeking durable solutions for temporarily displaced persons from Ukraine. We will support Ukraine in the expansion of a fiscally sustainable social safety net, enabling the gradual transition from humanitarian assistance towards more inclusive, scalable, efficient and effective Ukrainian-led systems and services for the most vulnerable.

7. Make full use of the UK-Ukraine TechBridge to facilitate mutual commercial interests and support innovation and the development of world-leading technologies. We will fully utilise the Digital Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine.

8. Support priority projects through UK Export Finance. The UK will consider applications to support Ukraine’s priority defence and infrastructure projects through support provided by UK Export Finance. This includes support for UK defence contracts, the reconstruction of bridges in Kyiv and Urenco’s contract to supply fuel to Energoatom. The UK will, subject to periodic review, consider providing payment protection insurance to UK exporters trading with Ukraine. The UK will encourage the international community to leverage the global power of export credit and foreign direct investment support for Ukraine. The UK will look to encourage an appropriate

information exchange with other Export Credit Agencies and sharing best practice, to ensure we all benefit from each other's experience, resources, and expertise.

9. Increase cooperation on agriculture and food security with the use of advanced agritechology and machine learning capabilities. We will codevelop a scientific database (the 'Grain Verification Scheme') to help identify and call-out grain theft from Ukraine by Russia. The UK will utilise businesses and expertise from its farming and agri-food sector to support Ukraine's agricultural transformation. The UK will help deliver food production and environmental protection in Ukraine.

10. Increase our infrastructure delivery cooperation to deliver modern, green infrastructure. The UK will share expertise and training; conduct feasibility studies, provide capacity-building support, export services, materials, and equipment – ensuring these efforts align with climate and net zero obligations. This will harness skills and services from the private sector and the views of civil society. We will facilitate dialogue with and participation of the private sector and civil society, sustainable approaches to planning and the attraction of expert assistance in preparing and implementing infrastructure projects to modernise and build greener.

11. Increase our collaboration on transport. We will bring together expertise across state and private sectors to collaborate on building a greener, smarter Ukrainian transport network, which ensures Ukraine, is well connected to its European neighbours. The UK will advise national and local government on transport planning; and support Ukraine to develop national and local strategies. Ukraine will share its expertise and experience on transport resilience. The UK will help set Ukraine on a pathway to reopen and modernise its airspace, including providing assistance for Ukraine's Air Traffic Management system. We will promote connectivity between our nations, including by negotiating a new Air Services Agreement allowing for an increase in flights between our nations.

PILLAR 5 – ENERGY, CLIMATE AND CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION

1. Develop and deepen our mutual energy partnership based on principles of sustainability and climate neutrality, on a mutually beneficial basis. We will

promote attracting long-term investments, including from the UK, in Ukraine's clean and renewable energy. Through Ukraine adopting key reforms, we will support a more enabling environment for private sector participation in the clean energy transition, utilising new innovations including AI, supporting access to global climate funds for innovation away from hydrocarbon, and building back better.

2. Combine competitive advantages to achieve synergy in the context of allied relations in the energy sector. We will strive to maximise our energy security, including by diversifying energy sources, using modern technologies, and minimising dependence on Russia. We will cooperate in the protection of civilian energy infrastructure and will counteract cyber and hybrid attacks.

3. Deepening cooperation in the energy sector will include: (i) exploring projects on renewable energy sources and seeking to attract investments of British companies in the development of renewable energy sources; (ii) collaborating in projects on renewable and low carbon hydrogen production, storage and transport and other renewable gases; (iii) supporting projects to close mines and supporting a just transition of Ukrainian coal regions; (iv) 8 supporting development of a Ukrainian critical minerals strategy and necessary regulatory structures required to support the maximisation of benefits from Ukraine's natural resources, through the possible establishment of a Joint Working Group; (v) cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel supply; (vi) supporting the safety of nuclear facilities, adoption of best practice, and replacement of Russian technologies and nuclear fuel in Europe and other countries; (vii) begin negotiations for an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Energy.

4. Deepening cooperation in the green steel production will include: (i) promoting the development of green steel production by encouraging cooperation on decarbonizing the steel industry, including through facilitating knowledge sharing between British and Ukrainian companies; (ii) encouraging joint efforts in transitioning to low-emission industrial processes in the steel sector in line with global and regional climate goals.

5. Develop a safe and secure place for UK industry to invest in Ukraine's energy sector, including an updated and transparent, EU-compliant regulatory environment ready to receive innovations, and a solid platform for growth opportunities for the private sector. Ukraine will commit to implementing the National Energy and Climate Plan anchored through the Green Transition Office and for Ukraine to update its National Determined Contributions to align with the NECP and deliver Net Zero.

PILLAR 6 – JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY

1. Deepen collaboration in the justice and accountability sphere. In line with the relevant rules of international law, we will work together to ensure that Russia, as well as those responsible for the crime of aggression and atrocities committed in Ukraine, are held accountable. We will support actions by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court aimed at restoring justice. We will also support work towards establishing a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. We will strengthen cooperation within international organisations and conventions, including providing mutual support for positions or forming joint positions on International Criminal Court issues, including at the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. We will exchange experiences on the practical application of international humanitarian law and human rights by the armed forces during military operations. We will continue to work towards establishing an international compensation mechanism to provide compensation for damage, loss, or injury. The UK will continue to work with Ukraine and other allies to pursue all lawful ways to ensure Russia is made to meet its obligation to pay for the damage it has caused Ukraine.

2. Deepen collaboration between our justice ministries, prosecutors' offices, private justice and legal service sectors and law enforcement agencies. We will advance reforms, including in modern, efficient, and inclusive Ukrainian judiciary with high integrity, that strengthen democratic, accountable, and effective institutions to benefit the citizens of Ukraine. We will foster collaboration between our respective

legal sectors. The UK will share expertise on regulating the legal profession and access to it. Recognising the value to commerce and trade of the laws of the UK, and in support of Ukraine's ambition to become a global hub for commerce, the UK will promote its legal professional qualification routes to the Ukrainian sector. We will deepen cooperation in the field of national justice. We will collaborate in developing sustainable modern justice systems through the sharing of best practice on the digital transformation of the legal and judicial sphere, including the implementation of online platforms. We will cooperate on improving mechanisms for the functioning of the penal system in criminal justice and the improvement of the procedure of enforcement and ensuring respect of court decisions.

3. Deepen cooperation in the criminal sphere to bring offenders to justice and support vulnerable groups within our justice systems, such as children and victims. We will also enhance criminal justice cooperation by sharing best practice on the effective management of prisons and probation and supporting innovation within our criminal justice systems, such as exploring options for noncustodial sentences. We will explore possibilities for digital transmission of requests for mutual legal assistance and the further expansion of the use of digital exchange of evidence.

4. Deepen cooperation in civil justice. We will exchange expertise on implementing private international law conventions. The Participants will share best practice to enhance the viability of arbitration and mediation as mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution in Ukraine, including through improving the procedures for recognising arbitral awards and developing mediation expertise and capacity. The UK and Ukraine will also share expertise on innovation in dispute resolution related to investment protection.

5. Enhance sanctions cooperation. We recognise the importance of sanctions in the context of limiting Russia's access to finance, goods, technology and services that it uses in its aggression and ongoing violations of international law, including the UN charter and other international obligations, to reduce Russia's revenues and deter future attacks. The UK commits to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from

energy and other commodities and take decisive action to combat sanctions circumvention. The UK commits to maintaining pressure until Ukraine prevails, Russia stops its violations of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, peace is secured, and Russia compensates Ukraine and victims for the damage it has caused. The UK will continue to work with its allies to pursue all lawful ways to use sanctioned Russian assets to support Ukraine and ensure Russia is made to meet its obligation to pay for the damage it has caused, in line with international law. We will also continue to work closely with our international partners to apply further economic pressure to Russia, recognising differences in our legislative frameworks.

PILLAR 7 – COUNTERING FOREIGN INFORMATION MANIPULATION AND INTERFERENCE (FIMI)

1. Establish deeper institutional links on strategic communication and combating foreign information manipulation, propaganda, and interference, recognising that foreign information manipulation is a global threat which undermines democratic values, peace and security, human rights, governmental processes, and political stability.

2. Building resilience to information manipulation and interference threats is central to the security of our democracies. We are committed to countering these threats, jointly promoting our shared democratic values and building coordinated responses over the coming years. We will do this through activity on strategic communications, analysis, information threat mitigation, defence of democratic institutions and processes, international partnerships and supporting independent media.

3. Support Ukraine's strategic communication institutions into leading centres of expertise over malicious foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) domestically and internationally in analysis, research, information exchange, training, education and capability building. We will hold regular analytical exchanges on FIMI issues, on research findings and jointly participate in analytical conferences.

Analytical exchanges will discuss research of FIMI networks, share analytic production and work towards building respective capabilities.

4. Implement joint media initiatives, contributing to coordinated efforts to promote shared values and vision, addressing the information manipulation and malign interference in third party countries. We commit to partnering on joint initiatives such as communication campaigns to mitigate against those threats. We commit to facilitate strengthening of relationships with civil society organisations to support research and the development of counter-FIMI approaches, recognising the importance of independent media and civil society organisations in building societal resilience.

5. Enable effective disruptive actions to respond to FIMI, including through information sharing, including on individuals and organisations that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. We will seek to coordinate counteraction on disruptive measures.

6. Establish a regular dialogue. We will hold a regular dialogue to facilitate collaboration and coordination on FIMI. This engagement may cover relevant topics including threat analysis, counter-FIMI measures, public events and forums.

PILLAR 8 – SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

1. Launch an emerging technology and research partnership. We will seek opportunities to collaborate in science, technology and innovation, for mutual advancement, and to address shared challenges and threats. We will progress Ukrainian and UK capabilities in the development and use of emerging innovative and critical technologies, including digital infrastructure and communications, space, AI and drones – capitalising on Ukraine’s battlefield-expertise and innovation of AI-enhanced drone capabilities in support of the development of civilian applications. We will uphold our shared commitment to safe and responsible AI development, governance and regulation. We will use solutions for simplified and efficient interaction between business and government, especially with the use of artificial intelligence. We will take joint measures in the field of modern solutions in the field of e-Governance and ensuring the possibility of providing up to 100% of public services online to improve

their ease of access, efficiency and transparency (in particular through the use of modern Ukrainian digital solutions such as the Diia platform, Armiia+, eMalyatko, digital passport, etc.).

2. Launch a comprehensive space partnership. We will establish broad cooperation between UK and Ukraine space industries and academic communities. We will explore the creation of collaborative scientific and commercial research and development programmes. We will leverage the potential of space technologies to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and develop new economic opportunities. We will develop longer-term options that will enhance our mutual defence and security space cooperation – including through industrial support and exploring elements of support in satellite imagery and space intelligence. We will set out the mechanisms and initial areas of focus of this cooperation through a Memorandum of Understanding.

3. Strengthen UK-Ukraine collaboration in research and innovation. We will enhance collaboration, including by delivering mutually beneficial joint programmes, between our key commercial bodies, higher education and other research institutions. We will endeavour to collaborate specifically on Women in STEM, and in programmes to support a more diverse future STEM workforce. We will leverage the UK and Ukraine's association to Horizon Europe, to strengthen our research and innovation partnership. We will work together to share good practice and bring together innovators and industry to further digitise government services, improve digital infrastructure, and promote e-governance for increased efficiency, transparency, and citizen engagement. The UK will support Ukraine to establish its innovation strategy and will explore ways in which it could facilitate its implementation.

4. Strengthen our health systems together. We will share expertise on hospital building, training and access to healthcare through a variety of methods, such as horizontal medical partnerships. We will facilitate private partnerships, and create exchanges between practitioners. We will share best practice on mental health, including treatment for anyone affected by trauma, and seek to reduce stigma around

mental health and psychological conditions. We will expand access to innovative medicines with the UK utilising Ukraine's rapid med-tech innovations and progress from the war. We will support inclusive healthcare reforms, for accessible quality care across the life-course, support development of community and family-based services, disability-inclusive healthcare and rehabilitation, comprehensive services for survivors of gender-based violence, and boost preparedness for health pandemics.

PILLAR 9 – SOCIAL, CULTURE & SPORT

1. Develop our Social Recovery and Inclusion Partnership. The UK will continue to support an inclusive and sustainable recovery for all Ukrainians in all their diversity. The UK will support Ukraine's ambitious social reform agenda, building capacity and capabilities, and encouraging the development of evidence and rights-based policies and practice. The UK will support Ukraine to build its demographic resilience, helping to anticipate, plan for, and respond to profound demographic shifts. We will crowd in others to catalyse change, leading participatory coordination mechanisms that improve cross-sectoral engagement collaboration on these important issues.

2. **Cooperate on the mobility of our citizens and remove barriers.** The Participants will do the utmost to encourage people-to-people contacts as an important condition for the development of economic, humanitarian, cultural, scientific and other ties. The Participants will establish a regular Migration and Mobility Dialogue between the UK Home Office and the Interior and Foreign Ministries of Ukraine for the exchange of information on combating irregular migration and people smuggling, and the Participants' respective requirements and conditions relating to work, study and visit visas, removing barriers where appropriate. Where the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place, the Participants will take gradual steps, making it easier for citizens to travel and visit each other's countries.

3. **Champion open, inclusive and fairer societies for all.** Together, we will champion equal rights for all, advancing equality, challenging discrimination and leaving no one behind. We will encourage the development of a vibrant civil society and support their full, active, and meaningful participation, representation and

leadership across their work. We will support initiatives that amplify the rights, choice, voice and visibility of diverse and representative groups including Women's Rights Organisations and Organisations for Persons with Disabilities. We will champion gender equality and continue to strengthen the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV) including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). The UK will launch new initiatives in support of Ukraine's 'Better Care' agenda, strengthening families, communities, and the care system to progressively end institutionalisation, develop alternative family and community-based services, and work to ensure every child has a safe and loving family environment.

4. Develop a long-term culture and sports partnership. The UK will take active steps to ensure preservation of the Ukrainian identity of Ukrainians residing in the UK. We will encourage twinning across museums, galleries, theatres, opera houses, music venues, teams and associations – to exchange works, best practices, perform and compete together, and co-produce. We will support greater engagement between our TV and film sectors to exchange experience and expertise. We will aspire to carry out a series of cultural exchanges to showcase their talent and creative institutions. We will deepen the relationship between the British Council and the Ukrainian Institute and will promote the activities of the Ukrainian Institute in the UK. We will deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. We will establish a Ukrainian-British Cultural Commission, chaired jointly by Ministers for both countries to convene expert discussions, and decide bilateral priorities and projects, and discuss joint funding where appropriate. We will encourage collaboration between our national sports bodies, particularly in the run up to international flagship events. We will strive to regularly celebrate Ukrainian culture in the UK, and UK culture in Ukraine at appropriate intervals, through cooperation between British Council and Ukrainian Institute.

5. Support deeper and more nationwide links between local and regional governments, including businesses, industry, and groups around them. We will build on the extensive twinning already established, encouraging greater trade,

friendships, tourism, exchange of workers, expertise and best practice. We will also support the alignment between our two countries of sectors that are geographically concentrated. We will build on lessons from the Homes for Ukraine and STEP Ukraine schemes, where communities built strong bonds, fostering inclusion and improving skills and resilience.

6. Offer leadership coaching for future leaders. The UK will offer coaching to support Ukraine Government officials with the development of leadership capabilities. We will work together to develop a leadership coaching culture in Ukraine.

7. Establish a veterans cooperation programme. We will carry out a series of expert policy exchanges, sharing best practice and learning in key areas of veteran policy. We will develop cooperation between military service and veteran charities and wider civil society organisations in specialist areas, which will provide a framework for enduring, gender and inclusive sensitive cooperation between Ukraine and UK organisations. Within the framework of the Invictus Games 2027, and in the run up to and beyond the Games, the UK will assist Ukraine with the development of their adaptive sports programme, sharing the rehabilitation benefits of sport and adventure for those with adaptive needs, and their families, caused by service. The UK will help Ukrainian access research on the evidence base for use of sport in rehabilitation.

8. Support cultural heritage protection and restoration. The UK will facilitate training and educational exchanges for cultural professionals for the protection, preservation and restoration of Ukrainian cultural heritage endangered by Russian aggression. We also commit to work together to protect Ukrainian cultural heritage, prevent the illicit trafficking and looting of its cultural values, and counteract cultural erasure.

9. Enter into a youth compact. We will grow our partnerships between our youth groups. We will twin 100 schools to build partnerships among pupils and teachers. The UK, through the Premier League and British Council, will help young people in Ukraine to develop the skills, education and confidence needed to be a

positive influence in their communities. The UK will increase opportunities to young Ukrainians residing in the UK, through encouraging participation in youth-focused programmes. The UK will support Ukraine's education recovery and reform ambitions through policy exchanges, technical assistance, leadership training, education partnerships, and sharing best practice including on funding systems. The UK will support British Universities to extend their educational offer in Ukraine building on our two countries excellent partnership links, including Higher Education twinning initiatives and Transnational Education pilots to encourage further education development and professional exchange. The UK will expand access to Chevening in Ukraine and strengthen our alumni programmes, supporting Ukraine's future leaders. We will promote intercultural dialogue and the acquisition of knowledge and skills. More exchanges, alumni programmes, leadership development, distance learning, joint competitions, school trips and exchanges, summer camps, and bilingual English Ukrainian schools will be encouraged.

10. Transform English language learning in Ukraine. The Law of Ukraine on the Use of the English Language in Ukraine will serve as a stepping stone for the UK to teach English to Ukrainian civil servants and support the professional development of English teachers.

11. Advance human security, the protection of civilians, and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The UK will support Ukraine in advancement of human security, protection of civilians, international humanitarian law, and women, peace and security commitments – within institutional, strategic and operational systems, structures and processes, and across civilian, security and defence sectors. We recognise the critical role of empowered and engaged women across all areas of peace and security, including conflict prevention and resolution, humanitarian and crisis response, early- and post-conflict recovery, security and justice, and transnational threats. We will tackle the barriers, challenges and harmful norms that may impede women in all their diversity and prevent transformative and sustainable outcomes for Ukraine. We will enable the meaningful participation of women in shaping a

comprehensive and inclusive security framework, and ensuring civilian dynamics are factored into operational planning. We will strengthen WPS regional coalitions and enhance sectoral implementation of WPS policies, support and champion women's rights organisations (WROs) and representative groups, and improve national monitoring and coordination mechanisms.

FINAL PROVISIONS

1. The provisions of this Declaration will continue in effect for 100 years from the date of signature.

2. Provisions may be amended at any time by joint decision of the Participants.

3. Any dispute about the interpretation of the Declaration will be resolved by consultations between the Participants, and will not be referred to any national or international tribunal, court or third party for settlement.

4. This Declaration may be terminated by either Participant by sending a written notice to the other Participant. The Declaration will be terminated six months from the date of receipt of such notice.

Signed in duplicate in Kyiv, Ukraine, on 16 January 2025 in the English and Ukrainian languages, the English version of which is valid in the event of any discrepancy.

For Ukraine: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Sir Keir Starmer,
Prime Minister

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

ІСТОРІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН (XVII-XVIII ст.)

Найраніші відомості про українсько-британські зв'язки відносяться до періоду Київської Русі. У 1017 р., після завоювання Англії датським королем Кнудом, у Києві знайшли притулок Едвард й Едмунд, сини англійського короля Едмунда II. Близько 1074 р. майбутній великий князь київський Володимир Мономах одружився з Гітою, дочкою англійського короля Гарольда II. До Києва їх, очевидно, супроводжували інші англійці, але кількість і доля цих осіб невідомі. Монгольське вторгнення у Східну Європу в середині 13 ст. перервало розвиток міждержавних відносин і до 17 ст. українсько-британські контакти мали загалом спорадичний характер. Починаючи з 15 ст., здійснювався експорт збіжжя й лісу з України до Британії через Балтійське море.

Ситуація змінюється на початку 17 ст. коли англійська дипломатія вперше активно поцікавилася Україною. У 1620-х рр., коли Європа була поділена на католицький і протестантський табори, Англія розглядала можливість використання у своїх інтересах українських (православних) козаків проти католицької Польщі. У зв'язку з цим, про козаків інформував свій уряд тодішній англійський посол у Константинополі Томас Роу. Далше зацікавлення Україною серед британців викликала національно-визвольна війна українського народу 1648-1657 рр. під проводом Богдана Хмельницького, яку тодішня революційна Англія, на чолі з Олівером Кромвелем, сприймала, як боротьбу проти спільного противника – католицизму. Кромвель стежив за подіями в Україні і намагався встановити зв'язки з Хмельницьким.

У 1708-09 рр. британський посланник у Москві Чарлз Лорд Вітворт інформував Лондон про події в Україні, пов'язані з укладенням протиросійського союзу між гетьманом Іваном Мазепою і шведським королем Карлом XII. З наступником Мазепи – гетьманом (в еміграції) Пилипом Орликом і його середовищем «мазепинців» підтримував зв'язки британський представник у Бендерах (Молдова) капітан Джеймз Джеффри. Після смерті Карла XII в 1718

р. Велика Британія, яку почав тривожити зріст потужності Росії, через свого посла в Швеції Лорда Картерета продовжувала підтримувати зв'язки з Орликом, який в той час там перебував. Будучи інтернованим в Салоніках на території Османської імперії з 1722 р. до 1734 р. Орлик користувався підтримкою місцевих британських посланців.

Зацікавлення Україною в 17 і 18 ст. поширилося й на ширші кола британського суспільства. Про Україну та її населення писали дипломати, вчені, мандрівники: Річард Ноуллз, Пітер Гейлін, Пол Рікоу, Едвард Браун, Джон Белл, Джозеф Маршалл, Вільям Кокс та інші. Про події в Україні інформували англійські газети «Mercurius Politicus», «London Gazette», «Moderate Intelligencer» та інші.

З Україною пов'язана діяльність британців, які перебували в Російській імперії на службі або з інших причин. У 1679-85 рр. генерал російської армії Патрик Гордон перебував в Україні і певний час був командувачем російського полку в Києві. В 1783 р. Томас Макензі став засновником Севастополя після приєднання Криму до Російської імперії. У 1789-90 рр. відомий англійський ініціатор пенітенціарної реформи Джон Гауерд перебував у Херсоні, де спалахнула епідемія висипного тифу, і де він сам захворів і помер. У 1780-х і 1790-х рр. фахівець паркової культури Вільям Гулд створив ландшафтні парки у різних містах України. У 1795 р. Чарлз Гаскойн розпочав проектування і будівництво металургійного заводу, довкола якого постало м. Луганськ.

LESSON 2. UK-UKRAINE AGREEMENT ON SECURITY CO-OPERATION

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

AGREEMENT ON SECURITY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN & NORTHERN IRELAND AND UKRAINE

Preamble

The United Kingdom ('the UK') and Ukraine (hereafter 'the Participants'):

- determined to end forever Russia's unprovoked attacks on Ukraine since 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, which have brought great suffering to Ukraine's people and threatened European and worldwide security;
- unwavering in our commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its borders, which have been internationally recognised since 1991, and to ensuring Ukraine's ability to defend itself, to resist future coercion, to choose its own future, and to prosper;
- committed to common values of democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Charter of Paris, including the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and the inviolability of borders, which are essential for European and worldwide security;
- desiring to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine as well as its economic and social recovery; reaffirming our support for reforms to strengthen Ukraine's security and economy, which are aimed at realising its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including towards European Union and NATO membership;
- and recognising that Ukraine's defence, recovery, reform and European and EuroAtlantic ambitions are mutually reinforcing and must go forward together;
- have jointly determined to strengthen our security co-operation by pursuing the measures set out in this Agreement.

Part I. Introduction Scope

1. This Agreement is intended to further the Joint Declaration launched by the UK, Ukraine and other members of the G7 in Vilnius on 12 July 2023 and subsequently joined by a further 24 states. It builds on the Political, Free Trade & Strategic Partnership Agreement of 8 October 2020, which remains the foundation of UK-Ukraine collaboration. The Participants will continue to explore ways to further strengthen their long-term relationship including working towards a hundred-year partnership.

2. With this Agreement, the UK and Ukraine have decided to deepen their cooperation and partnership, which is based on their common interests in the defence of international law and order, peace, and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

3. The UK believes that Ukraine's future membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would make an effective contribution to peace and stability in Europe. The Participants decided on coordinating and strengthening joint efforts to support Ukraine's accession to NATO. The main components of the security commitments provided to Ukraine by the UK in this Agreement are:

- provision of comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, including the territorial sea and free economic (maritime) zone, reconstruction of its national economy, and the protection of its citizens;
- prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, any military escalation and/or a new aggression by the Russian Federation; and
- support for Ukraine's future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including by supporting Ukraine's reform plans and interoperability with NATO.

Part II. Defence and Security Defence and Military Cooperation

1. Since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the UK has been one of the largest suppliers of military aid to Ukraine, has been training the Ukrainian Armed Forces and security forces through Operation Orbital, and was the first European country to provide lethal aid. The UK will continue to support Ukraine for as long as it needs, so that Ukraine can effectively defend itself.

2. The Participants recall the inherent right of states to individual and collective self-defence, and the unlawfulness of all attempts to redraw borders by force. They reaffirm that Ukraine's security is integral to Euro-Atlantic and global security. Ukraine's Armed Forces and security forces are defending not only state sovereignty, independence and their territory but also the UN Charter, our shared values and fundamental principles of international law.

3. The UK is a leading defence and security partner for Ukraine. The aims of UK-Ukraine defence co-operation are to support an independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, capable of deterring and defending against future attacks, as well as to deepen Ukraine's interoperability with NATO, and to accelerate Ukraine's transition to NATO equipment and standards.

4. The Participants will work together, and with other partners of Ukraine, to ensure Ukrainian Armed Forces and security forces are able to fully restore Ukraine's territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, as well as to increase Ukraine's resilience so that it is sufficient to deter and defend against future attacks and coercion. This will include, but is not limited to, working together so that Ukraine's military and non-military security institutions are able to perform effectively to

European and Euro-Atlantic standards and are fully accountable to the Ukrainian people, Parliament and Government.

5. Through this Agreement:

- the Participants will work together on ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future, through the continued provision of security assistance and modern military equipment, across the land, air and sea, space and cyber domains – prioritising air defence, artillery and long-range firepower, armoured vehicles, and other key capabilities as required, such as combat air, and by promoting increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners;

- the UK will provide long-term advice and support for defence governance and policies in order to strengthen Ukraine's Ministry of Defence;

- the UK will, alongside other international partners, help Ukraine to enhance its deterrence to external aggressors by developing modern Armed Forces that are increasingly interoperable with NATO and contribute to the NATO force pool. This includes development of a modern defence sector in Ukraine, and a pathway to a future in NATO through: o support to capabilities and training, as well as the infrastructure needed for Ukraine to exercise domestic control of their own airspace; o support to Ukraine's development of a Navy and the Sea Guard of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine that can execute mine clearance, and conduct maritime ISR, patrols, coastal defence and freedom of navigation, helping Ukraine to rebuild their economy; o support to the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine including (but not limited to): future force design, a move towards NATO concepts and operating procedures, command and staff training, combined exercises, and enhanced compatibility and interoperability with NATO Allies; o support for border protection and defence, its engineering and fortification, surveillance, monitoring of enemy troop movements, postwar reconstruction of border infrastructure, demining, and disposal of explosive ordnance; and o support to medical training and prosthetics.

- the UK will support plans and governance structures for Capability Coalitions, both to deliver the future force, and also to bring more coherence to the provision of capability in the current war. The UK is working with the US to develop the governance framework for the Capability Coalitions. All the Capability Coalitions will improve the interoperability of Ukrainian and NATO forces.

- the UK will make significant contributions to the Capability Coalitions including Maritime Security, Air, Air Defence, Artillery and Armour, as well as providing other weapons systems and ammunition agreed by the Participants.

6. In 2022, the UK provided Ukraine with £2.3bn in military aid. In 2023, the UK provided a further £2.3bn in military aid. In 2024, the UK will provide a further £2.5bn of support.

7. The Participants will seek to ensure that Ukraine's military capabilities are at such a level that, in the event of external military aggression against the United

Kingdom, Ukraine is able to provide effective military assistance. The terms, format and scope of such assistance will be determined by the Participants.

8. The UK will continue its support to Ukraine for the ten-year duration of this Agreement. Maritime Security 1. The UK will jointly lead the Maritime Security Capability Coalition and will make significant contribution to Ukraine's maritime fleet development. The Maritime Capability Coalition aims to support Ukraine to become a net contributor to maritime security across the Black Sea and Azov Sea out to 2035 and beyond. This will help Ukraine deter and repel threats, restore economic activity and move Ukraine towards interoperability with NATO in the maritime sphere.

Defence Industry Cooperation

1. The UK will work with its defence industry and Ukraine to contribute to the development of Ukraine's defence industrial base, and identify opportunities for closer defence industrial partnerships and collaboration including for mutual commercial benefit and co-ordination. The UK will work with Ukraine to identify the most impactful investment areas, strengthen efforts to reduce existing barriers for cooperation, encourage and support its defence industry to invest, including by supporting the localisation of production in Ukraine as well as exploring opportunities for joint production.

2. The UK will work with Ukraine to mitigate existing supply chain bottlenecks impeding the development of capacity and capability of both the UK and Ukraine for manufacturing of priority weapons and ammunition.

3. The UK will encourage its defence industry to work with Ukraine to support localising repair and maintenance and manufacturing of UK defence products in Ukraine. The UK will work with Ukraine to strengthen protection of the transferred technologies and intellectual property rights. At the same time, Ukraine guarantees the protection of these technologies and intellectual property.

4. The UK and Ukraine will promote information exchange on their respective defence related research and development efforts, in order to implement joint projects and programmes to develop new defence solutions.

5. The UK and Ukraine will work to transform Ukraine's defence industry into a powerful asset for Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security, enabling Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity, acting as a major driver in economic recovery and contributing to effective deterrence of future aggression.

Part III. Non-Military Security Protection of critical infrastructure

1. The UK will contribute to the development of Ukraine's critical infrastructure protection capabilities.

2. The UK will continue to engage Ukrainian specialists with experience in critical infrastructure security to implement relevant projects on its territory.

3. The UK and Ukraine will explore joint educational and training programmes for critical infrastructure protection specialists.

4. The UK will work with Ukraine to identify sources of funding to develop the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure in various sectors.

Cooperation in the sphere of security and cyber security

1. The Participants will work together on intelligence and security co-operation to enable Ukraine to detect, deter and disrupt Russian conventional aggression, espionage and hybrid warfare, including through greater cyber resilience, with cyber advice and industry support to secure IT infrastructure from cyber-attack, while supporting the modernisation and reform of Ukraine's security and intelligence architecture, including on cyber and information security issues. This will be achieved through intelligence sharing and co-operation.

2. The Participants recognise the need to detect, disrupt and deter malign cyber operations and in particular malicious use of cyber capabilities by the Russian Federation and other hostile state and non-state actors. The Participants will work together to identify and deter the irresponsible use of cyber capabilities by the Russian Federation against the Participants.

3. The Participants will contribute to the development of Ukraine's capabilities to defend against, deter and respond to threats to critical infrastructure by facilitating the availability of modern technological solutions in the field of critical infrastructure protection for its cybersecurity actors, including through the provision of international technical assistance to Ukraine.

4. The Participants will work on the implementation of a joint protocol for deterring and responding to cyberattacks by the Russian Federation, its satellites and pro-Russian hacker groups, including pursuing shared deterrence objectives and the creation of a mechanism for the prompt provision of expert services in the field of cybersecurity.

Information security, combating information manipulation and propaganda

1. The Participants recognise that the Russian Federation continues to manipulate information in support of its war on Ukraine and will seek to continue to mutually support each other's efforts to tell the truth well. To counter Russian information manipulation and propaganda globally, the UK and Ukraine will:

- collaborate to improve Ukraine's capabilities to counter information security threats, primarily Russian propaganda;
- work together with like-minded partners to communicate effectively at an international level, offering the world a truthful alternative to the Russian Federation's disinformation campaigns;
- co-ordinate on closer collaboration of communications output to counter disinformation; and
- promote the development of joint educational and training programmes for information security professionals, including improving the level of English language proficiency in this area, regular exchange of experience and professional events involving information security professionals.

Cooperation in the sphere of combating serious and organised crime

1. The Participants recognise that the Russian Federation and its proxies use serious and organised crime (SOC), particularly Illicit Finance (IF), to finance actions aimed at undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its internal stability.

2. The participants will take actions to counteract the activities of SOC, in particular, individuals and groups that are trying to infiltrate across Ukrainian society, have criminal influence in certain regions, including the temporarily occupied ones, and are actively used as a tool of “hybrid warfare” to counteract the processes of recovery and reconciliation in Ukraine.

3. In order to counter the activities of SOC, the Participants will take measures to:

- conduct joint operations to detect and suppress SOC;
- analyse the criminal situation in the countries and identify the main risks from SOC;
- identify assets that may be seized in criminal proceedings or in a case of recognising assets as unjustified;
- create joint working groups and joint investigation teams of prosecutors and other parties; and
- facilitate the provision of training and sharing of best practice.

4. The above measures are not exhaustive, and the Participants may pursue other forms of cooperation to achieve their goals in combating SOC.

Part IV. Political Co-operation Just peace

1. The Participants recognise that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is fully restored and there is a just peace that respects Ukraine’s rights under international law and the UN Charter. Ukraine and the UK will therefore work together for a just and lasting peace that has broad global support.

2. The UK welcomes Ukraine’s efforts to create a just and sustainable peace, also based on the principles of Ukraine’s Peace Formula. The UK is ready to play a leading role in taking forward steps to implement peace initiatives that reflect the principles of the UN Charter.

Sanctions

1. The Participants recognise the value of sanctions in restricting the Russian Federation’s access to the finance, goods, technology and services it is utilising in its aggression, in bearing down on Russia's revenue streams, and to deter future attacks. Since the invasion started, the UK has delivered its most extensive sanctions package ever imposed against a major economy.

2. While the Russian Federation’s aggression towards Ukraine continues, the UK will remain committed to pursuing robust sanctions against sectors of the Russian economy and those in the Russian Federation and outside who are supporting or

profiting from the war, or assisting in sanctions circumvention in third countries. The UK will also take determined action with partners to tackle all forms of sanctions circumvention as well as reinforcing its own domestic resilience against Russian-linked illicit finance and Kremlin-linked elites. The UK and Ukraine will provide each other up-to-date information on the grounds for sanctions and other relevant information, in compliance with relevant obligations.

Accountability

1. The Participants reaffirm their commitment to holding the Russian Federation accountable for causing losses or damage to individuals and entities, as well as to the state of Ukraine, as a result of its internationally unlawful acts in Ukraine or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. They reaffirm that the Russian Federation must bear the legal responsibility, including making reparation for any damage, caused by such act, which will also help deter future attacks and support Ukraine's recovery. They will seek to hold to account those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes committed in or against Ukraine, consistent with international law, including by supporting the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court to ensure allegations of war crimes are fully and fairly investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.

Part V. Fiscal Support, Recovery and Reconstruction Fiscal support

1. The UK has been at the forefront of efforts to support Ukraine's immediate recovery, fiscal and humanitarian needs. Since the full-scale invasion, the UK has to date committed to provide approximately £4.2bn in fiscal support, and more than £640m in bilateral humanitarian, stabilisation, recovery and reform assistance to meet Ukraine's immediate needs. The Participants co-hosted the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in London in June 2023 where the UK reaffirmed our commitment to Ukraine's early recovery and longer-term reconstruction. The URC sent a clear message that the UK not only stands with Ukraine to win the war and defeat the Russian Federation's aggression, but that the UK will also stand with Ukraine to win the peace.

Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction

1. The UK is steadfast in its commitment to support Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. The UK will support Ukraine to build increased institutional, economic and social resilience, with a focus on reforms that will underpin these areas. The UK will support early recovery activities in priority sectors, where the UK has expertise and a unique offer, including energy, infrastructure, tech and demining.

2. The Participants recognise that lasting security and prosperity for Ukraine must be underpinned by a strong private sector-led economy. The UK will seek to build a modern, resilient and sustainable Ukrainian economy that is integrated into global markets, is not susceptible to hostile Russian influence, and is based on strong and accountable institutions, respect for the rule of law.

3. The Participants recognise the need to unite efforts aimed at protecting the population and territories of Ukraine from the negative consequences caused by mines and explosive remnants of war as a result of the Russian Federation's armed aggression and alleviating the devastating consequences after its completion.

4. The Participants will promote the further development of partnership in the field of humanitarian demining, the accumulation, analysis, exchange and application of practical experience in the field of humanitarian demining.

5. The UK will continue to fund demining, risk education, and capacity building (working in partnership with a national operator) through its Global Mine Action Programme. The UK will support the State Emergency Services of Ukraine through the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine to develop and sustain international demining standards in its operations.

6. The UK also undertakes to work with other donors to improve coordination and identify and implement innovative finance vehicles that bring new sources of funding into the mine action sector. The UK will work closely within the mechanisms set up by the Ukrainian government to support the implementation of the forthcoming mine action strategy.

Macro-economic stability

1. The Participants recognise the importance of macro-economic stability. The UK stands behind Ukraine's IMF programme goals of sustaining economic and financial stability, restoring debt sustainability and promoting reforms that support Ukraine's recovery. Ukraine is committed to implementing the full set of policy requirements as set out in the IMF programme, including in meeting these through the quarterly review monitoring processes during the lifetime of the programme to 2027.

Access to financial sector, insurance industry, technology sector and other expertise

1. The UK will seek to facilitate access for Ukraine to the UK's private finance companies and institutions, insurance industry, technology sector and other expertise. To that end, the Participants will:

- continue implementation of the UK-Ukraine Political, Free Trade & Strategic Partnership Agreement;
- develop measures to increase investor confidence, and work with commercial insurance markets to unlock private investment to meet Ukraine's long-term reconstruction needs;
- use the newly agreed UK-Ukraine Digital Trade Agreement, signed on 20 March 2023, to modernise bilateral trade in the digital era and deepen our economic ties;
- support skills-sharing and corporate twinning initiatives that strengthen UK-Ukraine business partnerships and promote investment opportunities in Ukraine in key sectors that can drive economic recovery; and

- support opportunities for investment and UK-Ukraine partnerships in the tech sector, to drive a more modern, innovative economic future for Ukraine and drive excellence in e-governance.

Compensation for losses, injuries and damages caused by Russian aggression

1. The Participants reaffirm that the Russian Federation must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine. Russian sovereign assets in the UK's jurisdiction will remain immobilised until the Russian Federation has paid for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. The UK, working with its partners, will continue to pursue all lawful routes through which Russian assets can be used to support Ukraine.

2. As a priority, the Participants will continue to work together with others, including G7 states, to explore options for the development of appropriate mechanisms to provide reparation for damage, loss, or injury caused by Russian aggression, as envisaged by the Statute of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine adopted by the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Res (2023).

3. In this regard, the Participants will explore appropriate options for establishing a compensation mechanism to provide compensation to victims of Russian aggression.

Part VI. Humanitarian Co-operation Humanitarian aid, civil defence and resilience

1. The Participants reaffirm that, as Ukraine begins early recovery and reconstruction, they will ensure the continuation of well-coordinated life-saving humanitarian aid where it is needed. The Participants will work together to ensure a better prioritised, targeted humanitarian response which delivers to those most in need, including in hard-to-reach areas.

2. The UK will continue to support stabilisation and civil defence needs through the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU) where there is a strategic fit. Past support has included, for example, support to the State Emergency Services of Ukraine in multiple critical areas that bolster their emergency response and improve civil defence, and support to regional and local administrations in the provision of shelters, particularly in schools.

Operational delivery of humanitarian services

1. Where possible, the Participants will progressively shift the response to a nationally-led one that sees humanitarian support transitioning to Ukrainian systems of service provision over time and puts more leadership, capacity and funding in the hands of Ukrainian organisations to drive operational delivery of humanitarian services. The Participants will also continue to play an active role through our support for refugees from Ukraine.

Social recovery and territorial reintegration

1. The UK will support Ukraine to plan for the reintegration of currently occupied territories, to contribute to the vital stabilisation and socio-economic renewal,

particularly in liberated and frontline areas, and areas bordering Russia, to promote an inclusive social recovery, and to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, including through work to support women, social protection systems and veterans.

Part VII. Reform Inclusive reform

1. The Participants reaffirm that inclusive reform is indispensable for Ukraine's current and future security and prosperity, for its democracy, the resilience of its institutions and for Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including towards EU and NATO membership. The legacy effect created by the war, such as the liberation of occupied territory, the transition from martial law, and the need to meet public expectations, will require Ukraine's institutions to be well adapted to manage such challenges.

Priority reform areas

1. The Participants reiterate their commitment to streamline reform efforts against the priority reform areas set for accessions to EU and NATO and IMF benchmarks, as well as aligning with other major donors, in particular the International Financial Institutions, European Union and G7 partners.

Commitment to implement reforms

1. The UK recognises the significant progress Ukraine has made in implementing reforms. Ukraine reiterates its continued commitment to reforms, including in the areas of:

- governance – Ukraine will commit to continuing institutional governance reform in the interest of building a resilient and inclusive democracy, including the continued reform of its judiciary with strengthened judicial appointment procedures to build public trust in the rule of law;
- anti-corruption – acknowledging that this transcends all areas of reform, Ukraine commits to continuing to build its capability and capacity to prevent and tackle corruption across the public and private sectors, and civil society, including through establishing and supporting independent and well-resourced anti-corruption institutions that are able to operate with appropriate accountability but without political interference;
- defence and security sector - advancing security and defence sector reforms (including defence, intelligence and civilian security institutions) and modernisation including by strengthening democratic civilian control and improving efficiency and transparency across Ukraine's security institutions and defence-related industries, including through activities to support: o democratic civilian control of the Armed Forces, a prerequisite of NATO membership and an important indicator of the non-politicisation of the Armed Forces; o good governance within the defence and security sector, including evidence-based decision making, delegated management authority, clear directive structures, and improved recruitment, human resources and retention processes, and the corporatisation and good management of the state-owned defence industrial sector, to meet Ukraine's OECD obligations; improved defence and security

procurement processes (for both lethal and non-lethal equipment) ensuring that, wherever possible, the default process is transparent, and all relevant processes are followed to enable audit and evaluation activity; and increased alignment with Euro-Atlantic values and standards, including through the development and standardisation of International Humanitarian Law, and support for relevant Ministries in implementing their obligations towards marginalised groups.

- economic and business environment – modernising the economy by progressing reforms that will attract private finance, boost investor confidence, tackle corruption and create a fair and level playing field for all parties, including through a reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Support in delivering reform agenda

1. The UK will support Ukraine in delivering its reform agenda, sharing the UK's strength in harnessing and coordinating public-private partnerships, enabling financial and capital markets, and our specific expertise in anti-corruption, security and defence sector reform, judicial reform and support for inclusive and democratic institutions.

Part VIII. Cooperation in the event of future armed attack

1. Any future Russian invasion would violate the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law, and would grievously undermine Euro-Atlantic security, including that of the UK.

2. In the event of future Russian armed attack against Ukraine, at the request of either of the Participants, the Participants will consult within 24 hours to determine measures needed to counter or deter the aggression.

3. The UK undertakes that, in those circumstances, and acting in accordance with its legal and constitutional requirements, it would: provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across all domains as necessary, and economic assistance; impose economic and other costs on Russia; and consult with Ukraine on its needs as it exercises its right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

4. In order to ensure the widest and most effective collective response to any future armed attack, the UK and Ukraine may amend these provisions in order to align with any mechanism that Ukraine may subsequently agree with its other international partners, including the participants in the Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023.

Part IX. Final Provisions Executive and technical agreements

1. The Participants will, if necessary, designate authorised bodies for the development and implementation of bilateral agreements in accordance with the areas of cooperation specified in this Agreement.

2. The authorised bodies of the Participants can conclude executive and technical agreements on specific areas of cooperation within the framework of the implementation of this Agreement.

Timeframe of the Agreement

1. This Agreement is valid for ten years from the date of its signature.

2. At the same time, in accordance with the G7 Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023, the Participants intend this Agreement to remain in force as Ukraine pursues its path to future membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.

3. In the event that Ukraine becomes a member of NATO before the expiry of this Agreement, the participants will decide on its future status.

Termination

1. This Agreement may be terminated by either Participant by giving written notice to the other. The Agreement will be terminated six months from the date of receipt of such notice.

Amendments

1. This Agreement may be amended and supplemented by mutual agreement of the Participants, which will be made in writing.

Entry into effect

1. The provisions of this Agreement will come into effect immediately upon signature.

Signed in Kyiv on 12 January 2024 in duplicate in the English and Ukrainian languages, the English version of which is valid in the event of any discrepancy.

For the United Kingdom: Rishi Sunak, Prime Minister

For Ukraine: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

ІСТОРИЯ УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН (XIX ст.)

У першій половині 19 ст. українсько-британські зв'язки проявлялися головно через діяльність окремих британців на російській службі. Особливо активними в той час були різні архітектори та інженери, які брали участь у проєктуванні і будівництві міських кварталів, будинків та інших споруд у різних містах України. У 1816-34 рр. адмірал шотландського походження Олексій Грег займав посаду командувача російського Чорноморського флоту та генерал-губернатора Миколаєва і Севастополя.

Зацікавлення Кримом зросло в 1854-6 рр. коли Британська імперія брала участь у Кримській війні проти Росії. Разом із військами на півострові перебували відомі британські організаторки допомоги пораненим військовослужбовцям Флоренс Найтінгейл та Мері Сікоул. Після війни в Криму залишилися британські військові поховання, а її драматичні епізоди знайшли відображення в творчості Теннісона та інших англійських авторів.

У 1869 р. уродженець Уельсу Джон Гюз почав будівництво металургійного заводу і робітничого селища на місці, де згодом виросло місто Юзівка – нині Донецьк. За короткий час завод Гюза став найбільшим виробником чорного металу в Російській імперії. У Галичині на початку 20 ст. за допомогою британського капіталу засновано декілька нафтових товариств для експлуатації дрогобицького нафтового району: Англо-австрійське товариство в Густановичах (1906 р.), Англо-польське торговельне товариство (1908 р.) та англійське акціонерне товариство у Львові (1912 р.). В кінці 19 і на початку 20 ст. з України до Сполученого Королівства експортувалося збіжжя, цукор, жива худоба та залізна руда.

З метою дослідження економічного потенціалу південної частини Російської імперії і захисту інтересів британських підприємців, у різних українських містах відкрито британські представництва: ще в 1803 р. – консульство в Одесі, а в другій половині століття – консульства або віце консульства у Керчі, Херсоні, Феодосії, Миколаєві, Севастополі та Києві. Крім цього, у 1904-1914 рр. представник британських нафтових фірм у Галичині Роман Залозецький-Сас був почесним британським консулом у Львові.

У другій половині 19 і на початку 20 ст. в Сполученому Королівстві (СК) зросло зацікавлення українським художнім словом. Особливу роль у цьому відіграв славіст Вільям Морфілл, який написав декілька статей на тему української літератури, як також нарис про українську мову в Енциклопедії «Britannica» – перший українознавчий матеріал у цьому виданні. Про українську культуру появились в британській пресі також статті Михайла Драгоманова й

етнографа Федора Вовка, які підтримували зв'язки з місцевими славістами. Твори Тараса Шевченка переклали Етель Лілліан Войнич та ін.; переклади українських народних казок здійснили Вільям Ролстон та ін. Появилися також деякі літературні твори британських письменників на українську тематику.

Відомості про перебування українців у СК до кінця 19 ст. досить обмежені і стосуються радше окремих осіб. Перша значна група українських поселенців у СК складалася зі селян із Західної України, які в період з 1890-х років до вибуху Першої світової війни поселилися в Манчестері.

LESSON 3. UK/UKRAINE: POLITICAL, FREE TRADE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

UK/UKRAINE: POLITICAL, FREE TRADE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT [CS UKRAINE NO.1/2020]

PREAMBLE

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, hereinafter referred to as ‘the United Kingdom’ or ‘the UK’, of the one part, and UKRAINE, of the other part, hereinafter jointly referred to as ‘the Parties’,

TAKING ACCOUNT of the active development of bilateral relations between the Parties as well as their desire to strengthen and widen their relations and strategic partnership;

COMMITTED to a close and lasting relationship that is based on common values, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect for diversity, human dignity and commitment to the principles of a free market economy;

RECOGNISING that the Parties share common values and are committed to promoting those values;

CONVINCED of the need to help strengthen the atmosphere of friendship, mutual confidence and respect, understanding and cooperation in international relations and determined to play an active part in this process;

CONFIRMING that the United Kingdom acknowledges the EU membership aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice, as well as recognising the significant progress Ukraine has made in reforms to this end;

RECOGNISING Ukraine's continuing reform of its defence and security sectors, its strong commitment and contribution to international security, its Euro-Atlantic aspirations towards NATO membership and the progress it has made in this regard;

CONFIRMING that the United Kingdom will continue to support the political, socio-economic, legal and institutional reforms in Ukraine with the aim of building a developed and sustainable democracy and a strong market economy;

COMMITTED to implementing all the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the concluding documents of the Madrid and Vienna Conferences of 1991 and 1992 respectively, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950;

CONSCIOUS of their responsibility to help preserve peace and strengthen security in Europe and the whole world;

DESIROUS of strengthening international peace and security as well as engaging in effective multilateralism and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in particular by closely cooperating, to that end, within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organisations or entities of which the Parties are members;

REAFFIRMING the willingness of the Parties to respond jointly to regional and global security threats to comply with and restore the international order and international law;

EMPHASISING that in international relations it is impermissible for the threat or use of force to be employed as a means of settling disputes, and that all international disputes should be settled exclusively by peaceful means;

COMMITTED to promoting the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in accordance with international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly;

FULLY SUPPORTING the firm commitment of Ukraine to peace and security, and its efforts to restore through peaceful settlement Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders;

RECOGNISING that Russia's hostile actions against Ukraine undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in violation of international law;

COMMITTED to strictly adhering to the policy of non-recognition of Russia's attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol;

DESIROUS of achieving an ever-closer cooperation on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest;

COMMITTED to reaffirming the international obligations of the Parties to fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery, and to cooperating on arms control and international efforts on disarmament;

REAFFIRMING the importance and efficiency of the security assurances enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum);

DESIROUS of achieving a high level of economic cooperation, inter alia through a Free Trade Area (FTA) as an integral part of this Agreement, in compliance with rights and obligations arising out of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership of the Parties;

COMMITTED to developing a new climate conducive to economic relations between the Parties, and above all for the development of trade and investment and stimulating competition;

ACKNOWLEDGING the need for enhanced energy cooperation, and the commitment of the Parties to ongoing implementation of the Energy Charter Treaty;

COMMITTED to enhancing cooperation in the areas of energy, energy security, energy saving, energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources, facilitating the development of appropriate infrastructure and achieving a high level of nuclear safety and security;

COMMITTED to enhancing cooperation on legal migration based on reciprocity and equity and to cooperating on tackling illegal migration and trafficking in human beings;

RECOGNISING the importance of creating the most favourable conditions for entry and stay of nationals of the Parties in the territory of the other Party and of improving the well-managed and secure mobility of people;

COMMITTED to combating transnational organised crime, including, amongst others, money laundering and smuggling, to reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and to intensifying cooperation in the fight against terrorism;

AGREEING that environmental protection is a high priority; DESIROUS of promoting cooperation in the field of health care and public health protection;

COMMITTED to enhancing cooperation aimed at protecting and improving the environment and the principles of sustainable development and green economy;

COMMITTED to enhancing people-to-people contacts, including through cooperation and exchange in the fields of science and technology, business, youth, education, culture and sport;

RECOGNISING the value of cooperation between the regional bodies of each Party;

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that this Agreement will not prejudice and leaves open future developments in relations between the Parties;

RECOGNISING that the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, done at Brussels on 27 June 2014 (the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement) will cease to apply to the United Kingdom at the end of any transitional arrangement during which the rights and obligations under that Agreement continues to apply to the United Kingdom;

RECOGNISING that the Treaty on the Principles of Relations and Co-operation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine, done at London on 10 February 1993, will cease to have effect from the date of entry into force of this Agreement;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1 Objectives

1. A strategic partnership is hereby established between the United Kingdom, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part.

2. The Parties identify the following key aims of their strategic partnership:

(a) developing political and economic cooperation based on common values;

(b) providing an appropriate framework for a Strategic Partnership Dialogue in all areas of mutual interest, in accordance with Article 4 and Title VII of this Agreement;

(c) promoting, preserving and strengthening peace and stability in the regional and international dimensions in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the objectives of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, as well as with regard to the principles set out in the Budapest Memorandum;

(d) strengthening engagement for peaceful resolution of the conflict caused by Russia's hostile actions, in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, as well as for economic recovery and reintegration;

(e) supporting Ukraine's continuing political, economic, defence and security reforms, which are aimed at realising its European and EuroAtlantic aspirations, including towards EU and NATO membership;

(f) cooperating on the international stage in order to maintain the policy of non-recognition of Russia's attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until the full restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine;

(g) further developing a close relationship in the field of security and defence to tackle threats to peace and stability;

(h) establishing conditions for enhanced economic and trade relations, including by setting up a Free Trade Area as stipulated in Title IV (Trade and Trade-related Matters) of this Agreement;

(i) enhancing cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security with the aim of reinforcing the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(j) enhancing interaction of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary of the Parties with the aim of counteracting common transnational criminal threats as well as corruption;

(k) supporting and developing cooperation in the fields of education, science, culture, youth and sport with the aim of fostering people-to-people ties and collaboration between the Parties and their institutions operating in these domains; (l) establishing conditions for increasingly close cooperation in other areas of mutual interest.

TITLE I GENERAL PRINCIPLES ARTICLE 2

1. Respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, and other relevant human rights instruments, among them the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, and respect for the principle of the rule of law shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement.

2. Promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence also constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.

3. Cooperating and contributing to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery through full compliance with, and national implementation of, the Parties' existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations also constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.

4. The Parties reaffirm their respect for the principles set out in the Budapest Memorandum.

5. The Parties recognise that the principles of a free market economy and sustainable development underpin their relationship.

6. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the rule of law, good governance, the fight against corruption, as well as the fight against the different forms of transnational organised crime and terrorism.

7. The Parties shall develop their relations in strict observance of the principles of international law and in good faith.

TITLE II STRATEGIC POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ARTICLE 3

Aims of Strategic Political Dialogue

1. Strategic political dialogue in all areas of mutual interest shall be further developed and strengthened between the Parties through the Strategic Partnership Dialogue created in Article 400 of this Agreement.

2. The aims of the strategic political dialogue shall be:

(a) to increase political, foreign and security policy cooperation and effectiveness;

(b) to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflict caused by Russia's hostile actions, in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders;

(c) to cooperate in international fora in order to maintain the policy of nonrecognition of Russia's attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until the full restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine;

(d) to seek to restore and maintain peace and promote international stability and security based on effective multilateralism, as well as to jointly address global and regional challenges and threats;

(e) to enhance security and defence cooperation, as well as seek to establish closer collaboration between the defence industries of the two nations;

(f) to progress security and defence sector reforms to align with the standards upheld by NATO member states;

(g) to contribute to consolidating domestic reforms aimed at strengthening sustainable democracy, the rule of law and developing a strong market economy;

(h) to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect for diversity;

(i) to enhance cooperation in the field of justice, law enforcement and the fight against crime;

(j) to enhance cooperation in the field of migration, including mobility of citizens.

ARTICLE 4 the Conduct of the Strategic Partnership Dialogue

1. The Parties shall hold annual meetings of the Strategic Partnership Dialogue at high official or highest governmental level on all aspects of bilateral cooperation, including security, economic and migration issues, as well as on international and regional issues of mutual interest, in accordance with Title VII of this Agreement. For the purposes of this Article, the UK recognises migration under the UN Global Compact for Migration, including but not limited to, visas, border security and returns policy.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the Strategic Partnership Dialogue may also meet at any time and at any level, including at short notice where a situation so requires, to address any aspect of bilateral cooperation, as well as any international and regional issues of mutual interest.

3. The Parties shall encourage exchanges between members of their respective legislatures. They shall encourage cooperation and exchanges of experience in parliamentary procedures and practice, and in the preparation of legislation, and nothing in this Agreement shall restrict cooperation between the UK Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

4. The Parties shall also encourage contacts and exchanges of experience in public administration, in the judiciary and between legal bodies, and between press and media organisations.

ARTICLE 5 Dialogue and Cooperation on Domestic Reform

The Parties shall cooperate in order to ensure that their internal policies are based on principles common to the Parties, in particular stability and effectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular as referred to in Article 13 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 6 Foreign and Security Policy

1. The Parties shall, through the Strategic Partnership Dialogue created in Article 400 of this Agreement, intensify their dialogue and cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy and shall strengthen practical cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and crisis management, regional stability, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control and international efforts on disarmament.

2. The Parties shall work together bilaterally and within international organisations to respond effectively to regional and global security threats.

3. The Parties shall aim for the convergence of their foreign policy positions in the international arena on matters of common interest.

4. The Parties shall intensify the implementation of defence and security cooperation and assistance programs, as well as military and military-technical cooperation with the aim of further developing a close partnership in the field of security and defence, including through entering into relevant agreements.

ARTICLE 7 Peaceful Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Recovery

1. The Parties reiterate their commitment to peace and security in Ukraine, including the resolution of the conflict caused by Russia's hostile actions, in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. Conflict resolution will constitute one of the central subjects of the strategic political relationship between the Parties in accordance with Article 3 of this Agreement, as well as in dialogue in other bilateral and multilateral formats.

2. The United Kingdom reaffirms its commitment to advocating internationally the policy of non-recognition of Russia's attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

3. The Parties underline the necessity of maintaining peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict high on the international agenda and express their commitment in this context to coordinate efforts with other relevant international actors and organisations, including by maintaining international pressure on Russia and the use of sanctions, as appropriate.

4. The United Kingdom will support Ukraine's efforts aimed at the post-conflict recovery of the Donbas, in particular in rebuilding the economy and infrastructure of the liberated territories and the implementation of social programs to reintegrate the local population.

ARTICLE 8 Regional Stability

1. The Parties shall intensify their joint efforts to promote stability, security and democratic development in the region, as well as to work together for the prevention and peaceful settlement of regional conflicts.

2. These efforts shall follow commonly shared principles for maintaining international peace and security as established by the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other relevant multilateral instruments.

ARTICLE 9 Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

1. The Parties shall enhance practical cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management.

2. Cooperation in this field shall be based on modalities and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ukraine on consultation and cooperation on crisis management.

3. The Parties shall effect military and military-technical cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including but not limited to information on the development and implementation of national military doctrines, advice on defence policy and management, participation in joint exercises, military intelligence, the training of service personnel, legal matters of military service, cooperation in areas of military healthcare, identifying opportunities to purchase military equipment, spare parts and supplies, as well as improvement of defence and military capabilities.

ARTICLE 10 Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery, to both state and non-state actors, represents one of the most serious threats to international stability and security. The

Parties shall therefore cooperate and contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery through full compliance with, and national implementation of, their existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations, taking into account the provisions in nuclear non-proliferation treaties relating to civil nuclear energy.

2. The Parties shall cooperate and contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by:

(a) taking steps to sign, ratify or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all other relevant international instruments, and

(b) further improving the system of national export controls, in order to control effectively the export and transfer as well as transit of goods related to weapons of mass destruction, including through the effective implementation of end-use based “catch-all” controls and controls on transfer of sensitive technology by intangible means and provision of Technical Assistance that may contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, as well as effective sanctions for violations of export controls.

ARTICLE 11 Arms Control, Arms Export Control and the Fight against Illicit Trafficking of Arms

1. The Parties shall develop further cooperation on arms control and international efforts on disarmament, as well as with the aim of dealing with the impact on the population and on the environment of abandoned and unexploded ordnance. Cooperation on arms control shall also include export control and the fight against illicit trafficking of arms, including small arms and light weapons. The Parties shall promote universal adherence to, and compliance with, relevant international instruments and shall aim to ensure their effectiveness, including through implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

2. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to continue the process of conventional arms control, including through the full implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

ARTICLE 12 Fight against Crime

1. The Parties shall work closely together in the fight against crime, including organised crime and cybercrime, trafficking in human beings, smuggling, money laundering, illegal international transactions in cultural art objects, civil aviation and navigation threats, as well as hybrid threats.

2. The Parties shall exchange experience and seek to enter into agreements to facilitate cooperation in this field.

TITLE III JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY ARTICLE 13 Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

1. In their cooperation on justice, freedom and security, the Parties shall attach particular importance to the consolidation of the rule of law and the reinforcement of institutions at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law enforcement and the administration of justice in particular. Cooperation shall, in particular, aim at strengthening the judiciary, improving its efficiency, safeguarding its independence and impartiality, and combating corruption. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on justice, freedom and security.

2. Cooperation between the Parties, based on shared values, will reflect the balance between security on the one hand, and justice and freedom on the other.

ARTICLE 14 Protection of Personal Data

1. The Parties shall cooperate in order to ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data in accordance with the highest European and international standards, including the relevant Council of Europe instruments. Cooperation on personal data protection may include, inter alia, the exchange of information and of experts.

2. The Parties agree to cooperate in order to ensure that compliance with the relevant requirements for the protection of personal data are upheld when exchanging technical, operational and strategic information between law enforcement agencies.

ARTICLE 15 Cooperation on Migration, Asylum and Border Management

The Parties shall cooperate in the field of migration, asylum and border management, focusing jointly on:

(a) tackling the root causes of irregular migration, pursuing actively the possibilities of cooperation in this field with third countries and in international fora;

(b) establishing an effective and preventive policy against irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings including how to combat networks of smugglers and traffickers and how to protect the victims of such trafficking;

(c) establishing an inter-state dialogue on asylum issues and in particular on matters relating to the practical implementation of the UN Convention of 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967 and other relevant international instruments, as well as ensuring the respect by the Parties for the principle of nonrefoulement;

(d) further developing operational measures in the field of border management, subject to:

(i) cooperation on border management may include, inter alia, training, exchange of best practices including technological aspects, exchange of information in line with applicable rules and, where appropriate, exchange of liaison officers;

(ii) efforts of the Parties in this field will aim at the effective implementation of the principle of integrated border management;

(e) enhancing document security;

(f) developing an effective return policy; and (g) exchanging views on the informal employment of migrants.

ARTICLE 16 Treatment of Workers

Subject to the laws, conditions and procedures applicable by the Parties, treatment accorded to workers who are nationals of one Party and who are legally employed in the territory of the other Party shall be free of any discrimination based

on nationality as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, compared to the nationals of that Party.

ARTICLE 17 Mobility of Workers

The Strategic Partnership Dialogue shall regularly review the granting of more favourable provisions for mobility of workers, including by providing access to professional training, in accordance with laws, conditions and procedures in force in the UK and Ukraine, and taking into account the labour market in the UK and Ukraine.

ARTICLE 18 Movement of Persons

The Parties shall establish cooperation aimed at facilitating movement of persons and shall, where the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place, take gradual steps towards making it easier for citizens to travel to and visit each other's countries.

ARTICLE 19 Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

The Parties shall work together in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism financing. To that end, the Parties shall enhance bilateral and international cooperation in this field, including at operational level. The Parties shall ensure implementation of relevant international standards, in particular those of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

ARTICLE 20 Cooperation in the Fight against Illicit Drugs, and on Precursors and Psychotropic Substances

1. The Parties shall cooperate on issues relating to combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors on the basis of commonly agreed principles along the lines of the relevant international conventions, and taking into account the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem and the outcome document of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem "Our Joint Commitment to Effectively Addressing and Countering the World Drug Problem".

2. This cooperation shall aim to combat illicit drugs, reduce the supply of, trafficking in, and demand for, illicit drugs, and cope with the health and social consequences of drug abuse. It shall also aim at a more effective prevention of diversion of chemical precursors used for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

3. The Parties shall use the necessary methods of cooperation to attain these objectives, ensuring a balanced and integrated approach towards the issues at stake.

ARTICLE 21 Fight against Crime and Corruption

1. The Parties shall cooperate in combating and preventing crime and corruption.

2. This cooperation shall address, inter alia:

(a) smuggling of, and trafficking in, human beings as well as firearms and illicit drugs;

(b) trafficking in goods;

(c) economic crimes including in the field of taxation;

(d) corruption, both in the private and public sector;

(e) forgery of documents;

(f) cybercrime; and

(g) new crime types, including hybrid threats.

3. The Parties shall enhance bilateral, regional and international cooperation in this field, including, where appropriate, cooperation that involves the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). The Parties shall further develop their cooperation on, inter alia: (a) the exchange of best practice, including on investigation techniques and crime research; (b) the exchange of information in line with applicable rules; (c) capacity-building, including training and, where appropriate, the exchange of staff; and (d) issues relating to the protection of witnesses and victims.

4. The Parties are committed to implementing effectively the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of 2000 and its three Protocols, the UN Convention against Corruption of 2003 and other relevant international instruments.

ARTICLE 22 Cooperation in fighting Terrorism

1. The Parties agree to cooperate in the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism in accordance with international law, international human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law, and the respective laws and regulations of the Parties. In particular, the Parties agree to cooperate on the basis of the full implementation of Resolution No. 1373 of the UN Security Council of 2001, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 and subsequent updates and other relevant UN instruments, and applicable international conventions and instruments.

2. The Parties shall do so in particular by exchanging:

- (a) information on terrorist groups and their support networks;
- (b) experience and information on terrorism trends and on the means and methods of combating terrorism, including in technical areas, and training; and
- (c) experience in respect of terrorism prevention. All exchange of information shall take place in accordance with international and national law.

3. In accordance with paragraph one of this Article, the Parties further:

- (a) reaffirm their conviction that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed; and
- (b) reiterate their commitment to combat terrorism by all means and shall ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.

ARTICLE 23 Legal Cooperation

1. The Parties shall further develop judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, making full use of the relevant international and bilateral instruments and based on the principles of legal certainty and the right to a fair trial.

2. The Parties shall facilitate further judicial cooperation in civil matters on the basis of the applicable multilateral legal instruments, especially the conventions of the

Hague Conference on Private International Law in the field of international legal cooperation and litigation as well as the protection of children.

3. As regards judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the Parties shall seek to enhance arrangements on mutual legal assistance and extradition. This would include, where appropriate, accession to, and implementation of, the relevant international instruments of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998, including, wherever possible, cooperation through Eurojust.

ARTICLE 24 Diplomatic Missions

The Parties shall extend to each other all appropriate assistance in the operations of diplomatic missions in each other's countries.

TITLE IV TRADE AND TRADE-RELATED MATTERS CHAPTER 1 NATIONAL TREATMENT AND MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS SECTION 1 COMMON PROVISIONS ARTICLE 25 Objective

The Parties shall continue to progressively establish a free trade area over a transitional period of a maximum of 10 years starting from 1 January 2016, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and in conformity with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994").

ARTICLE 26 Scope and Coverage

1. The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to trade in goods² originating in the territories of the Parties.

2. For the purposes of this Chapter, "originating" means qualifying under the rules of origin set out in Protocol I to this Agreement (Concerning the Definition of the Concept of "Originating Products" and Methods of Administrative Cooperation).

1 Unless otherwise provided in Annex I to this Agreement.

2 For the purposes of this Agreement, goods means products as understood in GATT 1994 unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.

SECTION 2 ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES, FEES AND OTHER CHARGES ARTICLE 27 Definition of Customs Duties

For the purposes of this Chapter, a “customs duty” includes any duty or charge of any kind imposed on, or in connection with, the import or export of a good, including any form of surtax or surcharge imposed on, or in connection with, such import or export. A “customs duty” does not include any:

(a) charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with Article 32 of this Agreement;

(b) duties imposed consistently with Chapter 2 (Trade Remedies) of Title IV of this Agreement;

(c) fees or other charges imposed consistently with Article 33 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 28 Classification of Goods

The classification of goods in trade between the Parties shall be that set out in each Party's respective tariff nomenclature in conformity with the Harmonised System of the International Convention on the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System of 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the “HS”) and subsequent amendments thereto.

ARTICLE 29 Elimination of Customs Duties on Imports

1. The Parties shall eliminate all customs duties on goods originating in the other Party, except as provided in the Schedules set out in Annex I-A to this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Schedules”).

2. For each good, the base rate of customs duties to which the successive reductions are to be applied under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be that specified in Annex I to this Agreement. 20 Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, for worn clothing and other worn articles falling within the Ukrainian customs code 6309 00 00, Ukraine will apply an entry price custom duty on imports to its territory, in accordance with the conditions set out in Annex I-B to this Agreement.

3. If, at any moment following the date of entry into force of this Agreement, a Party reduces its applied most-favoured-nation (hereinafter referred to as ‘MFN’)

customs duty rate, such duty rate shall apply as base rate if and for as long as it is lower than the customs duty rate calculated in accordance with that Party's Schedule.

4. Two years after the entry into force of this Agreement, at the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult one another in order to consider accelerating and broadening the scope of the elimination of customs duties on trade between themselves. A decision of the Trade Committee created in Article 404(1) of this Agreement on the acceleration or elimination of a customs duty on a good shall supersede any duty rate or staging category determined pursuant to their Schedules for that good.

ARTICLE 30 Standstill

Neither Party may increase any existing customs duty, or adopt any new customs duty, on a good originating in the territory of the other Party. This shall not preclude that either Party may:

(a) raise a customs duty to the level established in its Schedule following a unilateral reduction; or

(b) maintain or increase a customs duty as authorised by the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter referred to as the "DSB") of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as the "WTO").

ARTICLE 31 Customs Duties on Exports

1. The Parties shall not institute or maintain any customs duties, taxes or other measures having an equivalent effect imposed on, or in connection with, the exportation of goods to the territory of each other.

2. Existing customs duties or measures having equivalent effect applied by Ukraine, as listed in Annex I-C to this Agreement, shall be phased out over a transitional period in accordance with the Schedule included in Annex I-C to this Agreement. In the case of an update to the Ukrainian customs code, commitments made under the Schedule in Annex I-C to this Agreement shall remain in force based on correspondence of description of the goods. Ukraine may introduce safeguard measures for export duties as set out in Annex I-D to this Agreement. Such safeguard

measures shall expire at the end of the period specified for that good in Annex I-D to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 32 Export Subsidies and Measures of Equivalent Effect

1. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, no Party shall maintain, introduce or reintroduce export subsidies or other measures with equivalent effect on agricultural goods destined for the territory of the other Party.

2. For the purposes of this Article, “export subsidies” shall have the meaning assigned to that term in Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture, contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement on Agriculture”), including any amendment of that Article of that Agreement on Agriculture.

ARTICLE 33 Fees and Other Charges

Each Party shall ensure, in accordance with Article VIII of GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes, that all fees and charges of whatever nature other than customs duties or other measures referred to in Article 27 of this Agreement, imposed on, or in connection with, the import or export of goods are limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered and do not represent an indirect protection of domestic goods or taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes.

SECTION 3 NON-TARIFF MEASURES ARTICLE 34 National Treatment

Each Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of the other Party in accordance with Article III of GATT 1994, including its interpretative notes. To this end, Article III of GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes are incorporated into and made an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 35 Import and Export Restrictions

No Party shall adopt or maintain any prohibition or restriction or any measure having an equivalent effect on the import of any good of the other Party or on the export or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of the other Party, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or in accordance with Article XI of GATT 1994

and its interpretative notes. To this end, Article XI of GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes are incorporated into, and made an integral part of, this Agreement.

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

ІСТОРИЯ УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН (1900-1939 pp.)

З початку 20 ст. вагомим чинником в українсько-британських зв'язках стає боротьба українців за національні права в Російській та Австро-Угорській імперіях. Ще до вибуху Першої світової війни питання політичного становища українців почало частіше фігурувати в британській пресі і серед впливових британських кіл. До цього чимало причинилися зокрема політичний емігрант з України Володимир Степанківський та британський публіцист Джордж Раффалович. Обидва займалися поширенням інформації про Україну і намагалися здобути прихильників української справи з-поміж чільних британців.

У перших роках війни британська влада вважала, що українська політична діяльність була в більшості пронімецькою, і з листопада 1916 р. до липня 1917 р. розповсюдження проукраїнської літератури в СК було заборонене. Під час війни (як також і під час Другої світової війни) деякі українці в Манчестері були на короткий або довший час інтерновані в таборах, переважно на острові Ман, оскільки, будучи австрійськими громадянами, вони вважалися «ворожими іноземцями».

Після проголошення Української Народної Республіки (УНР) у 1917 р. британський уряд почав поважніше трактувати українське питання, хоч офіційне ставлення до українських національних змагань було стримане. У грудні 1917 р.

Джон Піктон Баґт був призначений представником СК при уряді УНР. На початку 1918 р. СК було готове надати УНР офіційне визнання, однак після підписання Україною Берестейського миру з Центральними державами та вступу на її територію німецько-австрійських військ цю можливість було втрачено. Спроби Директорії УНР здобути підтримку Альянтів рік потому також завершилися безуспішно. Прихильнішим було ставлення СК до галицьких українців після завершення війни. Під час Паризької мирної конференції (1919 р.) британський уряд виступав проти польських претензій на Східну (українську) Галичину, розглядаючи можливість її приєднання до небільшовицької Росії або до Чехословаччини, чи навіть існування як незалежної держави під протекторатом Ліги Націй. Однак, під тиском Франції, СК зрештою було змушене погодитися на встановлення в краї польської влади, хоча й застерегла за українським населенням право на територіальну автономію. У міжвоєнній Західній Україні діяли британські віцеконсули у Львові та Бориславі.

У міжвоєнний період інформацію про Україну поширювали в СК насамперед різні українські представництва. У 1919-23 рр. у Лондоні діяли дипломатичні місії УНР і Західно-Української Народної Республіки, а в 1930-х рр. – Українське Бюро і представники гетьманського та націоналістичних рухів (див. Інформаційно-політична діяльність). З метою залучення британців до української справи постали Англо-український комітет, заснований 1931 р. представниками гетьманського руху, та окремий Англо-український комітет, заснований 1935 р. за сприяння Українського Бюро.

Голоси в українських справах іноді підносили також британська преса й окремі британці, зокрема щодо репресивних заходів польської влади в Галичині у 1930 р., відомих як «Пацифікація», та Голодомору 1932-33 рр. у підрадянській Україні. Для прикладу, в 1930 р. англійка Мері Шіпшанкс відвідала Галичину від імені Міжнародної ліги жінок за мир і свободу й оголосила в пресі свій критичний звіт. У 1932 р. група британських парламентаристів внесла до Ліги Націй петицію стосовно української меншості в Польщі і запровадження

автономії на території Східної Галичини. Про Голодомор в британській пресі писали зокрема Малколм Маггерідж, кореспондент газети «Manchester Guardian» у Москві, та журналіст Гарет Джоунз. Деякі британські організації пробували організувати допомогу голодуючим, і були звернення в британському парламенті в цій справі.

Британський уряд, однак, не віднісся критично ані до польського уряду стосовно становища українців у Польщі, ані до радянського у відношенні до Голодомору. Загалом, у міжвоєнний період британська влада прагнула зберегти політичний статус-кво в Європі і не підтримувала українські національні стремління, вважаючи їх чинником дестабілізації в руках реваншистських держав.

У міжвоєнний період продовжувалися українсько-британські торговельні зв'язки в загальному контексті торгівлі між СРСР і СК, хоч важко встановити, яка частина радянського експорту й імпорту припадала на Українську РСР. Значна частина британського імпорту збіжжя напевно походила з України. Серед інших українських товарів експортованих до СК – марганцева руда з Нікополя. У 1923 р. група британських підприємців заснувала Британську асоціацію торгівлі з Україною і були старання заснувати Британсько-український банк з метою сприяти торгівлі між Українською РСР і СК.

LESSON 4. COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND ARTICLE 5

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.

- Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.
- The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.
- NATO has taken collective defence measures on several occasions, including in response to the situation in Syria and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- NATO has standing forces on active duty that contribute to the Alliance's collective defence efforts on a permanent basis.

A cornerstone of the Alliance. Article 5

In 1949, the primary aim of the North Atlantic Treaty – NATO's founding treaty – was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. Every participating country agreed that this form of solidarity was at the heart of the Treaty, effectively making Article 5 on collective defence a key component of the Alliance.

Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.

Article 5: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise

of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

This article is complemented by Article 6, which stipulates:

Article 6 “For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

The principle of providing assistance

With the invocation of Article 5, Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to a situation. This is an individual obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in the particular circumstances.

This assistance is taken forward in concert with other Allies. It is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each country. It is therefore left to the judgment of each individual member country to determine how it will contribute.

Each country will consult with the other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.

At the drafting of Article 5 in the late 1940s, there was consensus on the principle of mutual assistance, but fundamental disagreement on the modalities of implementing this commitment. The European participants wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of the signatories come under attack; the United States did not want to make such a pledge and obtained that this be reflected in the wording of Article 5.

Invocation of Article 5

The 9/11 terrorist attacks

The United States was the object of brutal terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept had already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO's security. The Alliance's response to 9/11, however, saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities. Moreover, it led NATO to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the very first time in its history.

An act of solidarity

On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, the Allies invoked the principle of Article 5. Then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.

The North Atlantic Council – NATO's principal political decision-making body – agreed that if it determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5. On 2 October, once the Council had been briefed on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks, it determined that they were regarded as an action covered by Article 5.

By invoking Article 5, NATO members showed their solidarity toward the United States and condemned, in the strongest possible way, the terrorist attacks against the United States.

Taking action

After 9/11, there were consultations among the Allies and collective action was decided by the Council. The United States could also carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations under the United Nations Charter.

On 4 October, once it had been determined that the attacks came from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures to support the United States. On the request of the United States, it launched its first ever anti-terror operation – Eagle Assist – from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002. It consisted in seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

On 26 October, the Alliance launched its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States, Operation Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. In March 2004, the operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.

The eight measures to support the United States, as agreed by NATO were:

- to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
- to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;

- to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
- that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
- that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

Enhanced collective defence measures

Although NATO Allies have only invoked Article 5 once, they have coordinated collective defence measures on several occasions.

On the request of Turkey, on three occasions, NATO has put collective defence measures in place:

- in 1991 with the deployment of Patriot missiles during the Gulf War,
- in 2003 with the agreement on a package of defensive measures and conduct of Operation Display Deterrence during the crisis in Iraq, and
- in 2012 in response to the situation in Syria with the deployment of Patriot missiles.

Following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the rise of security challenges from the south, including brutal attacks by ISIL and other terrorist groups across several continents, NATO implemented the biggest increase in collective defence since the Cold War. For instance, it tripled the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force; established a 5,000-strong Spearhead Force within the NRF; and deployed

multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO also increased its presence in the southeast of the Alliance, centred on a multinational brigade in Romania. The Alliance further stepped up air policing over the Baltic and Black Sea areas and continues to develop key military capabilities, such as Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allies recognised cyberspace as a new operational domain, to enable better protection of networks, missions and operations. At their meeting in November 2019, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to recognise space as a new operational domain, to “allow NATO planners to make requests for Allies to provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications.”

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – which started in February 2022 – and in line with its defensive planning to protect all Allies, NATO is taking additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defence across the Alliance. This includes the deployment of the NRF for the first time in a deterrence and defence role. Allies have placed thousands of additional forces at high readiness, ensuring that the NRF continues to have the speed, responsiveness and capability to defend NATO territory and populations. Moreover, at an extraordinary Summit on 24 March 2022, NATO Leaders agreed to significantly strengthen the Alliance’s longer-term deterrence and defence posture. They agreed to reinforce the existing battlegroups and to establish four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. This has brought the total number of multinational battlegroups to eight, effectively doubling the number of troops on the ground and extending NATO’s forward presence along the Alliance’s eastern flank – from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south.

At the 2022 Madrid Summit, Allies committed to further concrete measures, such as deploying additional in-place combat-ready forces on the eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control. They also made initial offers to NATO’s new force

model, which will strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure and will resource a new generation of military plans. All these steps, together with the release of the 2022 Strategic Concept, which identified Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” will substantially strengthen NATO’s deterrence and forward defences.

Standing forces

Collective defence measures are not solely event-driven. NATO has a number of standing forces on active duty that contribute to the Alliance’s collective defence efforts on a permanent basis. These include NATO’s standing maritime forces, which are ready to act when called upon. They perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions, in peacetime and in periods of crisis and conflict.

Additionally, NATO has an integrated air and missile defence system to protect Alliance territory, populations and forces against any air or missile threat or attack. NATO also conducts several air policing missions, which are collective peacetime missions that enable NATO to detect, track and identify all violations and infringements of its airspace and to take appropriate action. As part of such missions, Allied fighter jets patrol the airspace of Allies who do not have fighter jets of their own. They run on a 24/7 basis, 365 days a year.

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

ІСТОРИЯ УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН (1939-1991 рр.)

Німецько-радянська окупація Польщі на початку Другої світової війни змусила британських дипломатів задуматися над можливістю використання

проти агресорів українського руху. У 1941 р., однак, після нападу Німеччини на Радянський Союз, останній став союзником СК, і в тих умовах не було в британському інтересі підтримувати ідею української незалежності. На завершальному етапі війни офіційний Лондон звертався до українського питання майже виключно у контексті дипломатичних переговорів щодо прилучення до СРСР західноукраїнських земель та встановлення нового радянсько-польського кордону.

Зразу після Другої світової війни, в умовах охолодження відносин між Заходом і Радянським Союзом, СК та його союзники обмірковували, яку майбутню роль міг би відіграти український національний рух у випадку війни з СРСР. Багато уваги офіційні кола приділяли становищу українських переміщених осіб та біженців і полонених колишніх вояків дивізії «Галичина» у Західній Європі. Остаточно, однак, політика Заходу почала орієнтуватися на порозуміння з СРСР, й українське питання відійшло на задній план. Спроба британського уряду в 1947 р. встановити безпосередні дипломатичні відносини з Українською РСР залишилася без відповіді, й офіційні зв'язки між СК й УРСР далі здійснювалися лише в загальному контексті британсько-радянських відносин.

На неурядовому рівні поживленню українсько-британських зв'язків посприяв масовий приїзд післявоєнних українських поселенців до СК. З 1950-х рр. деякі організації утримували зв'язки з Шотландською лігою європейської свободи та Британською лігою європейської свободи. Посередницьку роль між українцями і британцями відіграли Англо-Українське Товариство (1953-1984 рр.) та британсько-українське Товариство імені Мазепи (1967-1985 рр.).

Серед британців, які стали прихильниками українців були члени Парламенту Сполученого Королівства. У 1951 р. Джеффри Купер і Вільям Тілінг піднесли в парламенті справу запровадження україномовних передач Всесвітньої служби Бі-Бі-Сі. У 1960 р. Джон Кордоу заініціював парламентське обговорення справи урядової політики стосовно до офіційного визначення

національності осіб українського походження в СК. У 1975 р. Вільям Вітлок був ініціатором створення в парламенті Англо-української групи, яка діяла до 1983 р. У 1983-87 рр. післявоєнний іммігрант з України Стефан Терлецький був членом британського парламенту.

У 1960-80-х рр., коли в Радянському Союзі розгорнувся дисидентський рух, різні британські установи та окремі британці виступали в обороні радянських політичних в'язнів, в тому числі й українських. Однією з перших вагомих публікацій на Заході про переслідування українських правозахисників була стаття про засудження В'ячеслава Чорновола, яка появилася 7 лютого 1968 р. в лондонській газеті «The Times». Серед організацій, які займалися питанням українських та інших радянських дисидентів, особливо активною була Міжнародна амністія, центр якої знаходиться в Лондоні.

Інформація про економічні зв'язки між Україною і СК цього періоду досить обмежена. Відомо, однак, що в 1958-67 рр. Українська РСР експортувала до СК марганцеву руду, чушковий чавун, поташ і пшеницю, а в зворотний напрям експортувалася машинобудівна, хімічна і текстильна продукція.

У рамках договорів про культурні зв'язки між СК і СРСР, до СК прибули на гастролі деякі мистецькі колективи з України, в тому числі Український народний хор ім. Г. Верьовки та Ансамбль танцю ім. П. Вірського. Відбувалися змагання між українськими і британськими спортивними командами. Ще у 1950-х рр. були встановлені зв'язки між українськими і британським «містами-побратимами»: Одеса – Ліверпуль (1956 р.), Донецьк – Шеффілд (1956 р.), Луганськ – Кардіфф (1958 р.), Ялта – Маргейт.

При кінці 1980-х рр. контакти між Україною і СК посилювалися у зв'язку з процесом лібералізації політичного режиму в СРСР. Містами-побратимами стали Горлівка – Барнзлі (1988 р.) і Київ – Единбург (1989 р.). У 1990 р. в Києві відбулася велика виставка британської промисловості й побутового життя, і столицю України відвідала прем'єр-міністр СК Маргарет Татчер. Збільшилася

кількість науковців та інших осіб з України, які прибули до СК на запрошення різних наукових інституцій.

LESSON 5. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE AND BRITISH COUNCIL SIGN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL COOPERATION

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

On 19 May, in London, the British Council and Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science signed an updated Memorandum of Understanding during the Education World Forum, outlining new priorities for cooperation in English language learning, school and higher education development, and support for Ukraine's education system amid the ongoing war.

Ukraine's Minister of Education and Science, Oksen Lisovyi, and the British Council's Chief Executive, Scott McDonald signed the document, during a bilateral meeting held as part of the UK-Ukraine 100 year partnership programme at the Education World Forum in London.

Building on years of collaboration between the British Council and the Ministry, the Memorandum is tailored to address the challenges facing Ukraine's education system during Russia's full-scale invasion. It establishes a comprehensive framework for cooperation between the institutions and executive bodies responsible for education policy in both countries, covering the following areas:

- Fostering direct partnerships and experience-sharing between educational institutions to ensure quality education at all levels.
- Supporting collaboration between UK and Ukrainian universities in developing joint (dual) degree programmes, mutual recognition of qualifications, academic mobility, and joint research initiatives.
- Exchanging expertise in education policy to enhance educational quality, teaching excellence, leadership skills, and governance.

- Promoting high-quality professional development for teachers and improving English language teaching.
- Encouraging collaboration between UK and Ukrainian universities to improve gender representation in higher education leadership roles.
- Developing virtual partnerships between UK and Ukrainian schools to foster intercultural understanding among students.
- Enhancing mutual awareness of the UK and Ukrainian education systems through joint informational and promotional activities.

“A robust education system is a cornerstone for strategic partnership, cultural engagement, and building resilient international ties. In these challenging times, we deeply value cooperation rooted in trust, consistency, and a shared vision for the future. Signing this Memorandum with the British Council is a significant step towards systemic, long-term collaboration that is already yielding tangible results and opening new opportunities for Ukrainian teachers, children, and the entire education community. We are confidently advancing these changes,” said Oksen Lisovyi, Ukraine’s Minister of Education and Science.

The agreement strengthens cooperation in three key areas that have been prioritised recently, supporting the further development of existing programmes:

English Language Development

- BELT Programme: Annual training for 1,400 civil servants to use English as a working language.
- Access to English Learning: Online English courses for 1,000 children and teenagers in Ukraine.

School Sector Collaboration and Reform Support

- SWITLO Programme: Professional development for English teachers to create communities of teaching excellence.
- ENCOURSE Programme: A new initiative supporting the New Ukrainian School reform, aimed at developing students’ mediation skills through English language learning.

- UK-Ukraine School Partnerships: A UK Department for Education-funded collaboration programme that is in high demand, reflecting a strong interest in intercultural exchange and joint learning. The UK-Ukraine School Partnerships programme aims to foster cross-cultural understanding, enhance language and communication skills, and promote collaboration between students and educators from both countries. The programme will build international awareness and cultural understanding among students and teachers by bringing schools together into international partnerships. It will bring an international perspective to classroom learning which is highly motivational to students and teachers. The theme of the partnerships is ‘Reading for pleasure’ with a wide range of potential activities so that students from any school and classes can take part.

Additionally, the programme will focus on supporting learners’ language and communication skills in both countries – by promoting communication in English and Ukrainian, and aligning with Ukraine’s ambition to enhance the English proficiency of its young people. The programme will be beneficial for displaced learners from Ukraine in the UK, as it will strengthen UK-based Ukrainian young people’s cultural ties to the homeland – by engaging with some UK schools with students of Ukrainian origin.

The participant schools will be welcome to extend participation to the whole school and the wider school community, if desired, through activities such as assemblies, and communication and engagement activities with parents and other community members.

How it works: We will pair schools in the UK and Ukraine in guided partnerships, giving learners aged between 7 and 14 and teachers the chance to connect with their peers and bring an international perspective into the classroom – creating relationships that can continue well beyond the programme itself. The schools in Ukraine do not need to have a UK school partnership already – we provide the contacts to establish one.

The paired schools will collaborate on time-bound, joint educational projects using resources provided by the British Council (for example, Ukrainian Language and Culture and Reading for Pleasure packs) and the British National Literacy Trust. Schools are welcome to use their own materials if they wish. Partnerships should last a minimum of 4-6 months, and there will be three entry points: April 2025, September 2025, January 2026.

We will also provide teachers and school leaders with professional development opportunities, both in-person and online through partner-matching events and collaborative planning and learning sessions. These activities will focus on sharing effective practice, developing project plans using trauma-informed approaches, and building international partnerships that are impactful and sustainable.

Higher Education Reform

- Training Programme for Academic Managers: A Ministry initiative, implemented by the British Council under a joint project with the World Bank, to strengthen the leadership capacity of Ukrainian universities. The programme aims to strengthen the institutional capacity of Ukrainian HEIs by improving academic managers' skills in higher education transformation, good governance, strategy, finance, people management, internationalization, and institutional change.

Programme Content:

Module 1: Role of Universities in the Context of Social Transformations;

Module 2: Strategic Management in Times of Uncertainty;

Module 3: Human Resources Management;

Module 4: Finances, Resources, and Projects.

Programme Structure: four residential training sessions (Wednesday – Saturday, once per month), team assignments, presentation of an institutional change project at an international online conference.

Residential training sessions will take place in:

Kyiv (in partnership with Mariupol State University)

Lviv (in partnership with Ukrainian Catholic University)

Dnipro (in partnership with Dnipro University of Technology)

Higher education institutions will be assigned to the corresponding location according to their actual location.

The Programme is equivalent to 6 ECTS credits.

Programme participants will be granted the British Council Certificate upon successful completion of each module. Successful completion of the full Programme will result in Certificate of Professional Development, in accordance with the Resolution No. 800 (August 21, 2019) on professional development of academic staff of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The first cycle of training sessions will take place from 2 April 2025 to 19 July 2025. The international online conference will be held in mid-September 2025.

University Teams

Each university team should consist of 5-7 core team members and 2 reserve members.

Categories of participants: vice-rectors, deans & vice-deans, institute directors & deputy directors, heads of departments, heads of administrative units. Each team may include one member without a managerial position at the time of application. Teams represent different structural units within their institution.

Participation in the Programme is free for selected university teams. However, travel and accommodation expenses are covered by the participating HEIs.

- **Gender Equality Partnerships:** British Council grants for collaborative projects between Ukrainian and UK universities to address gender imbalances in higher education leadership. Launched in 2021, the Gender Equality Partnerships initiative has grown from just five partnerships between the UK and three other countries to a thriving global network of 70 collaborative projects, spanning 120 institutions and 12 countries.

Gender Equality Partnerships is one of our responses to a report that the British Council recently commissioned, entitled ‘Gender Equality in Higher Education: Maximising Impacts’. This report identified some key global gender equality

challenges as well as some examples of how governments, higher education institutions, sector bodies and funders are successfully addressing these issues.

Globally, the Gender Equality Partnerships aims to build partnerships and systemic change in the priority themes detailed below:

- Prevention of violence against women and girls with a particular focus on higher and further education institutions as safe spaces for women.
- Addressing women’s underrepresentation in higher and further education leadership.
- Enabling access and tackling subject segregation, particularly in the area of STEM.
- Strengthening pathways into employment for women graduates from further and higher education.
- Awards support partnerships between UK higher education institutions and partner institutions from Ukraine and other countries.

In Ukraine, the focus of Gender Equality Partnerships is on addressing women’s under-representation in higher education leadership. Projects to be implemented in 2025

UK University	Ukraine University	Project Title
Bangor University	Khmelnyskyi National University	3R SheLeader: Resilience, Resourcefulness, and Resultfulness
Coventry University	Alfred Nobel University & Kyiv National University of Construction and Architecture	Addressing the underrepresentation of women in HE leadership: Ukraine and UK
University of Birmingham	Ivan Franko National University of Lviv	Women in Leadership: Higher Education Institutions in Ukraine Before, During, and After War
University of Reading	National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine	Developing women’s leaderships skills and networks for equity in

		higher education leadership in Ukraine
University of Wolverhampton	Nizhyn Mykola Gogol State University	Development of a policy and framework for greater gender equality in Ukrainian HE leadership
University of Worcester	Ternopil Volodymyr Hnatiuk National Pedagogical University	Empowering female leaders in higher education through international peer-to-peer mentoring

Projects implemented in 2024

Kingston University – Lviv Polytechnic National University

University of Bedfordshire – Simon Kuznets Kharkiv National University of Economics

University of Cambridge – Kharkiv National Medical University

University of Hull – Mariupol State University

Leicester University – Kremenchuk Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi National University

Reading University – National University of Life and Environmental Sciences

Scott McDonald, Chief Executive of the British Council, stated that it was evident there was a need to support Ukraine’s education sector, as the war had damaged the country’s educational infrastructure, putting the right to education for millions of young people at risk. He noted that the UK Government had recently announced a Century of Partnership between Ukraine and the UK, which reflected the multifaceted nature of their relationship and their commitment to supporting Ukraine in all circumstances. He added that the British Council had been active in Ukraine for 30 years and expressed their strong belief that, especially now, it was crucial to foster positive connections, mutual understanding, and trust between people, a mission they continued to pursue during the war.

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

ІСТОРИЯ УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН (1991-2021 рр.)

На новий рівень вийшли українсько-британські зв'язки після проголошення незалежності України 1991 р. СК відкрило Генеральне консульство в Києві у листопаді того ж року, а 31 грудня визнало Україну як незалежну державу. 10 січня 1992 р. були встановлені дипломатичні відносини між двома країнами. Незабаром консульство в Києві було піднесене до рівня Посольства СК в Україні і першим британським послом в Україні був назначений Саймон Гіманз. Восени 1992 р. почало роботу Посольство України в СК на чолі з першим послом Сергієм Комісаренком, а в лютому 2002 р. Україна відкрила Генеральне консульство в Единбурзі.

Повноцінні відносини між Україною і СК розвинулися на підставі низки двосторонніх та інших договорів у політичній, оборонній, економічній, гуманітарній, культурній та інших сферах, і поступово поширилася співпраця між державними, комерційними, освітніми, культурними та іншими установами обох країн. Відбулися візити членів британського уряду, парламенту й королівської родини до України, як рівно і президентів України та інших українських високопосадових осіб до СК. У політичних відносинах між двома країнами домінували такі питання, як здійснення юридичних і демократичних реформ в Україні, підтримка зі сторони СК щодо прагнення України стати членом Європейського союзу, співробітництво у військовій сфері, зокрема після російської окупації Криму в 2014 р.

Після 1991 р. між Україною і СК постійно зростала торгівля товарами та послугами. Хоч Україна не посіла значного місця в міжнародних торговельних зв'язках СК, для неї СК стало важливим торговельним партнером, зокрема щодо торгівлі послугами. Серед товарів, які Україна експортувала до СК, були продукція сільського господарства і харчової промисловості, чавун і сталь тощо, а експорт товарів із СК до України охоплював транспортні засоби та іншу техніку, фармацевтичну та іншу хімічну продукцію тощо. Україна експортувала до СК послуги у сферах повітряних перевезень, досліджень та розробок, інформаційних технологій тощо, а СК до України – у сферах фінансів, юридичної діяльності, повітряних перевезень, телекомунікацій, інших бізнес-послуг. Британські підприємства здійснили значні інвестиції в Україні, а уряд надав технічну допомогу, спрямовану на поліпшення державного управління в країні й на гуманітарні потреби.

Взаємодія між двома країнами у сферах освіти, мистецтва й спорту стала нормою, а не винятком, як це було в попередніх десятиліттях. У 1992 р. Британська рада – організація, яка сприяє розвитку освітніх і культурних зв'язків з іншими країнами – почала працювати в Україні, і того ж року почалися щоденні радіопередачі Всесвітньої служби Бі-Бі-Сі українською мовою для слухачів в Україні, які проіснували до 2011 р. Встановилися нові зв'язки між містами-побратимами на додаток до попередніх.

Внаслідок усунення обмежень на подорожування з України після 1991 р. багато українців прибули до СК на тимчасове перебування різної тривалості або оселилися в країні на постійно. Звичним явищем стало подорожування із СК в Україну у різних волонтерських, бізнесових, культурних та інших цілях. Українці, які проживали в СК, зустрічалися з родичами, яких не бачили протягом десятиліть, або взагалі ніколи.

Активними у сфері сприяння розвитку зв'язків з Україною в цьому періоді були Всепартійна парламентська група з питань України у британському парламенті (заснована 1992 р.), а також такі організації, як Британсько-

Українська Правнича Асоціація (1993 р.), Британсько-Українська Комерційна Палата (1997 р.), Україно-Британський Сіті Клуб (2005 р.), Шотландська фундація «Друзі України» (2005 р.), Британсько-Українське Товариство (2007 р.).

LESSON 6. UK/UKRAINE DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ukraine;

Desiring to conclude a Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains;

Have agreed as follows: **Article 1 Personal scope** This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States. [Back to contents](#)

Article 2 Taxes covered

(1) This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and on capital gains imposed on behalf of a Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in which they are levied.

(2) There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital gains all taxes imposed on total income or on elements of income including taxes on gains from the alienation of movable or immovable property and taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises.

(3) The taxes which are the subject of this Convention are:

(a) in the case of the United Kingdom:\

(i) the income tax;

(ii) the corporation tax; and

(iii) the capital gains tax; (hereinafter referred to as “United Kingdom tax”);

(b) in the case of Ukraine: (i) the tax on profit (income) of enterprises (podatok na pributok (dokhody) pidpriemstv), and

(ii) the income tax on citizens of Ukraine, foreign citizens and stateless persons (pributkovy podatok z gromadyan Ukrainy, inozemnikh gromadyan ta ocib bez gromadyanstva); (hereinafter referred to as “Ukraine tax”).

(4) This Convention shall also apply to any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed by either Contracting State after the date of signature of this Convention in addition to, or in place of, the taxes of that Contracting State referred to in paragraph (3) of this Article. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of any substantial changes which have been made in their respective taxation laws.

Back to contents **Article 3 General definitions**

(1) For the purposes of this Convention, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) the term “United Kingdom” means Great Britain and Northern Ireland, including any area outside the territorial sea of the United Kingdom which in accordance with international law has been or may hereafter be designated, under the laws of the United Kingdom concerning the Continental Shelf, as an area within which the rights of the United Kingdom with respect to the sea bed and sub-soil and their natural resources may be exercised;

(b) the term “Ukraine” means the territory of Ukraine, its Continental Shelf and its exclusive (maritime) economic zone;

(c) the term “national” means:

(i) in relation to the United Kingdom, any British citizen, or any British subject not possessing the citizenship of any other Commonwealth country or territory, provided he has the right of abode in the United Kingdom; and any legal person, partnership, association or other entity deriving its status as such from the law in force in the United Kingdom;

(ii) in relation to Ukraine;

(aa) physical persons possessing the citizenship of Ukraine;

(bb) all legal persons, partnerships and associations deriving their status as such from the laws in force in Ukraine;

(d) the terms “a Contracting State” and “the other Contracting State” mean the United Kingdom or Ukraine, as the context requires;

(e) the term “person” comprises an individual, a company and any other body of persons, but subject to paragraph (2) of this Article does not include a partnership;

(f) the term “company” means anybody corporate or any entity which is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes;

(g) the terms “enterprise of a Contracting State” and “enterprise of the other Contracting State” mean respectively an enterprise carried on by a resident of a Contracting State and an enterprise carried on by a resident of the other Contracting State;

(h) the term “international traffic” means any transport by a ship or aircraft operated by an enterprise of a Contracting State, except when the ship or aircraft is operated solely between places in the other Contracting State;

(i) the term “competent authority” means, in the case of the United Kingdom, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or their authorised representative, and, in the case of Ukraine, the Minister of Finance of Ukraine or his authorised representative.

(2) A partnership or a joint venture deriving its status from Ukraine law which is treated as a taxable unit under the law of Ukraine shall be treated as a person for the purposes of this Convention.

(3) As regards the application of the Convention by a Contracting State any term not otherwise defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under the law of the Contracting State concerning the taxes to which the Convention applies.

Back to contents **Article 4 Residence**

(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the term “resident of a Contracting State” means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management, place of registration or any other criterion of a similar nature; the term does not include any person who is liable

to tax in that Contracting State only if he derives income or capital gains from sources therein.

(2) Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then his status shall be determined in accordance with the following rules:

(a) he shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State in which he has a permanent home available to him; if he has a permanent home available to him in both Contracting States, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State with which his personal and economic relations are closer (centre of vital interests);

(b) if the Contracting State in which he has his centre of vital interests cannot be determined, or if he has no permanent home available to him in either Contracting State, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State in which he has an habitual abode;

(c) if he has an habitual abode in both Contracting States or in neither of them, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State of which he is a national;

(d) if he is a national of both Contracting States or of neither of them, the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual agreement.

(3) Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article a person other than an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State in which its place of effective management is situated.

Back to contents **Article 5 Permanent establishment**

(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the term “permanent establishment” means a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.

(2) The term “permanent establishment” includes especially:

(a) a place of management;

(b) a branch;

- (c) an office;
- (d) a factory;
- (e) a workshop;
- (f) an installation or structure for the exploration of natural resources;
- (g) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources.

(3) A building site or construction or installation project constitutes a permanent establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months.

(4) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, the term “permanent establishment” shall be deemed not to include:

(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

(b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery;

(c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise;

(d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise, or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

(e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or, auxiliary character;

(f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of this paragraph, provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary character.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, where a person – other than an agent of an independent status to whom paragraph (6) of this Article applies – is acting on behalf of an enterprise and has, and habitually exercises, in a Contracting State an authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that

Contracting State in respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the enterprise, unless the activities of such person are limited to those mentioned in paragraph (4) of this Article which, if exercised through a fixed place of business, would not make this fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the provisions of that paragraph.

(6) An enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in a Contracting State merely because it carries on business in that State through a broker, general commission agent or any other agent of an independent status, provided that such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their business.

(7) The fact that a company which is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State, or which carries on business in that other State (whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise), shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.

Back to contents **Article 6 Income from immovable property**

(1) Income derived by a resident of a Contracting State from immovable property (including income from agriculture or forestry) situated in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

(2) The term “immovable property” shall have the meaning which it has under the law of the Contracting State in which the property in question is situated. The term shall in any case include property accessory to immovable property, livestock and equipment used in agriculture and forestry, rights to which the provisions of general law respecting landed property apply, usufruct of immovable property and rights to variable or fixed payments as consideration for the working of, or the right to work, mineral deposits, sources and other natural resources; ships and aircraft shall not be regarded as immovable property.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall apply to income derived from the direct use, letting, or use in any other form of immovable property.

(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (3) of this Article shall also apply to the income from immovable property of an enterprise and to income from immovable property used for the performance of independent personal services.

Back to contents **Article 7 Business profits**

(1) The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment.

(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article, where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.

(3) In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, including a reasonable allocation of executive and general administrative expenses incurred for the purposes of the enterprise as a whole, whether in the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.

(4) Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine, according to its laws, the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph (2) of this Article shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary; the method of apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article.

(5) No profits shall be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of the mere purchase by that permanent establishment of goods or merchandise for the enterprise.

(6) For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs, the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment shall be determined by the same method year by year unless there is good and sufficient reason to the contrary.

(7) Where profits include items of income or capital gains which are dealt with separately in other Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those Articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this Article.

Back to contents **Article 8 Shipping and air transport**

(1) Profits derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic shall be taxable only in that State.

(2) For the purposes of this article, profits from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic include: (a) income from the rental on a bareboat basis of ships or aircraft; and (b) profits from the use, maintenance or rental of containers (including trailers and related equipment for the transport of containers) used for the transport of goods or merchandise; where such rental or such use, maintenance or rental, as the case may be, is incidental to the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic.

(3) Where profits within paragraphs (1) or (2) of this Article are derived by a resident of a Contracting State from participation in a pool, a joint business or an international operating agency, the profits attributable to that resident shall be taxable any in the Contracting State of which he is a resident.

Back to contents **Article 9 Associated enterprises**

(1) Where: (a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State; or (b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State. and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from

those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, may be included by a Contracting State in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.

(2) Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State and taxes accordingly – profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first mentioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other.

Back to contents **Article 10 Dividends**

(1) Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

(2) However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the Company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that State, but if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends and subject to tax in respect of the dividends in that other Contracting State the tax so charged shall not exceed:

(a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company which controls, directly or indirectly, in the case of the United Kingdom, at least 20 per cent of the voting power in the company paying the dividends and in the case of Ukraine at least 20 per cent of the authorised capital in the company paying the dividends;

(b) 10 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.

(3) The term “dividends” as used in this Article means income from shares, or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making the distribution is a

resident and also includes any other item (other than interest relieved from tax under the provisions of Article 11 of this Convention) which, under the laws of the Contracting State of which the company paying the dividend is a resident, is treated as a dividend or distribution of a company.

(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the dividends, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State of which the company paying the dividends is a resident, through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that other State independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the holding in respect of which the dividends are paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14 of this Convention, as the case may be, shall apply.

(5) Where a company which is a resident of a Contracting State derives profits or income from the other Contracting State, that other State may not impose any tax on the dividends paid by the company, except insofar as such dividends are paid to a resident of that other State or insofar as the holding in respect of which the dividends are paid is effectively connected with a permanent establishment or a fixed base situated in that other State, nor subject the company's undistributed profits to a tax on undistributed profits, even if the dividends paid or the undistributed profits consist wholly or partly of profits or income arising in that other State.

Back to contents **Article 11 Interest**

(1) Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State if such resident is the beneficial owner of the interest and subject to tax in respect of the interest in that other Contracting State.

(2) The term “interest” as used in this Article means income from debt claims of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtors profits, and in particular, income from government securities

and income from bonds or debentures. The term interest shall not include any item which is treated as a distribution under the provisions of Article 10 of this Convention.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the interest, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State in which the interest arises, through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that other State independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the debt claim in respect of which the interest is paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14 of this convention, as the case may be, shall apply.

(4) Interest shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting State when the payer is that State itself, a political subdivision, a local authority or a resident of that State. Where, however, the person paying the interest, whether he is a resident of a Contracting State or not, has in a Contracting State a permanent establishment or a fixed base in connection with which the indebtedness on which the interest is paid was incurred, and such interest is borne by such permanent establishment or fixed base, then such interest shall be deemed to arise in the State in which the permanent establishment or fixed base is situated.

(5) Where, by reason of a special relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner or between both of them and some other person, the amount of the interest paid exceeds, for whatever reason, the amount which would have been agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial owner in the absence of such relationship, the provisions of this Article shall apply only to the last mentioned amount of interest. In such case, the excess part of the payments shall remain taxable according to the laws of each Contracting State, due regard being had to the other provisions of this Convention.

(6) Any provision in the laws of either Contracting State relating only to interest paid to a non-resident company shall not operate so as to require such interest paid to a company, which is a resident of the other Contracting State to be treated as a

distribution or dividend by the company paying such interest. The preceding sentence shall not apply to interest paid to a company, which is a resident of one of the Contracting States in which more than 50 per cent of the voting power is controlled, directly or indirectly, by a person or persons who are residents of the other Contracting State.

(7) The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or assignment of the debt-claim in respect of which the interest is paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.

Back to contents **Article 12 Royalties**

(1) Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State if such resident is the beneficial owner of the royalties and is subject to tax in respect of the royalties in that other Contracting State.

(2) The term “royalties” as used in this Article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work (including cinematograph films, and films or tapes for radio or television broadcasting), any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information (know-how) concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the royalties, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State in which the royalties arise, through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that other State independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the right or property in respect of which the royalties are paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14 of this Convention, as the case may be, shall apply.

(4) Where, by reason of a special relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner or between both of them and some other person, the amount of the royalties paid exceeds, for whatever reason, the amount which would have been agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial owner in the absence of such relationship, the provisions of this Article shall apply only to the last mentioned amount. In such case, the excess part of the payments shall remain taxable according to the laws of each Contracting State, due regard being had to the other provisions of this Convention.

(5) The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or assignment of the rights in respect of which the royalties are paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.

Back to contents **Article 13 Capital gains**

(1) Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of immovable property referred to in Article 6 of this Convention and situated in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

(2) Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of: (a) shares, other than shares quoted on an approved Stock Exchange, deriving their value or the greater part of their value directly or indirectly from immovable property situated in the other Contracting State, or (b) an interest in a partnership or trust the assets of which consist principally of immovable property situated in the other Contracting State, or of shares referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, may be taxed in that other State.

(3) Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of the business property of a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other Contracting State or of movable property pertaining to a fixed base available to a resident of a Contracting State in the other Contracting State for the purpose of performing independent personal services, including such gains from the alienation of such a permanent establishment (alone or with the whole enterprise) or of such fixed base, may be taxed in that other State.

(4) Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of ships or aircraft operating in international traffic by an enterprise of a Contracting State or movable property pertaining to the operation of such ships or aircraft, shall be taxable only in that Contracting State.

(5) Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs (1),(2),(3) and (4) of this Article shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident provided that those gains are subject to tax in that Contracting State.

(6) The provisions of paragraph (5) of this Article shall not affect the right of a Contracting State to levy according to its law a tax on capital gains from the alienation of any property derived by an individual who is a resident of the other Contracting State and has been a resident of the first-mentioned Contracting State at any time during the five years immediately preceding the alienation of the property.

Back to contents **Article 14 Independent personal services**

(1) Income derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of professional services or other activities of an independent character shall be taxable only in that State unless he has a fixed base regularly available to him in the other Contracting State for the purpose of performing his activities. If he has such a fixed base, the income may be taxed in the other State but only so much of it as is attributable to that fixed base.

(2) The term “professional services” includes especially independent scientific, literary, artistic, educational or teaching activities as well as the independent activities of physicians, lawyers, engineers, architects, dentists and accountants.

Back to contents **Article 15 Dependent personal services**

(1) Subject to the provisions of Articles 16, 18, 19, and 20 of this Convention, salaries, wages and other similar remuneration derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that State unless the employment is exercised in the other Contracting State. If the employment is so exercised, such remuneration as is derived therefrom may be taxed in that other State.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article, remuneration derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment exercised in the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in the first-mentioned State if: (a) the recipient is present in the other State for a period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate 183 days within any period of twelve months; and (b) the remuneration is paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of the other State; and (c) the remuneration is not borne by a permanent establishment or a fixed base which the employer has in the other State.

(3) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, remuneration derived in respect of an employment exercised aboard a ship or aircraft operated in international traffic may be taxed in the Contracting State of which the enterprise operating the ship or aircraft is a resident. Back to contents Article 16 Directors' fees
Directors' fees and other similar payments derived by a resident of a Contracting State in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.

Back to contents **Article 17 Artistes and sportsmen**

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 14 and Article 15 of this Convention, income derived by a resident of a Contracting State as an entertainer, such as a theatre, motion picture, radio or television artiste, or a musician, or as a sportsman, from his personal activities as such exercised in the other Contracting State, may be taxed in that other State.

(2) Where income in respect of personal activities exercised by an entertainer or a sportsman in his capacity as such accrues not to the entertainer or sportsman himself but to another person, that income may, notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 7, 14 and 15 of this Convention, be taxed in the Contracting State in which the activities of the entertainer or sportsman are exercised.

Back to contents **Article 18 Pensions**

(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 19 of this Convention, pensions and other similar remuneration paid in consideration of past employment to a

resident of a Contracting State and any annuity paid to such a resident shall be taxable only in that State.

(2) The term “annuity” means a stated sum payable to an individual periodically at stated times during his life or during a specified or ascertainable period of time under an obligation to make the payments in return for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.

Back to contents **Article 19 Government service**

(1) (a) Remuneration, other than a pension, paid by a Contracting State or a political subdivision or a local authority thereof to an individual in respect of services rendered to that State or subdivision or authority shall be taxable only in that State. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, such remuneration shall be taxable only in the other Contracting State if the services are rendered in that State and the individual is a resident of that State who: (i) is a national of that State; or (ii) did not become a resident of that State solely for the purpose of rendering the services.

(2) (a) Any pension paid by, or out of funds created by, a Contracting State or a political subdivision or a local authority thereof to an individual in respect of services rendered to that State or subdivision or authority shall be taxable only in that State. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, such pension shall be taxable only in the other Contracting State if the individual is a resident of and a national of that State.

(3) The provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18 of this Convention shall apply to remuneration and pensions in respect of services rendered in connection with a business carried on by a Contracting State or a political subdivision or a local authority thereof.

Back to contents **Article 20 Students Payments** which a student or business apprentice who is or was immediately before visiting a Contracting State a resident of the other Contracting State and who is present in the first-mentioned State solely for the purpose of his education or training receives for the purpose of his maintenance,

education or training shall not be taxed in that first mentioned State, provided that such payments arise from sources outside that State.

Back to contents **Article 21 Other income**

(1) Items of income beneficially owned by a resident of a Contracting State, wherever arising, which are not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Convention, other than income paid out of trusts or the estates of deceased persons in the course of administration, shall be taxable only in that State.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply to income, other than income from immovable property as defined in paragraph (2) of Article 6 of this Convention, if the recipient of such income, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that other State independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the right or property in respect of which the income is paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14 of this Convention, as the case may be, shall apply.

Back to contents **Article 22 Elimination of double taxation**

(1) Subject to the provisions of the law of the United Kingdom regarding the allowance as a credit against United Kingdom tax of tax payable in a territory outside the United Kingdom (which shall not affect the general principle hereof): (a) Ukraine tax payable under the laws of Ukraine and in accordance with this Convention, whether directly or by deduction, on profits, income or chargeable gains from sources within Ukraine (excluding in the case of a dividend, tax payable in Ukraine in respect of the profits out of which the dividend is paid) shall be allowed as a credit against any United Kingdom tax computed by reference to the same profits, income or chargeable gains by reference to which the Ukraine tax is computed; (b) in the case of a dividend paid by a company which is a resident of Ukraine to a company which is a resident of the United Kingdom and which controls directly or indirectly at least 10 per cent of the voting power in the company paying the dividend, the credit shall take into account (in

addition to any Ukraine tax for which credit may be allowed under the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph) the Ukraine tax payable by the company in respect of the profits out of which such dividend is paid.

(2) United Kingdom tax payable under the laws of the United Kingdom and in accordance with this Convention, whether directly or by deduction, on profits, income or chargeable gains from sources within the United Kingdom (excluding in the case of a dividend, tax payable in the United Kingdom in respect of the profits out of which the dividend is paid) shall be allowed as a credit against any Ukraine tax computed by reference to the same profits, income or chargeable gains by reference to which the United Kingdom tax is computed.

(3) For the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, profits, income and capital gains owned by a resident of a Contracting State which may be taxed in the other Contracting State in accordance with this Convention shall be deemed to arise from sources in that other Contracting State.

Back to contents **Article 23 Limitation of relief**

(1) Where under any provision of this Convention any income is relieved from tax in a Contracting State and, under the law in force in the other Contracting State a person, in respect of that income, is subject to tax by reference to the amount thereof which is remitted to or received in that other Contracting State and not by reference to the full amount thereof, then the relief to be allowed under this Convention in the first-mentioned Contracting State shall apply only to so much of the income as is taxed in the other Contracting State.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Article of this Convention, a resident of a Contracting State who, as a consequence of domestic law concerning incentives to promote foreign investment, is not subject to tax or is subject to tax at a reduced rate in that Contracting State, on income or capital gains shall not receive the benefit of any reduction in or exemption from tax provided for in this Convention.

Back to contents **Article 24 Partnerships** Where, under any provision of this Convention, a partnership or joint venture is entitled, as a resident of Ukraine, to

exemption from tax in the United Kingdom on any income or capital gains, that provision shall not be construed as restricting the right of the United Kingdom to tax any member of the partnership or joint venture who is a resident of the United Kingdom on his share of such income or capital gains, but any such income or gains shall be treated for the purposes of Article 22 of this Convention as income or gains from sources in Ukraine.

Back to contents **Article 25 Non-discrimination**

(1) Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected.

(2) Stateless persons who are residents of either Contracting State shall not be subjected in either Contracting State to any taxation or requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of the State concerned in the same circumstances are or may be subjected.

(3) The taxation on a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less favourably levied in that other State than the taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the same activities.

(4) Except where the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 9, paragraph (5) or (7) of Article 11 or paragraph (4) or (5) of Article 12 of this Convention apply, interest, royalties and other disbursements paid by an enterprise of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first mentioned State.

(5) Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any taxation or

any requirement connected therewith which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the first-mentioned State are or may be subjected.

(6) Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed as obliging either Contracting State to grant to individuals not resident in that State any of the personal allowances, reliefs and reductions for tax purposes which are granted to individuals so resident.

(7) The provisions of this Article shall apply to the taxes which are the subject of this Convention.

Back to contents **Article 26 Mutual agreement procedure**

(1) Where a resident of a Contracting State considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, present his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which he is a resident.

(2) The competent authority shall endeavour, if the objection appears to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance of taxation not in accordance with the Convention.

(3) The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention.

(4) The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate with each other directly for the purpose of reaching an agreement in the sense of the preceding paragraphs.

Back to contents **Article 27 Exchange of Information**

(1) The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by this Convention

insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to this Convention, in particular, to prevent fraud and to facilitate the administration of statutory provisions against legal avoidance. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by this Convention. Such persons or authorities shall use information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.

(2) In no case shall the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article be construed so as to impose on the competent authority of either Contracting State the obligation: (a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice prevailing in either Contracting State; (b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of either Contracting State; (c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy.

Back to contents **Article 28 Members of diplomatic or permanent missions and consular posts:**

Nothing in this Convention shall affect any fiscal privileges accorded to members of diplomatic or permanent missions or consular posts under the general rules of international law or under the provisions of special agreements.

Back to contents **Article 29 Entry into force:**

(1) Each of the Contracting States shall notify to the other, through the diplomatic channel the completion of the procedures required by its domestic law for the bringing into force of this Convention. This Convention shall enter into force on the date of the later of these notifications and shall thereupon have effect: (a) in the United Kingdom: (i) in respect of income tax and capital gains tax, for any year of assessment beginning on or after 6th April in the calendar year next following that in

which the Convention enters into force; (ii) in respect of corporation tax, for any financial year beginning on or after 1st April in the calendar year next following that in which the Convention enters into force; (b) in Ukraine: (i) in respect of taxes on dividends, interest or royalties for any payments made on or after the sixtieth day following that day on which the Convention enters into force; (ii) in respect of tax on profits (income) of enterprises for any taxation period beginning on or after 1st January in the calendar year next following that in which the Convention enters into force; (iii) in respect of income tax on citizens of Ukraine, foreign citizens and stateless persons for any payments made on or after the sixtieth day following that day on which the Convention enters into force;

(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article, the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Air Transport Undertakings and their Employees signed at London on 3rd May 1974 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1974 Agreement”) and the Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains signed at London on 31st July 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1985 Convention”) shall cease to have effect as regards the taxes to which this Convention applies in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article.

(3) Where any provision of the 1974 Agreement or the 1985 Convention would have afforded any greater relief from tax than is due under this Convention, any such provision as aforesaid shall continue to have effect: (a) in the United Kingdom, for any year of assessment, financial year or chargeable period, and (b) in Ukraine, for any taxable period beginning, in either case, before the entry into force of this Convention.

Back to contents **Article 30 Termination** This Convention shall remain in force until terminated by one of the Contracting States. Either Contracting State may terminate the Convention, through the diplomatic channel, by giving notice of

termination at least six months before the end of any calendar year beginning after the expiry of five years from the date of entry into force of the Convention.

In such event, the Convention shall cease to have effect:

(a) in the United Kingdom: (i) in respect of income tax and capital gains tax, for any year of assessment beginning on or after 6th April in the calendar year next following that in which the notice is given; (ii) in respect of corporation tax, for any financial year beginning on or after 1st April in the calendar year next following that in which the notice is given;

(b) in Ukraine: (i) in respect of taxes on dividends, interest or royalties for any payments made on or after the sixtieth day following that day on which the notice is given; (ii) in respect of tax on profits (income) of enterprises for any taxation period beginning on or after 1st January in the calendar year next following that in which the notice is given; (iii) in respect of income tax on citizens of Ukraine, foreign citizens and stateless persons for any payments made on or after the sixtieth day following that day on which the notice is given.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have signed this Convention.

Done in duplicate at London this 10th day of February 1993 in the English and Ukrainian languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКІ ДИПЛОМАТИЧНІ ВІДНОСИНИ

(Наталя ЯКОВЕНКО, докторка історичних наук, професорка кафедри міжнародних організацій та дипломатичної служби Навчально-наукового інституту міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка)

Упродовж майже десяти років Збройні сили України героїчно та самовіддано дають відсіч рашистській навалі, розкриваючи весь свій потенціал та докладаючи максимум зусиль для захисту нашої держави, незалежності і свободи. Війна Росії проти Української держави та міжнародного порядку загалом розпочалася ще 2014 року та впродовж певного часу мала форму гібридної. Розгортання ж повномасштабної агресії Росії проти України засвідчило, що топ пріоритетами залучення всіх політичних гравців стали створення міжнародної антирашистської коаліції для перемоги та подальшої відбудови України, санкційна політика і дипломатія, зокрема воєнного часу.

Велика Британія традиційно є однією з провідних держав світу, яка ефективно застосовує дипломатичні засоби для розв'язання міждержавних конфліктів. Трагічні події останніх років в Україні актуалізували дипломатичний аспект двосторонніх відносин, бо саме інструменти і форми дипломатії стають ефективним важелем гальмування кривавого сценарію дій кремля на українській землі. За час російсько-української війни найпоширенішими практичними методами дипломатії обох держав стали: візити і переговори, виступи та промови, спільні конференції, наради, зустрічі, підготовка та укладання спільних угод і договорів, участь у роботі міжнародних організацій, діяльність дипломатичних представництв в обох країнах. Воєнний стан і війна внесли свої корективи у традиції дипломатії, дотримання правил і норм дипломатичного протоколу та етикету, підготовку та проведення дипломатичних заходів. Уже звичними стали зустрічі, бесіди та переговори в онлайн-форматі, нерідко візити на високому та найвищому рівнях були неочікуваними або неанонсованими як з боку України, так і Великої Британії.

Від початку рашистської збройної агресії Велика Британія має, мабуть, найбільш непримиренну позицію стосовно росії та її лідера. Водночас країна демонструє послідовну й ефективну підтримку України, хоч у різні періоди інтерес Сполученого Королівства до розвитку відносин з Україною був неоднаковим, зі значними спадами. Однак були і стрімкі злети – як, наприклад, навесні 2022 року. Тут важлива історична аналогія: як Україна 2022 року опинилася віч-на-віч із Путіним, так само і Британія на початку Другої світової війни 1939 року була сам на сам із Гітлером.

На сьогодні Лондон є одним із найактивніших прихильників прискореного передавання Україні потужних та сучасних систем озброєнь західного виробництва. Відомо, що Велика Британія посідає друге місце (після США) за обсягом військових поставок Україні. Проте неухильна підтримка Сполученого Королівства виявляється не лише у військовій допомозі, вона є багатоаспектною завдяки низці чинників.

На думку експосла України у Великій Британії Вадима Пристайка, для Лондона основною стала реалізація стратегічної концепції «глобальної Британії», яка з'явилася після виходу країни з ЄС і демонструє прагнення держави бути активнішим гравцем на міжнародній арені. На рівні офіційних документів концепт «глобальної Британії» уперше пролунав у меморандумі Міністерства закордонних справ та у справах Співдружності націй у березні 2018 року. Відтоді британський уряд наполегливо намагається втілити його в життя. Експерти також наголошують на винятковій ефективності діяльності українського експосла В. Пристайка, вважають його «топ-послом воєнного часу», за каденції якого було досягнуто найвищого рівня союзництва між Києвом і Лондоном.

Варто також пам'ятати і про традиційні орієнтири британської зовнішньої політики на європейському напрямі. Йдеться про дотримання історичного принципу «балансу сил» на континенті, що унеможливило домінування однієї чи кількох держав. Водночас офіційний Лондон прагне зберегти та посилити свій

вплив як однієї з провідних держав світу. Запорукою досягнення цієї мети стала особлива роль Великої Британії в російсько-українській війні, всебічна підтримка України як незламної держави, здатної захистити народи Європи від рашистської навали. Британія як головний протектор України згодом отримає вагомий внутрішньо-європейський політичний ресурс, що сприятиме зростанню її геополітичної та економічної ролі на глобальному рівні.

LESSON 7. FROM MILITARY TRAINING TO MUSIC: WHAT UNITES UKRAINE AND GREAT BRITAIN

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

Great Britain is truly one of the closest allies of Ukraine today. We can see it from the British military, humanitarian, and financial support, as well as historical encounters. In dark times, we can see the people who stand with Ukrainians for democratic values.

History matters

In medieval times, dynastic marriages brought together distant England and Rus. The daughter of the last Anglo-Saxon king Harold II, Gytha of Wessex was the first wife of Grand Prince of Kyiv Volodymyr Monomakh.

British army built the first railway on the Ukrainian territory near Balaklava during the Crimean War (1853-1856). Grand Central Crimean Railway, as well as raglan clothing, named after the commander of the British troops in Crimea Field Marshal FitzRoy James Henry Somerset, 1st Baron Raglan are the symbols of that war.

Moreover, Welsh engineer John Hughes helped to develop the coal industry in the East of Ukraine in the second half of the XIX century. Contemporary Donetsk city was named after him – Yuzivka (Hughesivka).

One of the first, who reported on the terrible truth of Holodomor 1932-1933 (an artificial famine and genocide of Ukrainians organised by Joseph Stalin and Soviet

authorities), was a British journalist of Welsh origin Gareth Jones. After his two visits to Moscow and Soviet Russia, Jones traveled to the Ukrainian SSR in March 1933, where he witnessed man-made famine, described in the press release, which was published, for example, by «The Manchester Guardian».

Stefan Terlezki, arriving without any money in Britain in 1948, through hard work in local restaurant and hotel business has become a preeminent figure in Welsh politics and sport in the 1960-1970s (local Councillor and Chairman of Cardiff Football Club). Telezki was the first MP (1983-1987) of the British Parliament of Ukrainian origin. He was also the economic adviser of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. For his service to Great Britain and the British nation, Terlezki was appointed the Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire by Queen Elizabeth II in 1992.

The UK recognized the independence of Ukraine on December 31, 1991, and opened the British Embassy in Kyiv at the beginning of 1992.

The official visit of British Prime Minister, Conservative John Major to Ukraine in April 1996 was remembered by the photogenic eating of the lightly salted cucumbers on the Bessarabian Market in the center of Kyiv. John Major called Kyiv «the most beautiful city in the world».

Only once Prince Charles visited Ukraine in November 1996 as a part of his tour. During the 2-days trip, he visited the Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv and the British War Memorial near Sevastopol, where the battle of Balaclava took place in 1854.

In general, British policy towards Ukraine from 1991 until the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) concentrated on multilateral cooperation through supporting the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and NATO. The first joint Ukrainian-British military exercises «Cossack steppe» in the second half of the 1990s were a part of «Partnership for Peace» program of NATO.

How Britain reassured its strategic partnership with Ukraine after 2014

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine started in February 2014 with the attempted annexation of Crimea.

Great Britain was actively involved in SMM OSCE mission in the east of Ukraine as well as providing non-lethal military aid to Ukraine since the autumn of 2014. Apart from humanitarian support for internally displaced persons within the country, affected by the Russian hostilities in the east of Ukraine.

Operation «Orbital», which main aim was training the Armed Forces of Ukraine by British instructors, started in March 2015. These trainings were pivotal for the interoperability among units of the Ukrainian army. During the 7 years (2015-2022) of the Operation Orbital, more than 22 thousand of Ukrainian service people were trained. The 2016 Brexit referendum reoriented British foreign policy from a focus on the European Union to a focus on bilateral and trilateral relationships.

The visits of Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson to Kyiv in September 2016 and March 2017 were moments of reaffirming the British support of Ukraine in terms of prolonging Operation «Orbital» as well as personnel reinforcement of SMM OSCE on the frontline in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The official visit of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky to London in October 2020 became a turning point of the Ukrainian-British relations, which transformed into bilateral strategic partnership. The signing of Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine opened a new chapter in our cooperation.

British support of Ukraine after February 24, 2022

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on February 24, 2022, has drastically changed European and global security. Great Britain reacted by providing Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian support and condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Even beforehand, in late January 2022, Great Britain gave Ukraine military aid with NLAW missile systems that played a vital part in the defense efforts in the first months of the full-scale war. The trilateral British-Polish-Ukrainian security alliance was also formed with the goal of jointly improving cybersecurity, increasing energy security, and countering disinformation. The idea originated from the Foreign Minister

of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba in October 2021, and it was negotiated with London and Warsaw at the end of January 2022. The alliance was officially announced during the visit of Foreign Secretary Liz Truss to Kyiv in mid-February 2022.

Three visits of PM Boris Johnson to Ukraine after February 24 were an example of bravery and a true partnership. During his June visit to Kyiv, Johnson announced the start of the UK-based training mission of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Operation INTERFLEX. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Australia joined it.



10 thousand Ukrainian defenders have been trained in Britain during 2022, and 20 thousand more are expected in 2023.

The next PM Liz Truss and the current leader of the Cabinet, Rishi Sunak, continued the policy regarding Ukraine. For instance, in January 2023 the UK announced the provision of Ukraine with 14 Challenger II main battle tanks, becoming a pioneer of the tank coalition. Moreover, on May 11, the UK government announced the decision to transfer Storm Shadow missiles with an operational range of up to almost 200 miles to Ukraine.

Cultural diplomacy and British-Ukrainian relations

Cultural diplomacy as a way of communicating with the world became more widely practiced within the Ukrainian government and civil society after 2014. Dmytro Kuleba was among those diplomats who established public and cultural diplomacy as a particular vector of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs activities. One of the main tasks has been to put Ukrainian history and culture into a more global context. UK/Ukraine season culture, co-organized by Ukrainian Institute and British Council, started in 2022 and has a very ambitious goal – to present Ukrainian culture to the British, and British culture to the Ukrainians. It is done through cinema festivals, literary exhibitions, and performances.

Ukrainian Institute (London) and Cambridge Ukrainian Studies are key organizations, which help with explaining the peculiarities of Ukraine's past and present in Great Britain. You can study the Ukrainian language, literature, and art in a wider context through their educational and cultural projects. For example, the play «Cassandra» written by Lesia Ukrainka and brilliantly translated into English by Nina Murray has recently been staged in Cambridge and Oxford.

Moreover, those cultural connections are built not just by institutions, but by people. For instance, London-based Ukrainian chef and food writer Olia Hercules describes the traditions of Ukrainian cuisine in her books, which became bestsellers in Great Britain. For Hercules cooking is about solidarity and supporting each other.

Chef Yurii Kovryzhenko co-founded a restaurant of Ukrainian cuisine Mriya. Mriya is «Ukraine's culinary embassy» for him and his colleagues, who opened it in London in July 2022. They are cooking a «lighter version of Ukrainian cuisine», following trends of healthy food with less cholesterol. Yurii proved that such stolen by Russia/Soviet Union dishes as borshch or Chicken Kyiv are actually Ukrainian ones.

Eurovision Song Contest has also been an event that could unite nations throughout the years. In 2023, UK is hosting on behalf of Ukraine after the Ukrainian band «Kalush Orchestra» won in 2022. Due to the ongoing war, it was impossible to host the contest in Ukraine, so Liverpool hospitably welcomed the event along with

many Ukrainian artists, musical performances, and exhibitions. Liverpool is famous for being a British music center, where, for example, the Beatles started their career.

The slogan of Liverpool Eurovision is «United by music». British and Ukrainian people are united by democratic values, the willingness to fight for freedom and never give up, even during the dark times.

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКІ ДИПЛОМАТИЧНІ ВІДНОСИНИ

(Наталя ЯКОВЕНКО, докторка історичних наук, професорка кафедри міжнародних організацій та дипломатичної служби Навчально-наукового інституту міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка)

Безумовно, одним із найважливіших аспектів двосторонніх відносин є дипломатичний. Ще до початку повномасштабної рашистської агресії спостерігали пришвидшений розвиток українсько-британських відносин після підписання угоди про політичне співробітництво, вільну торгівлю і 168 стратегічне партнерство між Британією й Україною у грудні 2020 року.

Це перша після Брекзиту масштабна міжнародна угода Сполученого Королівства. У договірній практиці України вона також матиме особливий статус, адже стала першою двосторонньою рамковою угодою, яка встановила засади справді стратегічного партнерства та глибокої економічної співпраці й лібералізації ринків. Цей амбітний документ було розроблено і підписано за рекордні для міжнародної дипломатичної практики терміни. Угода підтвердила наявну та надала подальшого політичного поштовху майбутній двосторонній

співпраці між Києвом і Лондоном у сфері безпеки та оборони, поглибила військову та військово-технічну взаємодію. Борис Джонсон багато разів наголошував, що «український порядок денний» створює додаткові можливості для солідаризації зі союзниками. Ескалацію конфлікту (неоголошеної війни) на південному сході України навесні 2021 року супроводжували заяви британського керівництва про готовність спільно з ЄС і США підтримувати Київ. Зокрема, в березні 2021 року лідери Групи семи (українське питання було вписане до порядку денного під час головування Лондона у G7 як найважливіший елемент об'єднання союзників та відновлення євроатлантичної солідарності) вкотре виступили із заявами у зв'язку з роковинами анексії Криму та засудили дії Москви, які «підривають суверенітет і територіальну цілісність України».

Напередодні повномасштабного рашистського вторгнення вже була спроба створити новий формат політичної співпраці в Європі. Зокрема, Україна, Велика Британія та Польща анонсували створення тристороннього альянсу, аби реагувати на загрози європейської безпеки та посилювати економічну взаємодію між країнами. Новий альянс, як зазначав глава МЗС України Дмитро Кулеба, ґрунтується не на локальній географії, а на спільних принципах України, Польщі і Британії, прагненні зміцнювати безпеку і розвивати торгівлю, готовності до конкретних дій. Ініціативу заснування такого формату, який би став частиною стратегії малих альянсів як проактивної зовнішньої політики України, офіційний Київ запропонував ще в жовтні 2021 року. І хоч ідея тристоронньої співпраці належить українській стороні, її авторство нерідко приписують Лондону через те, що однією з перших оголосила про неї тодішня Міністерка закордонних справ Великої Британії Ліз Трасс.

Згідно з результатами соціологічних опитувань, ідею міждержавних військово-політичних союзів з країнами Європи підтримали в Україні у всіх групах – регіональних, вікових та за майновим становищем. Зокрема, за створення тристороннього союзу «Україна – Польща – Велика Британія»

висловилися 85% українських громадян; також 80% респондентів відповіли, що позитивно ставляться до союзу «Україна – Польща – Литва».

На жаль, зазначений проєкт так і не реалізували: альянс документально не задекларовано, його створення формально пригальмували. На відміну від Києва, у Варшаві та Лондоні бракувало запиту на розвиток українсько-польсько-британського союзу, а про те, що саме визначення «союз» сприймали в обох столицях доволі неоднозначно, годі й казати. Ні в Лондоні, ні у Варшаві не мали відповіді на запитання, що три країни могли втілити в межах трикутника, чого було неможливо досягнути у двосторонньому форматі. Декларування ідеї мало чималий медійний супровід (найбільший в Україні, трохи в Польщі і найменший у Британії). Але на операційному рівні проєкт майже забули, ніхто цією темою у Форін Офісі Сполученого Королівства надто не опікувався. Початок повномасштабної рашистської агресії (24 лютого 2022 року) став справжнім викликом для британсько-української дипломатичної співпраці та новою точкою відліку в побудові повноцінної дипломатії воєнного часу. Позаяк саме у воєнний період необхідно було задіяти та активізувати всі потужні дипломатичні інструменти обох держав.

LESSON 8. POLICY PAPER: UK SUPPORT TO UKRAINE: FACTSHEET

Updated 30 May 2025

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine poses a serious threat to UK prosperity and security. We are proud to be a leading partner in providing vital support to Ukraine.

In total, the UK has committed £18 billion for Ukraine:

- £13 billion in military support (including our £2.26 billion ERA Loan contribution)
- £5 billion in non-military support

Diplomacy

- the UK, alongside France, is leading efforts to build a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to defend any peace deal and support Ukraine’s future security
- the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership is fostering broader and closer collaboration across 9 key pillars, including defence and security, science and technology, and economy and trade (signed at leader-level on 16 January 2025)
- both leaders announced the intention to restart our bilateral Strategic Dialogue this year. The inaugural meetings took place in 2021
- the UK has supported UNGA resolutions condemning:
 - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: 24 February 2025, 23 February 2023 and 2 March 2022
 - Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure, including nuclear facilities: 24 July 2024
 - Russia’s attempted illegal annexation of 4 eastern Ukrainian regions: 12 October 2022
- we regularly use the UN Security Council to condemn Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and reaffirm that Russian disinformation, false accusations and violations of UNSC resolutions will not deter our steadfast support for Ukraine. This included the Foreign Secretary using the UK’s November 2024 Council Presidency to mark 1,000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and reiterate the importance for the world of Putin failing
- we use the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a forum to hold Russia accountable:
 - the Foreign Secretary spoke at the Reinforced Permanent Council to set out our continued support for Ukraine (24 February 2025)
 - UK representatives sit across the table from the Russian delegation to deliver interventions every week, calling out malign Russian behaviour, combatting disinformation and isolating it diplomatically

- we have supported the OSCE’s Support Programme for Ukraine financially and highlighted Russian human rights abuses in Ukraine via the OSCE’s formal fact-finding missions (known as the Moscow Mechanism), which have published 4 reports since February 2022

- we use the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to show UK support for the IAEA’s efforts towards nuclear safety in Ukraine, particularly at ZNPP (Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant). We hold Russia directly accountable for the nuclear safety and security challenges Ukraine now faces, including from Russia’s missile strikes on Ukraine’s energy grid

Military

- to date, the UK has committed £10.8 billion in military support for Ukraine since the invasion and we will sustain £3 billion a year in military aid until 2030 to 2031 and for as long as it takes (announced on 10 July 2024)

- we are contributing £2.26 billion to the G7 ‘Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration’ Loans for Ukraine, to be repaid using profits generated by seized Russian assets. Two thirds of the UK’s contribution has now been disbursed to Ukraine, with the second £752 million payment having been made on 14 April 2025

- the UK therefore expects to provide £4.5 billion in support of Ukraine this year – more than in any previous year (16 January 2025)

- we have sent around 400 different capabilities to Ukraine, with packages including drones, tanks, boats, air defence systems, munitions and lightweight multirole missiles. We are contributing £350 million to a new £450 million package of military support, which will support repairs and maintenance as well as funding radar systems, anti-tank mines and hundreds of thousands of drones (11 April 2025)

- 30,000 new attack and surveillance drones will be delivered to Ukraine via the UK and Latvia-led drone coalition (9 January 2025). £7.5 million was invested by the UK (19 November 2024)

- Ukraine has received a new rapidly-developed bespoke air defence system called Gravehawk, jointly funded by the UK and Denmark. Two prototypes of the air

defence capability system were tested in Ukraine in September, and a further 15 will follow this year (16 January 2025)

- our UK-Ukraine Defence Industrial Support Treaty expanded the range of military equipment that could be funded through £3.5 billion of UK Export Finance-guaranteed loans (signed on 19 July 2024). A new deal worth £1.6 billion will see Thales supply 5,000 lightweight multirole missiles manufactured in Belfast (2 March 2025)

- we have trained over 54,000 Ukrainian personnel in the UK under Operation INTERFLEX and the training scheme has been extended until at least the end of 2025

- as part of Operation INTERFLEX, we will train 180 Ukrainian soldiers to be combat mental resilience practitioners on the frontlines in 2025 – nearly double the 100 trained in 2024 (28 December 2024)

- a £20 million uplift in funding supports wounded Ukrainian troops through the UK's Project Renovator. The project has been repairing and upgrading a military rehabilitation hospital in Ukraine and providing training to Ukrainian surgeons, doctors and nurses (24 February 2025)

- we administer the International Fund for Ukraine to procure military equipment: over £1.5 billion has been pledged to the International Fund for Ukraine to date, including new contracts worth £30 million for Anduril UK to supply cutting-edge drones (6 March 2025)

Non-military

- the UK's non-military commitments to Ukraine since the start of the invasion come to £5 billion. This includes:

- £4.1 billion in fiscal support through World Bank loan guarantees to bolster Ukraine's economic stability and support vital public services. This includes a multi-year commitment announced at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2023

- £977 million committed in bilateral assistance to the end of the financial year 2024 to 2025. We committed £282 million in bilateral assistance in 2024 to 2025, to

fund humanitarian, energy, stabilisation, reform, recovery and reconstruction programmes

Humanitarian

- the UK provided over £120 million in humanitarian assistance in 2024 to 2025, bringing our total humanitarian contribution to over £477 million for Ukraine and the region from the start of the full-scale invasion to the end of the financial year 2024 to 2025

- almost £25 million in new funding will support local Ukrainian organisations to protect the most vulnerable who continue to suffer from Russia's ongoing aggression (9 May 2025)

- we have provided £8.6 million to HALO Trust for demining and we have extended HALO Trust's contract for 2025 to 2026, providing a further £4.3 million to support their work in Ukraine. Our demining efforts supported the clearance of over 511,000 square metres of land (May 2022 to March 2025)

Recovery and reconstruction

- the UK co-hosted the London Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2023, raising over \$60 billion

- war risk insurance is being provided through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), part of the World Bank group, and through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to boost inward investment into Ukraine

- UK Export Finance has committed £3.5 billion of financial support for critical reconstruction, energy and defence projects in Ukraine. This support has already enabled the reconstruction of 6 key bridges in the Kyiv region and the delivery of mine countermeasure vessels

- through our development finance institution, British International Investment (BII), we are working in partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to make trade finance available to support critical imports and exports to

and from Ukraine. BII intend to provide up to £30 million in finance (11 September 2024)

- our Good Governance Fund for Ukraine, a £38 million 3-year technical assistance programme, counters corruption and supports reform
- a new £50 million economic recovery programme will unlock hundreds of millions of pounds worth of private lending to bolster the growth and resilience of small and medium businesses in Ukraine (£40 million announced 12 January 2025, £10 million boost announced 5 February 2025)

Energy

- overall, the UK has committed over £400 million for energy security and resilience in Ukraine through grant, in-kind support and loan guarantees
- as part of this, we have committed £84 million to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund to support repairs, protection and power generation
- our most recent commitment to the UESF was made by the Prime Minister, when he announced £20 million to support emergency energy needs (17 December 2024)
- this builds on the £20 million to support essential repairs and protection to the power network (announced 11 September 2024)
- UK Export Finance has concluded negotiations to provide £181 million of support to pay Urenco to supply enriched uranium to help power Ukraine and maintain its independence from Russian fuel (18 July 2024)
- we have committed £17 million for a second round of the UK's Innovate Ukraine Green Energy Competition, bringing our total investment to £33 million. This will support UK and Ukrainian innovators to help rebuild a greener and more resilient energy grid (5 February 2025)

Sanctions

- the UK has sanctioned over 2,500 individuals, entities and ships under the Russia sanctions regime, over 2,300 of which have been sanctioned since Putin's full-scale invasion

- UK, US and EU sanctions have deprived Russia of over \$450 billion in revenue since February 2022, equivalent to around 3 more years of funding for the invasion

- the UK has now sanctioned over 250 ships for transporting Russian energy. According to some estimates, sanctions against the shadow fleet by the UK and our partners have already collectively crippled it with 200 ships sidelined – that’s almost half of its overall capacity (46%)

- Russian oil revenues were down 27% in 2024 (January to November) compared to the same period in 2022

- this government has imposed sanctions against:

- 100 targets across Russian energy and financial services sectors, the Russian military industrial complex and its third country suppliers, and malign actors involved in democratic interference and Russia’s information war on Ukraine (20 May 2025)

- 110 more oil tankers – the largest package of sanctions against the shadow fleet (9 May 2025)

- over 100 targets, including 40 oil tankers aiding Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine and Russia’s military supply chains – our largest package of sanctions in over 2 years (24 February 2025)

War crimes and justice

- the UK announced £4.5 million of new funding to support Ukraine’s domestic war crimes investigations (29 December 2024). As of March 2025, our overall contribution stands at £11.3 million

- we have also given an additional £2.3 million to the International Criminal Court

- the Foreign Secretary endorsed the draft legal texts to establish a Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine under the framework of the Council of Europe (9 May 2025)

- we are a founding member and Chair of the Conference of Participants of the Register of Damage for Ukraine, which allows Ukrainians to record losses, injury or damage as a result of the war
- we are supporting Ukraine's efforts to establish a Claims Commission for Ukraine that would assess the claims submitted under the Register of Damage. We are a member of the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee and took part in the second round of negotiations in May (12 to 15 May 2025)

Trade

- the UK-Ukraine Digital Trade Agreement entered into force facilitating duty-free digital content trade (1 September 2024)
- the UK-Ukraine TechBridge delivers projects in mutual trade, investment, innovation research and digital skills development
- our City-Ukraine Hub leverages UK expertise to deliver capacity building projects
- our military aid and insurance through the UK-developed Unity facility has supported the Black Sea maritime corridor and enabled Ukraine to keep exporting its goods. Ukraine is on track to export all of its 2024 harvest – crucial for global food security and Ukraine's economy
- UK-Ukraine Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement enables UK businesses to benefit from tariff free trade on all goods until 31 March 2029 (tariffs on eggs and poultry removed until 31 March 2026) (8 February 2024)
- For further information visit the Department for Business and Trade's Ukraine page.

Ukrainians in the UK

- 223,400 Ukrainians have arrived in the UK, including 164,700 through Homes for Ukraine (as of 31 March 2025)
- the Ukraine Permission Extension (UPE) scheme opened on 4 February 2025 and provides an additional 18 months permission and a continuation of the same

rights and entitlements for Ukrainians in the UK on the Ukraine schemes. 6,637 UPE applications have been granted (as of 31 March 2025)

EXERCISE №2 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКІ ДИПЛОМАТИЧНІ ВІДНОСИНИ

(Наталя ЯКОВЕНКО, докторка історичних наук, професорка кафедри міжнародних організацій та дипломатичної служби Навчально-наукового інституту міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка)

Початок повномасштабної рашистської агресії (24 лютого 2022 року) став справжнім викликом для британсько-української дипломатичної співпраці та новою точкою відліку в побудові повноцінної дипломатії воєнного часу. Позаяк саме у воєнний період необхідно було задіяти та активізувати всі потужні дипломатичні інструменти обох держав.

Увагу українсько-британської дипломатичної взаємодії було зосереджено на таких проблемах: надання Україні військово-технічної допомоги для протистояння агресору; пошук умов політико-дипломатичної деескалації та припинення війни; зменшення масштабів гуманітарної катастрофи в Україні; фіксування та документування фактів воєнних та інших тяжких злочинів, які скоїли російські окупанти; посилення санкційного тиску на РФ; формування механізмів притягнення до відповідальності за злочин агресії; надання фінансової та гуманітарної допомоги Україні від іноземних партнерів та міжнародних організацій; забезпечення гідних умов перебування українських

біженців за кордоном; залучення іноземних коштів для реалізації президентської Формули миру, гарантій безпеки України тощо.

Велика Британія однією з перших надала зброю для оборони України та, як і її західні союзники, запровадила масштабні санкції проти Росії. Окрім постачання озброєння, Лондон також навчає тисячі українських військовослужбовців. Британія – один із найпослідовніших союзників України у війні за незалежність. Британський часопис «The Economist» визнав Україну «країною 2022 року», відзначивши героїзм, винахідливість, стійкість і натхнення українців. Через інтенсивні дипломатичні контакти українська влада сподівалася дещо знизити безпекові виклики. Помітну роль у цьому відіграв британський Прем'єр-міністр Борис Джонсон. Саме він допоміг об'єднати західних лідерів у наданні військової допомоги Києву, а також став першим закордонним керівником, який прибув із візитом до української столиці після початку повномасштабного російського вторгнення. Як Прем'єр-міністр Великої Британії Борис Джонсон двічі відвідував Україну, а загалом за час війни він приїжджав чотири рази.

Про перший візит Б. Джонсона до Києва 9 квітня 2022 року не повідомляли заздалегідь, хоч ще 21 березня таблоїд «Daily Mail» написав, що британський прем'єр розглядає можливість поїздки до Києва, щоб продемонструвати підтримку боротьбі України проти РФ. За підсумками переговорів із Президентом України Володимиром Зеленським Борис Джонсон пообіцяв додатково надати Києву 120 одиниць бронетехніки та нові протикорабельні ракетні системи.

Під час другого візиту в червні 2022 року британський прем'єр запропонував Президенту України започаткувати масштабну програму навчання українських захисників. Було передбачено, що кожні 120 днів підготовку проходять 10 тисяч українських воїнів. Зокрема, кожен солдат матиме три тижні навчання, упродовж яких опануватиме навички, необхідні на передовій, основи медичної підготовки, кібербезпеки і тактики противибухового захисту.

Варто зауважити, що в межах попередньої навчальної місії «Орбітал» Британія, починаючи з 2015 року, навчила більш як 22 тисячі українських військовослужбовців.

Наприкінці листопада 2022 року Київрада ухвалила рішення про присвоєння Борису Джонсону звання Почесного громадянина міста Києва. Вручили нагороду в Українському домі у Давосі.

На Всесвітньому економічному форумі в Давосі Прем'єр-міністр Великої Британії закликав держави світу надати українцям танки. «Треба дати Зеленському всі інструменти, яких він потребує, щоб закінчити справу. І вони виграють!» – емоційно виголосив тоді Джонсон. Політик і раніше неодноразово демонстрував свою принципову позицію щодо Росії. Упродовж своєї діяльності у Форін Офісі Джонсон проводив жорстку політику стосовно РФ, зокрема вислав двадцять трьох її дипломатів після отруєння колишнього шпигуна Сергія Скрипаля.

Підтримка України в нинішніх умовах – це не особиста примха Бориса Джонсона і навіть не позиція владної Консервативної партії. Це – консенсусне ставлення політичних еліт Великої Британії. На думку українського політолога Володимира Фесенка, «це відображення національних інтересів Великої Британії, зокрема в протистоянні російській агресії».

Як зазначає інтернет-видання «Європейська правда», на підставі результатів соціологічних опитувань можна припустити, що завдяки особистій ролі Прем'єр-міністра Бориса Джонсона і значній збройній допомозі напередодні повномасштабного вторгнення та після нього Велика Британія посіла одне з провідних місць у списку найбільших союзників України з показником 62%. Порівняймо: за рік до великої війни Британію згадали менше 7% опитаних.

Серію візитів британських лідерів до Української держави продовжив уже наступник Бориса Джонсона Ріші Сунак. Цікаво, що свій перший закордонний візит на посаді Прем'єр-міністра Великої Британії він пообіцяв нанести саме в Україну. Попри те, що приїзд Ріші Сунака анонсували майже відразу після того,

як його обрали главою британського уряду, конкретної дати не називали (з дипломатичного погляду в цьому немає нічого дивного, зважаючи на умови воєнного часу). «Я пишаюся тим, як Велика Британія з самого початку підтримувала Україну. І приїхав, щоб сказати, що Велика Британія та наші союзники продовжуватимуть підтримувати Україну, оскільки вона бореться за припинення цієї варварської війни та встановлення справедливого миру», – сказав Сунак під час зустрічі з Володимиром Зеленським 19 листопада 2022 року в Києві.

LESSON 9. SECURITY GUARANTEES TO UKRAINE

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

What has NATO offered Ukraine?

Measures agree at the Vilnius summit in July 2023

Although no timeframe was offered to Ukraine, NATO leaders provided a clearer path to membership at the Vilnius summit in July 2023. The summit agreed a three-part package of political and practical support.

Despite not offering a clear timeline for accession, President Zelenskyy said, “what’s most important is to have results” and that “we can see some specific points, making us close to NATO”.

Exemption from Membership Action Plan process

Ukraine will not be required to complete the Membership Action Plan process, which is a programme of advice, assistance and practical support offered to aspiring NATO nations. Ukraine’s path to membership will now be a one-step process with an invitation extended when allies agree and conditions on membership are met.

Creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council

The NATO-Ukraine Council replaces the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which has, since 1997, been the main body through which the NATO-Ukraine relationship has developed and the forum through which consultation on issues of common security concern has taken place. To assist in the commission’s work, in 2008 an Annual National Programme (ANP) was developed to help guide Ukraine’s reform efforts.

At Vilnius, the decision was taken to replace the commission with the NATO-Ukraine Council, to reflect the strengthening of political ties and the increasing integration of Ukraine within NATO. The council is a joint body where allies and Ukraine sit as equal participants (as opposed to a meeting of NATO allies and a partner). It will provide for joint consultations, decision making (unlike the previous commission) and serve as a crisis consultation mechanism between NATO and Ukraine.

Unlike the NATO-Ukraine Commission, Ukraine will itself be able to convene a meeting of the council for crisis consultations. NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has described the council as “a much stronger, much more important political entity” than the partnership established by the NATO-Ukraine Commission.⁴

The inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council took place on 12 July 2023. The Council has met several times over the course of 2023 and early 2024 to:

- Address the security situation in the Black Sea and Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative
- Take forward the measures agreed at Vilnius
- Discuss energy security
- Look at Ukraine’s Annual National Programme for 2024
- Discuss air defence.
- Strengthen Ukraine’s defences against Russian attacks on its critical national infrastructure.

Military assistance to Ukraine

A multi-year programme of military assistance will help the Ukrainian armed forces rebuild, transition from Soviet-era doctrine and equipment, and become fully interoperable with NATO forces. That programme will be based on the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), which was established in 2016 and supplemented at the Madrid Summit in 2022.

Under the enhanced CAP, allies will also support Ukraine in dealing with the “physical and social consequences of war”, including support for demining efforts, medical assistance and examining lessons learned.

The Washington Declaration – July 2024

At its summit in Washington in July 2024, NATO described Ukraine’s path to membership as “irreversible” and reaffirmed the view adopted at its 2023 summit that Ukraine’s future “is in NATO”. However, the Alliance did not extend an invitation to Ukraine to join; that will be when allies “agree and conditions are met”. The declaration suggested Ukraine still has work to do, on interoperability, and democratic and security sector reforms.

The summit focused more on what assistance NATO could provide to Ukraine, describing the decisions the alliance took as constituting a “bridge” to Ukraine’s membership in NATO. These decisions include:

- Establishing a NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine command to coordinate the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine by NATO allies and partners. That NATO-led effort will work in tandem with the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group which will continue to “orchestrate worldwide support” for Ukraine.

- A pledge of long-term security assistance for Ukraine, to provide military equipment, assistance and training. Allies intend to provide a “minimum baseline funding of €40 billion within the next year”. That commitment extends to all costs related to the provision of military equipment, assistance (including non-lethal aid and investment in Ukraine’s defence industry) and training. Allies will aim to meet this pledge through proportional contributions, according to their share of Alliance GDP.

- Establish a NATO-Ukraine joint analysis, training and education centre to identify and apply lessons from the conflict and increase Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO.

- Appointment of a senior NATO Representative in Ukraine.

G7 security guarantees

On the sidelines of the Vilnius summit in July 2023, and outside of the framework of NATO, members of the G7 (the US, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan) signed a Joint Declaration committing to the creation of long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.

While the G7 Declaration creates a framework, those guarantees are being formalised through bilateral security commitments and arrangements, in accordance with the legal and constitutional requirements of each country. The intention is for those agreements to expire once Ukraine achieves NATO membership.

To date, 32 countries have signed the Joint Declaration.

Objectives of the security guarantees

Those bilateral agreements would be framed according to the following objectives:

- Ensuring sustainable Ukrainian forces capable of defending Ukraine and deterring Russian aggression in the future. To achieve that end, any arrangements will include:

- Continued provision of security assistance and modern military equipment across the land, air and sea domains. Priority capabilities will include air defence, artillery and long-range weapons, armoured vehicles and combat air assets, such as fast jet aircraft. Increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners will be a key objective.

- Intelligence sharing and cooperation.

- Training and training exercises for Ukrainian armed forces. – Support to develop Ukraine's defence industrial base.

- Support for cyber defence and to address security and resilience, including the ability to respond to hybrid threats.

- Strengthening Ukraine's economic stability and resilience, including through reconstruction and recovery efforts.

- Providing technical and financial support for Ukraine’s immediate needs arising from the Russian invasion, as well as enabling Ukraine to continue implementing the reform agenda, which underpins its aspirations to EU and NATO membership.

Commitments regarding future aggression by Russia

In the event of future aggression by Russia, the G7 declaration commits its signatories to “immediately consult with Ukraine to determine appropriate next steps”. Specific bilateral arrangements will set out the intention to provide Ukraine with “swift and sustained” security assistance, military equipment, economic assistance and to consult with Ukraine on its needs as it exercises its right to self-defence under the UN Charter. Economic and other costs will also be imposed on Russia. What the arrangements will not replicate is the Article V mutual defence clause that lies at the heart of the NATO alliance.

The Joint Declaration also reiterates the intention of the G7 member states to hold Russia accountable for its actions, including war crimes and other international crimes committed in, and against, Ukraine. Russian sovereign assets will also be held in the respective jurisdictions of each country until Russia pays reparations to Ukraine. To enable reparations, the declaration recognises the need for an international mechanism to be established.

The declaration also states that the EU and its member states, “stand ready to contribute to this effort” and welcomes the participation of any other countries that wish to contribute.

Precedents for the Joint Declaration

The G7 declaration is the first time that this many countries have collectively agreed to establish comprehensive long-term security arrangements with another country. However, it is not entirely without precedent. After Sweden and Finland were formally invited to join NATO in June 2022, some allies, including the UK, offered bilateral security assurances to both countries should either be attacked during the

accession period. President Biden also compared any US agreement to the security assistance that the US provides to Israel.

Not a substitute for NATO membership

President Zelenskyy welcomed the commitment to long term security guarantees for Ukraine but made clear that they cannot be viewed as a substitute for eventual Ukrainian membership of NATO. In a press conference on 12 July 2023, he said that while “these guarantees will be valid on our way to NATO... the best guarantee for Ukraine is to be in NATO”.

This was a view shared by former UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. Calling the security guarantees a “new high point in international support for Ukraine”, he said that the commitments “are not a substitute for NATO membership”.

President Biden has said that Ukrainian NATO membership “is going to happen”, referring to the security commitments as “commitments we were going to make... until it becomes official”.

Acknowledging that Ukraine cannot join NATO until allies agree and conditions are met, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, described the need for “credible arrangements” for Ukraine’s security to be in place once the war ends. He subsequently welcomed the plan to extend security guarantees independently of NATO.

What was Russia’s initial response? Speaking to reporters on 13 July 2023, President Putin responded to questions about the G7 security guarantees. Suggesting that there was “nothing unusual in what NATO and the G7 have announced”, and that Ukraine had the right to ensure its own security, he also went on to stress that it could only be done “if the Russian Federation’s security is provided for in full”.

Russia’s arguments about the international principle of indivisibility of security, and that one country cannot ensure its security at the expense of another, dominated diplomatic discussions before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov went one step further, however, and called the security guarantees “dangerous”, saying they were “doing us [Russia] harm and we will take this into consideration”.

The UK becomes the first country to formalise security guarantees

On 12 January 2024, then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced that the UK and Ukraine had concluded a ten-year security cooperation agreement, making the UK the first country to deliver on the wider commitment to provide long-term security guarantees.

The government described that agreement as “the first step in developing an unshakeable hundred-year partnership between Ukraine and the United Kingdom”. It builds upon a 15-year Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation that was signed in March 2016 and a Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement that was agreed in November 2020. The new agreement is wide ranging in its ambition, but is centred around two main objectives:

- It formalises the support that the UK has been providing, and will continue to provide, including the provision of modern military equipment (primarily through Capability Coalitions), intelligence sharing, protection of critical national infrastructure, cyber security assistance, medical and military training and long-term defence industrial cooperation, including joint programmes, the localisation of repair and maintenance and the manufacturing of UK defence equipment in Ukraine. It also outlines long-term support for defence governance and civil-military reform.

- It commits the UK to consult with Ukraine, within 24 hours, if it is attacked by Russia in the future and to provide “swift and sustained” security assistance. It does not oblige the UK, however, to come to Ukraine’s defence with the deployment of forces. The long-term aim is to support an independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, capable of deterring and defending against future attacks, as well as to deepen Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO, and to accelerate Ukraine’s transition to NATO equipment and standards.

Beyond the security sphere, the agreement also sets out the commitment to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, including through continued humanitarian support and for the country’s future integration into the EU and NATO, including support for continued political and economic reform.

The agreement notes that the legacy effect created by the war, such as the liberation of occupied territory, the transition from martial law, and the need to meet public expectations, will require Ukraine's institutions to be well adapted to manage such challenges. The provisions of this agreement came into force upon signature.

What about the other G7 countries and the EU? The G7

Bilateral security agreements have been concluded with all the G7 member countries. All are similar in scope to the agreement concluded with the UK. They have a ten-year duration, can be terminated with six months' notice by either side and will expire upon Ukraine's accession to NATO. They do not impose legal rights or obligations on either party and in the face of future Russian aggression, allies commit to consultation and the provision of any assistance that is deemed appropriate.

In line with its pacifist constitution, the Japanese Accord also focuses solely on the provision of non-lethal defence and security assistance:

- Agreement on security cooperation between Ukraine and France, 16 February 2024
- Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany, 16 February 2024
- Agreement on security cooperation between Canada and Ukraine, 24 February 2024
- Agreement on security cooperation between Italy and Ukraine, 24 February 2024
- Accord on support for Ukraine and cooperation between the Government of Japan and Ukraine, 13 June 2024
- Bilateral security agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine, 13 June 2024

United States

President Biden and President Zelenskyy signed the US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement during a meeting of the G7 in June 2024. As an executive agreement it does not require Congressional approval.

The US administration said the agreement “is sending a powerful signal of our strong support for Ukraine now and into the future” and along with the “mutually reinforcing” agreements signed with other allies and partners provides “a key part of Ukraine’s bridge to NATO membership”.

In terms of the funding required to underpin the US agreement, the White House has said that it will “work closely with the U.S. Congress to build on the national security supplemental and develop sustainable levels of assistance to Ukraine over the long term” and that it would work with allies and partners to “maintain a balanced division of responsibility and burden-sharing to meet the necessary capabilities for Ukraine’s future force”.

The six-month termination clause within the agreement would, however, allow any future President to withdraw from its obligations, should they so decide.

EU joint security commitments

In June 2024, the EU also agreed a document setting out joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine.

Similar in scope to previously agreed documents, it sets out the overarching commitments of the EU, and its member states, to the long-term security of Ukraine “which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilisation efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future”.

The agreement will remain in effect “as Ukraine pursues its European path” and will be reviewed after ten years. It is the first EU document of its kind that commits the EU to consult with a third country in the event of future aggression.

Individual European countries are also concluding bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. Among them are Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Latvia. At the time of writing the Czech Republic and Slovenia are the latest countries to sign agreements, having done so at the meeting of the European Political Community on 18 July 2024. The EU agreement notes that those bilateral security commitments are “complementary and mutually reinforcing” and that the EU will “facilitate

coordination between Member States...and cooperate with other partners on the implementation of respective security commitments”.

The Ukraine Compact

On 11 July 2024, a year after the signing of the original G7 Declaration, the US and other signatories to the Declaration launched the Ukraine Compact. The Compact creates what the US calls a “unified and comprehensive security architecture to support Ukraine today and in the future, in war and in peace”. It is collectively based on all the bilateral security cooperation agreements that have been signed to date.

The Compact does not set out any additional commitments. It reaffirms that: the security of Ukraine is integral to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, and that we [the signatories] intend to support Ukraine until it prevails against Russia’s aggression; and confirms that a more coordinated and accelerated effort will be made to deliver on the commitments outlined in those bilateral security agreements, in particular through existing multilateral mechanisms such as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the new NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine mechanism and the EU Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine.

The Compact was signed by Ukraine and the 24 countries, and the EU, which have concluded security cooperation agreements to date. Further countries can join the Compact once a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine has been concluded.

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

УКРАЇНСЬКО-БРИТАНСЬКІ ВІДНОСИНИ В КУЛЬТУРО-ІСТОРИЧНОМУ КОНТЕКСТІ (2022–2023)

(Гриценко, Г., & Яцула Є-П. (2024). Проблеми гуманітарних наук: збірник наукових праць Дрогобицького державного педагогічного університету імені Івана Франка. Серія Історія, Спецвипуск, 124–129. doi: <https://doi.org/10.24919/2312-2595.spec.11>)

Починаючи від лютого 2022 р. поза межами України було проведено чимало культурних й мистецьких заходів різних рівнів (від персонального, інституційного до загальнодержавного), форматах (разові події, окремі проєкти, частини міжнародних форумів) та формах (арт, аналітика, дискусії тощо). Велику роль у розповсюдження інформації про Україну та її культуру, війну Росії в Україні відіграють публікації вітчизняних авторів та авторок у світових ЗМІ, англомовні медійні ініціативи, наприклад, цикл PEN Ukraine «Діалоги про війну» і т.д.

З метою посилення культурного обміну Велика Британія та Україна провели Сезон культури Британія / Україна (травень-листопад) 2022 р., для відзначення 30-річчя дипломатичних відносин та сформування ще тіснішого партнерства між двома країнами. Про проведення заходу повідомили міністри Ліз Трасс та Дмитро Кулеба, під час зустрічі «Діалог із стратегічного партнерства», що відбулась в Лондоні.

Для святкування цієї річниці Британська Рада й Український інститут об'єднали зусилля в організації захопливого двостороннього культурного проєкту співробітництва. Варто відзначити, що до відкриття цього дійства також через відео звернення приєдналася Олена Зеленська зі словами подяки «кожному, хто нині допомагає українцям, та уряду Великої Британії за стратегічне партнерство, адже сезон є його справжнім втіленням». Перша леді наголосила, що з початком російської агресії в Україні культурні заходи були відкладені через вагання «чи доречне мистецтво під час війни?» Але згодом зрозуміли, що «саме під час війни... Кожен звук музики, кожен кадр фільму є культурним фронтом, який протистоїть хаосу».

Сезон культури на тему «Future reimagined / Сценарії майбутнього» об'єднав значну розмаїту спільноту митців, діячів культури, творців та освітян з

обох країн для дослідження українсько-британських культур, взаємин із цифровими технологіями й того, яким виглядає майбутнє для всіх залучених у культурні процеси.

Зокрема, метою міжнародної організації Сполученого Королівства Британської Ради є поглиблення культурних зв'язків та освітніх можливостей, сприяння, зокрема, дружньому британсько-українському діалогу та кращому порозумінню у Великій Британії.

Володимир Шейко, генеральний директор Українського інституту, зазначив: «головною метою Сезону культури Велика Британія/Україна було посилення мистецького та культурного обміну між Великою Британією та Україною. Міцні та стійкі партнерські стосунки, які утворилися під час Сезону, не лише призвели до нових мистецьких проєктів, але й згенерували ідеї та плани щодо майбутньої творчої співпраці. Ми пишаємось бути свідками партнерства та проєктів Сезону, оскільки вони продовжують існувати далі та процвітати навіть після закриття». Наприкінці Сезону Британська Рада та Український інститут співпрацювали з Міською Радою Ліверпуля на Євро Фестивалі, що передував Євробаченню 2023. На фестивалі було представлено понад 20 культурних проєктів, значна частина з них – колаборації між українськими та британськими митцями.

З початком російської агресії, українські закордонні студії стали осередками вітчизняної культури не тільки для українців, які вимушено опинилися за кордоном, а й важливим важелем у поширенні інформації про Україну в міжнародній спільноті.

Українські студії, крім наукової діяльності, активно займаються ще й проведенням різних заходів. Зокрема, місією Українського культурного центру Ноттінгема є збереження культурної ідентичності українців у Великій Британії. Одна з найстаріших у країні школа українознавства ім. Лесі Українки організовує різні культурні й освітні заходи для осіб різного віку.

Українці Великої Британії від самого початку російської агресії активно підтримують Україну в боротьбі за вільне життя народу. Протягом війни діаспорна спільнота (активісти) розгорнула широку діяльність у багатьох стратегічних напрямках: організація мітингів у різних містах Великобританії на підтримку України; виконують Гімн України, скандують «Слава Україні», тримають українські прапори та плакати з гаслами: «Stop Putin», «Save Ukraine from Putin's Red Terrorism», «No fly zone over Ukraine now», «putin, Kill Yourself, not Ukraine»; активно поширюють правдиву інформацію про злочинну московську війну в Україні у своїх групах на Facebook.

Отже, культурна дипломатія – формат донесення правдивої інформації про війну в Україні та її культуру. Вона доповнює, продовжує боротьбу, яку ведуть (і в якій, на жаль, гинуть) на фронті українські захисники та захисниці, серед котрих є й багато представників культурної сфери.

Сьогодні українці мають широке вікно можливостей для активної комунікації у світі. Це нагода розкривати себе, пробуджувати інтерес до української культури та України. Але щоб це було максимально ефективно, потрібно «виступати з єдиної узгодженої позиції, а також максимально об'єднувати зусилля культурних інституцій, окремих діячів, дипломатичних установ».

Відтак, британське дипломатичне, інформаційне, культурне співробітництво з Україною є важливим важелем у зупиненні і поверненні назад просування Росії. Завдяки підтримці британського уряду України, з британським народом зміцніють відносини, що сприятиме ще більшому культурному обміну. Однак зважаючи вже на значний масив опублікованих праць з проблематики українсько-британських відносин, обговорюване питання вимагає подальшої наукової розробки, щоб простежити подальші перспективи розширення відносин між двома країнами.

LESSON 10. MULTILATERAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION AUTHORITIES MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

EXERCISE №1. Read the text and translate it into Ukrainian.

1. Recitals The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission; the Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau of the Government of Canada; the New Zealand Commerce Commission; the United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority; the United States Department of Justice; and the United States Federal Trade Commission (the “Participants”) to this Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities (the “Framework”):

1.1. Recognising the 2014 Recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Council concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings, the 2005 OECD Council Recommendation on Merger Review, and the 2019 revised OECD Council Recommendation concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, which promote deeper international cooperation among competition authorities;

1.2. Recognising the existing and ongoing International Competition Network and OECD work on cooperation and that this Framework complements rather than replaces this ongoing work;

1.3. Recognising that the matters they investigate and review increasingly require engagement with counterpart competition authorities in other jurisdictions on issues that benefit from being considered in a broader, cross-border context;

1.4. Recognising that the sharing of information among competition authorities requires relationships of trust and mutual understanding that are supported through informal cooperation and appropriate legal protections;

1.5. Recognising that a consistent cooperation and mutual assistance framework between them can make investigations more effective for the Participants and the subjects of their investigations;

1.6. Recognising that the transparency of their activities is enhanced by ensuring that this Framework and any subsequent agreements made in relation to it are made publicly available; and

1.7. Recognising that their respective jurisdictions all have some form of information sharing legislation that allows for sharing of confidential information in certain circumstances and similar competition law enforcement regimes, including criminal cartel provisions; have come to the following understanding:

2. Definitions

In this Framework, terms have the following definitions:

“Agency Confidential Information” means information that is in the possession of a Participant that it is not prohibited from disclosing by law, but normally treats as non-public.

“Competition Laws” means the law of each Participant’s jurisdiction in relation to cartels and other anti-competitive agreements and arrangements, unilateral conduct or monopolistic practices, and merger control, as amended.

“Framework” means this Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities.

“Investigation” means an enforcement matter, inquiry or review conducted by a Participant pursuant to applicable Competition Laws.

“Investigative Information” means information related to an Investigation that is not in the public domain, which has been either compulsorily acquired by, or provided voluntarily to, a Participant and that the Participant is required to protect from disclosure.

“Model Agreement” means the agreement in Annexure A to this Framework.

“Participants” means the competition authorities that are signatories to this Framework as set out on the signature pages.

3. Cooperation

3.1. Recognising that the Participants can benefit by sharing their experience in developing, applying, and enforcing Competition Laws and competition policies, the

Participants intend to cooperate and provide assistance, including by:

a) exchanging information on the development of competition issues, policies and laws;

b) exchanging experience on competition advocacy and outreach, including to consumers, industry, and government;

c) developing agency capacity and effectiveness by providing advice or training in areas of mutual interest, including through the exchange of officials and through experience-sharing events;

d) sharing best practices by exchanging information and experiences on matters of mutual interest, including enforcement methods and priorities; and

e) collaborating on projects of mutual interest, including via establishing working groups to consider specific issues.

3.2. The Participants are expected to provide assistance and cooperation on Investigations not covered in the Model Agreement or other existing arrangements with similar effect, including with respect to:

a) sharing public information, Agency Confidential Information and Investigative Information permitted to be disclosed by law or by waiver of confidentiality;

b) coordinating their investigative activities;

c) facilitating voluntary witness interviews;

d) providing copies of publicly available records; and

e) other cooperation and assistance as requested.

3.3. Where Agency Confidential Information is provided, the Participant receiving said information will protect the confidentiality of the information and, unless otherwise jointly decided, consistent with applicable law, will return or destroy any records containing said information promptly at the request of the Participant that provided the Agency Confidential Information.

3.4. Participants are expected to provide cooperation and assistance where appropriate and subject to each Participant's reasonably available resources and each Participant's interests.

4. The Model Agreement

4.1. In addition to the cooperation and assistance contemplated under Section 3 of this Framework, the Participants have developed the Model Agreement in Annexure A.

4.2. The Model Agreement addresses the following substantive matters involving the provision of investigative assistance to enhance cooperation: a) the nature of the assistance that can be requested; b) the process for making a request for assistance; c) the maintenance of the confidentiality of any Investigative Information; and d) the scope of permitted use of any Investigative Information shared by the Participants.

4.3. The Participants have developed the Model Agreement in an effort to assist any Participants that wish to pursue enhanced cooperation agreements or arrangements between or among themselves (bilaterally or multilaterally) to pursue the maximum level of assistance possible, respectful of the law of their respective jurisdictions. It is acknowledged that not all Participants may be able to carry out all of the elements of enhanced cooperation envisaged under the Model Agreement.

4.4. The Participants may refer to the Model Agreement as a potential basis for negotiation of bilateral or multilateral agreements, as appropriate to their circumstances, but nothing prevents the Participants from expanding the scope of any such agreement they may negotiate or relying on any existing instruments that deal with matters contained in the Model Agreement.

4.5. The Model Agreement is intended to be broadly reciprocal. If there are limitations on a Participant's ability to reciprocate or restrictions on the assistance that a Participant can provide under the law of its jurisdiction, the Participants are expected to address them as part of negotiations that they may carry out. It is acknowledged that

a Participant is able to implement the Model Agreement only to the extent permissible under the law of its jurisdiction.

5. Framework Committee

5.1. To facilitate the cooperation contemplated by Sections 3 and 4 of this Framework, the Participants intend to establish a committee, with representative(s) from each Participant, to oversee the implementation and monitor the operation of this Framework in a manner to be determined via consensus between them.

6. Functioning of Framework Memorandum of Understanding

6.1. This Framework does not cover, engage, or commit other government entities, or their procedures, beyond the Participants.

6.2. This Framework is not intended to be legally binding and does not give rise to legal rights or obligations under domestic or international law.

7. Effect and Discontinuation

7.1. This Framework becomes effective on the date of its last signature by the Participants.

7.2. A Participant may discontinue its participation in this Framework at any time. A Participant is expected to provide 60 days written notice to the other Participants of its intent to do so. Discontinuation may also be effected by the mutual written consent of the Participants.

8. Review of Framework

8.1. The Participants intend to review the Framework every five years after the Framework takes effect or as otherwise determined by consensus of the Participants.

8.2. The Participants intend to consider such matters as whether this Framework requires any modifications.

8.3. Any changes to this Framework will be made by consensus between the Participants. Signed in six originals at the place and date noted below in the English and French languages, each version being equally valid.

On behalf of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Rod Sims
Chair Place: Date: _____, 2020 _____

On behalf of the Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau of the Government of Canada Matthew Boswell Commissioner of Competition Place: Date: _____, 2020 _____

On behalf of the New Zealand Commerce Commission Anna Rawlings Chair Place: Date: _____, 2020 _____

On behalf of the United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority Andrea Coscelli Chief Executive Place: Date: _____, 2020 _____

On behalf of the United States Department of Justice Makan Delrahim Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division Place: Date: _____, 2020 _____

On behalf of the United States Federal Trade Commission Joseph J. Simons Chairman Place: Date: _____, 2020 _____

ANNEXURE A: MODEL AGREEMENT

[Party A], [Party B], [Party C], [etc.], (the “Parties”),

Noting this Agreement is based on the Model Agreement contained in the Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities, signed by the Parties at [location] on [date] (the “Framework”);

Noting the [list/reference any existing agreements [between] [among] the Parties];

Recognising that the matters they investigate and review increasingly require engagement with counterpart competition authorities in other jurisdictions on issues that benefit from being considered in a broader context;

Recognising that the sharing of confidential or sensitive information [between] [among] competition authorities requires relationships of trust and mutual understanding that are supported through informal cooperation, information sharing, expertise sharing and appropriate legal protections outlined in the Framework;

Recognising the importance of having appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of information and data shared under this Agreement;

Recognising that their respective jurisdictions all have some form of information sharing legislation that allows for sharing of confidential information in certain

circumstances and similar Competition Law enforcement regimes, including criminal cartel provisions;

Recognising that they intend to give full effect to the provisions of this Agreement with a view towards the ultimate objectives of improved international cooperation and information sharing;

Recognising that they will make good faith efforts to respond to requests for cooperation in a timely manner;

and Recognising that procedural fairness in competition investigations is acknowledged internationally as being a foundation of effective and efficient enforcement; agree as follows:

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement:

“Agreement” means this [insert title of bilateral or multilateral agreement here].

“Competition Laws” means the law of each Party in relation to cartels and other anti-competitive agreements, unilateral conduct or monopolistic practices, and merger control, including:

a) For [Party A], the statutes and regulations as set out in Appendix A to this Agreement; and

b) For [Party B], the statutes and regulations as set out in Appendix A to this Agreement;

as well as any subsequent amendments and such other laws as the Parties may agree in writing.

“Investigative Assistance” means the scope of assistance described in Section 3.

“Investigation” means an enforcement matter, inquiry or review conducted by a Party pursuant to applicable Competition Laws.

“Investigative Information” means information related to an investigation that is not in the public domain, which has been either compulsorily acquired by, or provided voluntarily to, a Party and that the Party is required to protect from disclosure.

“Person” means any natural person or legal entity, including corporations, unincorporated associations, trusts, partnerships, or bodies corporate.

“Requesting Party” refers to a Party seeking or receiving Investigative Information or Investigative Assistance pursuant to this Agreement.

“Responding Party” refers to a Party from which Investigative Assistance is sought pursuant to this Agreement.

2. Application of Laws

2.1. This Agreement does not require a Party to act inconsistently with its law.

2.2. This Agreement does not give rise to a right on the part of any private Person.

3. Scope of Investigative Assistance

3.1. The Parties intend to provide Investigative Assistance to each other on a broadly reciprocal basis in facilitating the administration and enforcement of their Competition Laws. If there are limitations on a Party’s ability to reciprocate or restrictions on the assistance that a Party can provide under its law, that Party shall explain such limitations or restrictions.

3.2. The Parties shall provide timely Investigative Assistance to the fullest extent permissible under their respective law.

3.3. Investigative Assistance contemplated by this Agreement includes:

a) disclosing, providing or discussing Investigative Information in the possession of a Party;

b) obtaining Investigative Information at the request of a Party, including: i. taking the testimony or statements of Persons or otherwise obtaining Investigative Information from Persons;

ii. obtaining documents, records, or other forms of Investigative Information;

iii. locating or identifying Persons or things; and

iv. executing searches and seizures; together with disclosing, providing or discussing any such Investigative Information obtained.

3.4. This Agreement does not prevent a Party from seeking Investigative Assistance from or providing Investigative Assistance to the other Party pursuant to other agreements, arrangements, or practices, either in place of or in conjunction with Investigative Assistance that may be provided pursuant to this Agreement.

3.5. Investigative Assistance may be provided whether or not the conduct underlying a request would constitute a violation of the Competition Laws of the Responding Party, unless a Party is prevented from doing so under its law.

3.6. This Agreement does not authorise a Party to compel a Person to provide Investigative Information in violation of a legally applicable right or privilege.

3.7. This Agreement does not affect the ability of a Party to seek information on a voluntary basis from a Person located in the territory of the other Party and does not preclude any such Person from voluntarily providing information to a Party.

4. Requests for Investigative Assistance

4.1. A Party may make a request for Investigative Assistance to a Responding Party. The Parties shall consult and share views on the nature and scope of the Investigative Assistance and the process for carrying out the request prior to and following the request.

4.2. Requests shall be in writing and include, without limitation:

a) a general description of the subject matter and nature of the investigation or proceeding to which the request relates, including identification of the Persons subject to the investigation or proceeding and citations to the specific Competition Laws giving rise to the investigation or proceeding in sufficient detail to explain how the subject matter of the request concerns a possible violation of the Competition Laws in question;

b) a description of the Investigative Assistance sought pursuant to Section 3 and to this Section, including, if applicable and to the extent possible:

i. the identity and location of any Person from whom information is sought, and a description of that Person's relationship to the investigation or proceeding which is the subject of the request;

ii. the subject matter to be addressed in the examination of a witness; iii. a description of the materials requested;

iv. with respect to searches and seizures, a precise description of the place or Person to be searched and of the information or records to be seized;

v. the relevance of the requested assistance to the investigation or proceeding; and

vi. any further information required under the law of the Responding Party;

c) if applicable, a description of procedural or evidentiary requirements bearing on the execution of the request, which may include requirements relating to:

i. the manner in which any testimony or statement is to be taken or recorded, including the participation of counsel;

ii. the administration of oaths; iii. any legal privileges that may be invoked under the law of the Requesting Party that the Requesting Party wishes the Responding Party to respect in executing the request, together with an explanation of the desired method of taking the testimony or provision of evidence to which the privilege(s) may apply;

iv. the authentication of records; v. the desired time period for a response to the request;

vi. requirements for confidential treatment of the request or its contents;

vii. any obligation upon the Requesting Party to retain Investigative Information after the conclusion of an Investigation; and

viii. any other information that may facilitate review or execution of a request.

5. Responses to Requests for Investigative Assistance

5.1. After receiving a request, the Responding Party shall use its best efforts to provide the Requesting Party an initial response within 14 calendar days that:

a) acknowledges receipt of the request;

b) provides an indicative timeline for responding to the request in more detail; and

c) provides, if possible, an early indication of the likelihood of the Responding Party being able to respond to all or part of the request.

5.2. The Responding Party shall execute the request in a timely manner, taking into account the complexity and nature of the Investigative Assistance sought by the Requesting Party, and any particular timing considerations noted by the Requesting Party in its request.

5.3. The Requesting and Responding Parties shall discuss the procedures required for executing the request and any legal requirements and processes for obtaining and handling any Investigative Information.

5.4. The Responding Party shall, to the extent permitted by its law, facilitate the participation in the execution of a request of such officials of the Requesting Party as are specified in the request, including allowing these officials to question the Person giving the testimony or providing the Investigative Information.

5.5. The Responding Party shall provide to the Requesting Party timely updates as to the progress of efforts to secure the Investigative Assistance requested and when it expects to be in a position to provide the Investigative Assistance requested.

5.6. The Responding Party may impose conditions on the Investigative Assistance it provides.

5.7. The Responding Party shall execute the request in the manner established with the Requesting Party to the extent permitted by the Responding Party's law.

5.8. The Requesting Party may modify or supplement a request if the Responding Party consents.

5.9. If the request is for testimony:

a) a Person requested to testify and produce documents, records, or other articles pursuant to this Agreement may be compelled to appear and testify and produce such documents, records, and other articles, in accordance with the requirements of the law of the Responding Party;

b) every Person whose attendance is required for the purpose of giving testimony pursuant to this Agreement is entitled to such fees and allowances as may be provided for by the law of the Responding Party;

c) upon request by the Requesting Party, the Responding Party shall furnish information in advance about the date and place of the taking of testimony or the production of evidence pursuant to this Agreement;

d) the Responding Party shall, to the extent permitted by its law, comply with any instructions of the Requesting Party made pursuant to Section 4 with respect to any claims of legal privilege or immunity under the law of the Requesting Party; and

e) the Responding Party shall permit a Person whose testimony is to be taken pursuant to this Section, to have counsel present during the testimony, to the fullest extent appropriate under its law.

6. Privileged Information

6.1. Each Party shall respect its own law with respect to legal rights and privileges when requesting or providing Investigative Information and shall endeavour not to request or provide Investigative Information that it knows is protected by any legal right or privilege in the other Party's jurisdiction.

6.2. If the Responding Party transmits any Investigative Information that is later identified as privileged or protected against self-incrimination under its law, the Requesting Party shall ensure that it does not use such information for the purposes of the enforcement of its Competition Laws and shall use all appropriate procedures to limit the disclosure of such information in other contexts, except when after discussion with the Responding Party it has been determined that any such privilege or protection against self-incrimination has been waived or otherwise lost.

6.3. If the Requesting Party discovers that it has received Investigative Information from the Responding Party that is privileged or protected against self-incrimination under the law of the Requesting Party, the Requesting Party shall treat this information in accordance with its law protecting such information.

7. Authentication and Certification

7.1. Investigative Information transmitted by the Responding Party pursuant to this Agreement shall be authenticated in accordance with the requirements of the law

of the Requesting Party, insofar as these requirements are consistent with the law of the Responding Party.

7.2. When a request is to be executed by means of the search or seizure of information, the request shall include such information as is necessary to justify such action under the law of the Responding Party. Upon request, the Responding Party shall ensure that its officials who have custody of information seized pursuant to this Agreement certify the continuity of custody, the identity of the evidence, and the integrity of its condition; the Responding Party shall furnish such certifications in the form specified by the Requesting Party.

8. Costs

8.1. The Parties shall mutually decide on a case-by-case basis who will pay the costs associated with executing a request, including costs associated with staff time and any disbursements.

8.2. If during the execution of a request it becomes apparent that expenses of an amount substantially more than anticipated in Sub-section 8.1 above are required to fulfil the request, the Parties shall consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the request may be executed.

8.3. The Parties shall decide on practical measures on a case-by-case basis for the management and payment of costs in conformity with this Section.

9. Handling of Investigative Information at Conclusion of Matter

9.1. Unless the Parties otherwise determine, at the conclusion of the investigation or proceeding specified in a request, the Requesting Party shall, upon the request of the Responding Party or as required by its law, return or destroy all Investigative Information obtained pursuant to the execution of a request under this Agreement, along with all copies thereof, in the possession or control of the Requesting Party, subject to any legal obligations to retain the documents.

9.2. Investigative Information that has lawfully become public is no longer subject to the requirement in Sub-section 9.1.

9.3. A Responding Party may request that Investigative Information be returned or destroyed before the conclusion of an investigation or proceeding upon termination of this Agreement for an unauthorized disclosure or use as outlined in Section 13.

10. Limitations on Assistance

10.1. The Responding Party may deny or postpone Investigative Assistance in whole or in part if it determines that:

- a) a request is not made in accordance with this Agreement;
- b) execution of the request would exceed its reasonably available resources;
- c) execution of the request would be contrary to its law or other important interests; or
- d) the Requesting Party is unable to give assurances with regard to confidentiality or the purposes for which the information will be used.

10.2. Before denying or postponing a request, the Responding Party shall consult with the Requesting Party to determine whether Investigative Assistance may be given in whole or in part subject to terms and conditions. When a request is denied in whole or in part, the Responding Party shall provide an explanation for the denial.

10.3. If the Requesting Party accepts Investigative Assistance subject to terms and conditions, it shall comply with those terms and conditions.

11. Confidentiality

11.1. Each Party represents that the confidentiality of Investigative Information communicated and received under this Agreement is protected by its law and procedures, that its law and procedures are sufficient to securely maintain the confidentiality of Investigative Information provided under this Agreement, and that the Parties are themselves subject to the confidentiality restrictions imposed by their respective law and procedures.

11.2. Except as otherwise provided by this Section and Section 12, each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible and consistent with its law, maintain confidentiality of any Investigative Information communicated and received under this Agreement,

including the fact that a request for Investigative Information has been communicated or received.

11.3. Each Party shall protect Investigative Information received under this Agreement from disclosure to the fullest extent possible under its law, as determined by the Party, except as outlined in Sub-section 11.4 and Sub-section 11.5.

11.4. This Agreement does not prevent disclosure of Investigative Information received under this Agreement: a) to Persons that are subject to an enforcement proceeding brought by a Requesting Party if such disclosure is required by its law as determined by the Requesting Party; b) to courts and tribunals in the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding; or c) when the Requesting Party advises the Responding Party it is required to do so under its law.

11.5. Investigative Information received pursuant to this Agreement that has been disclosed by virtue of Sub-section 11.4 and that has been made public consistent with the terms of this Section may thereafter be used by the Requesting Party for any purpose consistent with its law.

11.6. The Requesting Party shall notify the Responding Party at least 14 calendar days in advance of any proposed disclosure under Sub-section 11.4, or, if such notice cannot be given because of a court or tribunal order, then as promptly as possible.

12. Limitations on Use

12.1. Except as provided by this Section and Sections 9 and 11:

a) Investigative Information provided to the Requesting Party pursuant to this Agreement may be disclosed or used by the Requesting Party solely to administer or enforce its Competition Laws with respect to the investigation specified in the request and for the purpose stated in the request;

b) Investigative Information obtained pursuant to this Agreement may only be disclosed or used by the Requesting Party to administer and enforce its Competition Laws with respect to a different investigation or for a different purpose than stated in the request with the consent of the Responding Party; and

c) Investigative Information obtained pursuant to this Agreement may only be disclosed or used by the Requesting Party with respect to the administration and enforcement of laws other than its Competition Laws with the consent of the Responding Party.

13. Unauthorized Disclosures

13.1. Unauthorized disclosure or use of Investigative Information provided to a Party pursuant to this Agreement shall, upon discovery, be reported immediately to the Responding Party by the Requesting Party.

13.2. The Parties shall promptly consult on steps to minimize any harm resulting from such disclosure or use and to ensure that unauthorized disclosure or use of Investigative Information does not recur.

13.3. Unauthorized disclosure or use of Investigative Information provided under this Agreement is a ground for immediate termination of this Agreement by the Responding Party, in accordance with the procedures set out in Sub-section 15.4.

14. Changes in Applicable Law

14.1. The Parties shall provide to each other prompt written notice of any significant modifications to their relevant Competition Laws or relevant confidentiality laws and procedures.

14.2. In the event of a significant modification to any relevant Competition Laws or relevant confidentiality laws and procedures, the Parties shall promptly consult to determine whether this Agreement should be amended or terminated.

15. Entry into Force, Amendments, Termination of Agreement

15.1. This Agreement enters into force on the date of the last signature of the Parties.

15.2. Investigative Assistance under this Agreement shall be available for requests concerning conduct occurring before, as well as after, this Agreement enters into force.

15.3. This Agreement may be amended, in writing, by the mutual agreement of the Parties.

15.4. A Party may terminate this Agreement by giving 60 calendar days written notice to the other Party or by giving immediate written notice pursuant to Sub-section 13.3. This Agreement may also be terminated by mutual written consent of the Parties.

15.5. The obligations set out in Sections 9, 11, 12 and 13 remain in effect despite termination of this Agreement.

15.6. Upon termination of this Agreement, all materials or information provided pursuant to this Agreement still in the possession or control of a Requesting Party shall be managed consistent with Section 9.

[Signature block to be settled between the Parties]

16 Appendix A [Insert list of competition laws here, as per definition of Competition Laws in the Model Agreement]

EXERCISE №2. Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

EXERCISE №3. Translate the text into English.

ВЕЛИКА БРИТАНІЯ ТА УКРАЇНА ПІДПИСУЮТЬ 100-РІЧНЕ ПАРТНЕРСТВО: ПОГЛИБЛЕННЯ БЕЗПЕКОВИХ ЗВ'ЯЗКІВ ТА ЗМІЦНЕННЯ ПАРТНЕРСТВА ДЛЯ МАЙБУТНІХ ПОКОЛІНЬ

Велика Британія та Україна підпишуть історичну угоду про партнерство під час візиту Прем'єр-міністра до України та зустрічі з Президентом Володимиром Зеленським.



- Угода сприятиме військовому співробітництву в галузі морської безпеки через нову структуру для посилення безпеки в Балтійському, Чорному та Азовському морях і стримування триваючої російської агресії;
- 100-річне партнерство об'єднає експертів для розвитку науково-технологічного партнерства в галузі охорони здоров'я та боротьби з хворобами, агротеху, космосу і дронів, а також створить тривалу дружбу через шкільні проєкти.
- Також буде запущено нову схему перевірки зерна для відстеження вкраденого збіжжя з окупованих українських територій, розроблену Великою Британією

Велика Британія та Україна підпишуть історичну угоду про партнерство під час візиту Прем'єр-міністра, під час якого той зустрінеться з Президентом Володимиром Зеленським.

Непорушні зв'язки між Великою Британією та Україною будуть офіційно оформлені через знакову угоду про 100-річне партнерство, яка розширить і поглибить відносини в оборонній та невійськовій сферах та забезпечить тісніші зв'язки між двома країнами.

Від спільної роботи на світовій арені до подолання бар'єрів для торгівлі та зростання, розвитку культурних зв'язків, Велика Британія та Україна відстоюватимуть інтереси одна одної задля оновлення, перебудови та реформ для майбутніх поколінь.

Партнерство є основою непохитного лідерства Прем'єр-міністра та уряду, які продовжують підтримувати Україну. Угода охоплює дев'ять ключових

напрямоків та поглиблюватиме інновації, силу та стійкість, які Україна продемонструвала, захищаючись від незаконного та варварського вторгнення Росії, підтримає довгострокову безпеку та зростання обох наших країн. Сам Договір і політична декларація, які складають Угоду про 100-річне партнерство, будуть представлені в парламенті найближчими тижнями.

Очікується, що партнерство посилить військову співпрацю щодо морської безпеки через нову структуру для зміцнення безпеки Балтійського, Чорного та Азовського морів і стримування триваючої російської агресії, об'єднає експертів для розвитку науково-технологічного партнерства у сферах охорони здоров'я та боротьби з хворобами, агротеху, космосу та дронів, а також створить тривалу дружбу через шкільні проєкти.

Це також посилює позицію Сполученого Королівства як бажаного партнера для української енергетичного сектору України, стратегії використання критичних корисних копалин і екологічного виробництва сталі.

100-річне партнерство – це важливий крок до довгострокової безпеки України та гарантування того, що вона більше ніколи не буде вразлива до подібної жорстокості з боку Росії, і зобов'язання стояти пліч-о-пліч із суверенною Україною протягом наступного століття.

Україна має висококваліфіковану армію та успішний технологічний сектор, який швидко розробляє та розгортає сучасне боєдатне обладнання. Партнерство з Україною у сфері безпеки зробить Британію сильнішою.

Очікується, з нагоди підписання угоди про партнерство Прем'єр-міністр оголосить про новий пакет підтримки Великої Британії для України – від військової допомоги до підтримки економіки.

Прем'єр-міністр Кір Стармер сказав:

Прагнення Путіна відірвати Україну від її найближчих партнерів виявилось величезним стратегічним провалом. Натомість ми ближчі, ніж будь-коли, і це партнерство виведе цю дружбу на новий рівень.

Мова не лише про сьогодні, а й про інвестиції в наші дві країни на наступне століття, об'єднання технологічного прогресу та наукових досягнень, культурного обміну, а також використання феноменальних інновацій, продемонстрованих Україною за останні роки для прийдешніх поколінь.

Не можна недооцінювати силу нашої багаторічної дружби. Підтримка оборони України від варварського вторгнення Росії та відбудови процвітаючого, суверенного майбутнього є життєво важливою для основи безпеки цього уряду та нашого Плану змін.

Завдяки цьому партнерству ми створюємо сильну економіку, яка працює на користь британського народу, безпечну країну, яка захищає наші інтереси вдома та за кордоном, і процвітаюче суспільство.

Прем'єр-міністр сьогодні приєднається до дистанційного уроку між українським класом та початкової школи в Ліверпулі де чекатиме Міністерка освіти Бріджит Філіпсон. Він почує від молодшого покоління про те, як партнерство забезпечить краще майбутнє для дітей обох країн, сприяючи культурним обмінам і навчанню для молоді.

Протягом наступних місяців 100 шкіл у Великій Британії та Україні побудують партнерства в рамках двосторонньої програми, яка заснована навколо читання на дозвіллі. Ділячись історіями, якими просякнуті культури обох країн, вони досліджуватимуть силу читання, щоб долати виклики, будуючи зв'язки між країнами для майбутніх поколінь.

Також очікується, що відвідавши українську лікарню, Прем'єр-міністр особисто побачить, як британська допомога підтримує українців, які живуть під бомбардуваннями. Він зустрінеться з пацієнтами та лікарями і послухає, як використання 100 млн фунтів гуманітарного фінансування від Сполученого Королівства допомагає забезпечити потреби по всій Україні та спеціалізовану медичну допомогу постраждалим від опіків, у тому числі тих, хто отримав поранення від російських ракет, що упали на житлові райони.

Медичні заклади підтримують фахівці Національної служби охорони здоров'я Британії, які підвищують кваліфікацію українських медичних бригад і надають життєво важливі консультації щодо лікування тяжко поранених пацієнтів, як віртуально, так і під час короткочасних відряджень до України. Багато людей, які потрапляють до лікарні, мають опіки від 30% до 40% поверхні тіла.

Прем'єр-міністр також оголосить про виділення 40 млн фунтів на нову програму відновлення економіки, щоб розблокувати сотні мільйонів приватного кредитування для підтримки зростання та економічної стійкості малого та середнього бізнесу в Україні, який є основою економіки країни.

Програма створить можливості для британських компаній, підтримуючи ключові сектори, що розвиваються в Україні, відкриваючи додаткові торгові та інвестиційні можливості з одним із наших найближчих союзників. Фінансування буде спрямовано на підприємства, які підтримують зелену економіку, жінок, ветеранів та маргіналізовані групи.

Сподіваємося, що в довгостроковій перспективі програма під назвою TIGER (Стимулювання інвестиційного зростання та економічної стійкості) зменшить залежність українських громад від гуманітарної підтримки та допоможе розвинути економічну стійкість.

У рамках партнерства також буде запущено нову Схему перевірки зерна для відстеження вкраденого зерна з окупованих територій України. Велика Британія розробила нову схему після прохання України до G7 про допомогу у відстеженні викраденого зерна з українських полів з територій, які перебувають під контролем Росії, яке потім перемаркується та продається далі.

Використовуючи передову науку, щоб допомогти визначити, де вирощували та збирали зерно, Британія розробила базу даних для підтримки зусиль України щодо відстеження та припинення крадіжки зерна з окупованих регіонів.

Україна залишається основним постачальником сільськогосподарської продукції та має вирішальне значення для глобальної продовольчої безпеки. Базу даних буде передано Україні Міністром екології найближчими тижнями.

Сьогоднішнє оголошення засноване на пакеті підтримки в розмірі 12,8 млрд фунтів, який Велика Британія надала Україні. Він включає військову допомогу в розмірі 7,8 млрд, зобов'язання надавати військову допомогу в розмірі 3 млрд доки це буде потрібно, і постійну підтримку енергетичної інфраструктури для допомоги лікарням і громадським об'єктам, аби забезпечити світлом і теплом невинних мирних жителів, які постраждали від вторгнення Путіна.

Велика Британія та Україна використовуватимуть щорічний Стратегічний діалог на високому рівні, щоб забезпечити прогрес у партнерстві на десятиліття вперед.